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Readers of international relations or "deterrence" literature
are familiar with the proposition that the " actual amount " of power
available to a state may not be as important in peacetime as its
perceived military capability. If a state is viewed as being
strong, then those views -- and not its "true" military strength --
may be decisive for reassuring allies and compelling or deterring
foes. Conversely, if it is accepted as weak or weakening, then
allies may become nervous and foes more bold.
American policy-makers have recently shown renewed interest in
the significance of perceived power. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger,
for example, in writinq about the strategic nuclear balance called
upon the United States to
maintain capabilities such that everyone -- friend, foe, and
domestic audience alike -- will perceive that we are the equal
of our strongest competitors. We should not take the chance
that, in this most hazardous of areas, misperceptions could
lead to miscalculation, confrontation, and crisis.
He reiterated the same theme again when writing about the naval
balance:
XII
...the naval forces of the Soviet Union and its allies are
not generally superior to those of the United States and its
allies, and ...this should be perceived by well-informed
observers J
This book accepts that perceptions are important in peacetime
and that perceptions of U.S. -Soviet power'are particularly worthy of
investigation. It aims to make a contribution in two areas: (1)
helping systematize the research field centering on these perceptions,
and (2) offering empirically-based conclusions as to the comparative
ranking of the superpowers in perceived strength, the factors which
condition those views, and the policy consequences flowing from them
in the minds of perceivers.
Part one is devoted to analytical, methodological, and overall
policy considerations. The first chapter presents a "general map"
of the research field as it raises and organizes questions and problems
faced by an analyst. The second chapter provides the rationale for
arguing that U.S. policy-makers should more consciously consider the
perceptions impact of force development and deployment decisions, and
the third recommends a procedure which builds upon the perceptions of
experts to measure where countries stand in specific weapons systems
balances.
Part two is substantive in nature, and its six chapters illustrate
the use of different research methods and sources. The focus is on
American, Soviet, British, French, German, Japanese, and Arab views of
xm
various superpower balances with overall military and strateqic
capabilities most often being the objects of their views.
Part three has only one chapter. It highlights and draws
together some of the findings presented in part two.
There are many books which describe the military capabilities
of the United States or Soviet Union, but there are few which deal
with how those capabil itites are perceived. If any part of this
book stimulates the reader to push further and develop more sophisticated
research techniques or contribute to a cumulative base of evidence,







PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. -SOVIET BALANCE:




This paper outlines some of the analytical and practical problems
involved in work on perceptions of the U.S.-S.U. military balance.
Since the aim is to raise and systematize questions and problems, the
paper is singularly abstract and dataless. Like a blank check, its
utility depends on being filled in; and, of course, this is the
objective of ongoing empirical work. A general map of the area may
seem a dispensable luxury. However, as interest and work grow, some
systemization of the field is useful to bring order and economy into
research programs.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF PERCEPTIONS
Let us begin by clarifying certain nonsubstantive characteristics
of perceptions of the military balance.
'Perception' in the present context is used in a figurative sense.
Technically, 'percepts' and 'perceptions' are central elaborations of
sensory inputs. 'Perceptions' of the U.S.-S.U. balance do result from
reading or hearing something, but the sensory or perceptual input
simply plays the role of a medium and is not the object of attention.
A line in a newspaper is perceived, but its meaning is not a percept.
In short, 1 perception ' of the military balance could just as well be
called 'beliefs,' 'ideas,' 'impressions,' 'convictions' depending on
the nuance one wishes to convey. This excursion into semantics prob-
ably should be unnecessary, but suggestions sometimes made that psy-
chological theories of perception provide a useful background for
analysis of perceptions of the military balance is, in my view, mis-
leading. It transforms a fiqurative use of 'perception' into a literal
or technical use. This area of study could equally well be called
"Beliefs About the Military Balance." Presumably the "Psychology of
Perception" would then be displaced by the "Psychology of Belief."
This certainly would be more appropriate.
'Perception' of military power makes more literal sense in those
cases where observers are at a military review or military maneuvers or
are present on a battlefield or at a naval or air demonstration.
Indeed interesting substantive questions revolve precisely around
physical visible military demonstrations and concern the differential
impact of a statement about military power and a physical perception
of it. The substantial impact that a physical demonstration of a
weapon often has results, no doubt, from the fact that this j_s_ a per-
ception and not just a statement. Evidently, however, in most contexts
in which one speaks of perceptions of military power, 'perception' is
a figurative substitute for 'beliefs about.'
Any attempt to convey perceptions of the US- SLU. balance (either
by the perceiver to an investigator or by the investigator to his
readers) runs the danger of givinq the description greater exactness
and sharpness of contour than existed in the original perception.
The exigencies of exposition and communication put a premium on
reducing fuzziness or vagueness that may have existed in the original
perception. This vagueness may be a more important characteristic
of the perception than its substantive content. What is often required
is an exact description of confusion. Confusion may lend itself much
more than precise and well-ordered knowledge to manipulation and pro-
vide a richer field both in crises and in stable situations for the
political use of military forces.
The question, what is the US.-S.U. strateqic, naval, or NATO
balance?, evokes an image of a balance and a needle moving along a
scale and thus implies a quantitative answer in a single dimension,
or, more briefly, a single number. Obviously, of course, perceptions
of US,-SU military power (even in a single sector, strateqic, naval,
etc.) may be more complex than this. The better informed a person
is the more his perception of US. and Soviet military power is likely to
be expressed by a set of statements not always reducible to a few
summary propositions. That a person may agree with one or more
propositions about the balance does not necessarily mean that they
are an adequate account or his perception of the balance.
The breadth or narrowness of an individual's conception of the
military balance may vary according to the amount of information he
has; but it may also result from varying conceptions of what is relevant
to an appreciation of the U.S.-SU. strategic, NATO, or naval balance.
Accounts of perceptions of the U.S-S.U. military balance should
indicate, where at all possible, their degree of stability. This is
particularly important in investigating the impact of a particular
event on beliefs. Whether the effect endures for a day, a week, a
month, or longer, is obviously of capital importance. Our interest in
the stability of opinions will vary according to whether we are dealing
with a crisis situation, a slowly evolving situation, or a guite stable
international context. In crisis situations, knowledge of the perception
of r" the balance may be important even though the perception may change
radically during the course of the crisis or have little enduring
effect after it. Both the special interest attaching to perceptions
during a crisis and the difficulty that may exist in studying them at
that time, raise questions concerning the feasibility of predicting
changes in perception during crises from their pre-crisis status.
Whether long-term swings in the perception of the military balance are
the product of relatively stable perceptions undergoing slow evolution
or are the product of a series of sharp shocks to beliefs is an
empirical question of considerable theoretical and practical interest.
The stability-instability of perceptions has, of course, to be related
to the stability-instability of the underlying reality.
Instability of perceptions may not be related to changinq
political or military environments. Perception changes may represent
instability in the data gathering process, but they may also — and,
of course, it is this that interests us -- reflect a low level of
attention, conviction and clarity in the views of the people we
are interviewing or observing. An elicited description of perceptions
is sometimes a casual and unstable expression invented to provide an
answer.
Perceptions of the military balance should be distinguished by
the degree of confidence attached to them by the perceiver. Persons
whose perceptions show considerable instability may nonetheless attach
a high measure of confidence to them. The confidence or lack of con-
fidence that the perceiver has in his perceptions may affect attention
to and absorption of information on the balance.
Generally we do not include, in speaking about perceptions of the
military balance, any emotion or affect attached to these beliefs', that
is, we treat the perception of the balance as purely coqnitive and not
an affective event. The degree of confidence that a person has in his
perception already moves us into areas that are not purely cognitive.
Perception of the military balance may be accompanied in varying
degrees by fear, pride, anger, or other affects. These aspects of the
perception may not always be easy to observe, but they must be presumed
to affect the character of present and future perceptions.
We often think of perceptions of the military balance as repre-
senting comparisons of capabilities at a given time point. In fact,
when we examine newspaper and journal materials, we find that much
of what is written about the balance of military power deals with
who is gaining on whom. Thus an important component of perceptions of
the military balance is the direction and rate of change in military
capabilities. If one is behind, it is useful to keep emphasizing a
greater rate of growth, and this, or course, is what the Soviets have
done in making economic comparisons between themselves and the United
States. In the military field, they were not inclined to use this type
of presentation since they did not like, in the past, to acknowledge
their great inferiority in strategic and naval capabilities. U.S.
spokesmen, on the other hand, have been \/ery free in providing state-
ments concerning the Soviet Union catching up with the United States
or surpassing it, so that a good deal of U.S. and world discussion has
been in terms of rates of change. In any event, perception of the
military balance may, for many perceivers, be essentially (a) a per-
ception of impending changes in the balance, and (b) an imputation of
superiority to the side with the greatest growth rate.
The relation of perceptions to reality is important in differ-
entiating the perceptions of various groups, in judging their poten-
tial political consequences, and in considering means of bringing
perceptions into closer (or more distant) alignment with reality.
The correspondence of perceptions to reality or their deviations from
it increase considerably in interest when we know the information
sources to which the perceiver has been exposed and the correspondence
of those sources to reality.
There are several difficulties in relating perceptions to reality.
First of all, perceptions as noted earlier, are often so vague and complex
that whether or not they correspond to reality is not easily assessed.
Second, some aspects of perceptions (such as the affect that accom-
panies them) cannot be related to reality in the sense of being
measured against it. Third, and more important, perceptions of the
military balance are not always in the form of simple factual state-
ments. That the Soviet Union has so many more missiles than the
United States may be easily assessed against reality. However, many
of the perceptions of military reality, as one meets them in articles,
editorials, and other sources, do not correspond with any readily
defined "reality." Perceptions of the balance, for instance, may take
the form of predictions that the United States or Soviet Union could win
an intercontinental strategic war or make a successful first strike, or
could do a variety of other things more effectively than the other side
if conditions so necessitated. Obviously, such statements cannot now
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be verified against "reality." Even statements that have a past or
present time reference can also provide the same difficulties.
Statements that refer to the past or present military worth of, say,
French nuclear capabilities are not statements on whose "reality
status" there will be ready agreement.
When no clear understanding of "reality" exists in a given
situation, the observation and discussion of people's perceptions are
likely to be distorted because the investigator's own vague "reality"
differs from the vague "reality" of his subjects and influences his
perceptions of the subject's perceptions. Thus a psychiatrist who
thought we were close to a nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis
viewed a calm attitude toward the crisis by his subjects as representing
a psychiatrically alarming perception of the situation.
There are, of course, a substantial number of relatively clear-
cut aspects of the military reality and the problems just indicated
do not prevent us from analyzing how well perceptions of the military
balance correspond with these more measurable aspects.
DIFFERING MILITARY BALANCES AS OBJECTS OF PERCEPTIONS
In inquiring into perceptions of (a) the strategic balance, (b)
the NATO balance, (c) the naval balance, or (d) the global, overall
balance, we must recognize that these divisions and their definitions
are those of the investiqator and do not necessarily preexist in the
minds of our subjects. Presumably we can get our subjects, if we
interview them, to consider the balance separately in various military
sectors and in the terms that we specify, but we should remember that
these may be our constructions, not theirs. This consideration is
also pertinent in describing perceptions reported in the various media.
We may be able to sort out statements made in an editorial or in a
political speech or in an article into several sectors (strategic,
naval, etc.), but these divisions may not have had much independent
existence in the mind of the writer. This, of course, does not mean
it is unjustified to do the sorting out. It only means that the con-
clusions we draw may be different according to whether it is we or the
writer who do the sorting. Thus, the statements of some subjects may
reflect only a view concerning a vague, overall balance and may not be
accompanied by any sense of or any conviction about individual sector
balances, even though some statements may permit classification by the
investigator into various military sectors.
The investigator's own definition of the military balance may also
vary in different research contexts. Thus sector divisions and defini-
tions appropriate for studying some types of subjects (mass, leaders;
naive, sophisticated, etc.) may not be appropriate for others. Or the
definition of the balance during a crisis may differ Prom one used in
a steady-state period in order to emphasize certain components that
have special relevance in particular confrontations.
The Strategic Balance
From the investigator's standpoint, the term "strategic balanr.p"
generally refers to capabilities for nuclear intercontinental war.
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"Capabilities" may be characterized by number of bombs, warheads,
and carriers, by accuracy and reliability, by active defenses, civil
defense, and vulnerability to first-attack, by command and control,
warning, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Evidently even a very summary account of these aspects of Soviet or
US. capabilities together with even the most simplified account of
their dynamic interactions would take several rather substantial
paragraphs or pages. The attempt to establish equivalences between
categories for both the Soviet Union and the United States might require
a good deal of further elaboration. Any serious attempt to reduce these
multiform capabilities to a few abbreviated strategic "capability
coefficients" would require a forbiddingly complex set of intellectual
operations and justifications. Such comparisons might require inputing
the same purpose to the strategic capabilities of the United States and
the Soviet Union, an imputation which our subjects may or may not make.
The investigator may not reduce the components of the strategic
balance to a simple expression, but this does not mean that it is
necessarily a difficult task for his subjects. Their lesser sophis-
tication, more limited information or simply lesser preoccupation may
make it possible for them to reduce a complex reality to a simple
expression. Even specialists in military affairs may not integrate
all relevant components of the balance into their 'perceDtion. ' This
does not exclude them from having a rough weighting system and a
'coefficient' of strategic capability.
Two different accounts by subjects should be distinguished:
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(i) that which the subject provides without constant prodding by the
investigator, that is, what the subject provides more or less spontan-
eously, and (ii) statements elicited only under more detailed question-
ing. Whether the latter are to be viewed as part of the subject's
'perception' will depend on the uses to which their accounts are going
to be put.
It is likely that for many persons military capabilities in the
sense of materiel are less understandable or less interesting or rele-
vant than notions concerning what each nation can do to the other. A
view that the Russians have more ICBMs than the United States may be
ignored, and if not ignored it may nonetheless be associated with the
view that the Soviet Union would not dare to engage in a first-strike
or risk other types of military undertakings. Particular beliefs
concerning deterrence (or nondeterrence) may be associated with a
wide range of capabilities imputed to the United States and the Soviet
Union.
In addition to beliefs concerning what each country might be
able to undertake are beliefs concerning the outcomes of such under-
takings. Who would "win the war" if there were an intercontinental
war, or who would suffer least damage may be the principal modes in
which some subjects perceive the strategic balance. It may be possible
to trace such beliefs to prior beliefs about weapon systems, but
beliefs about 'who would win' may shape beliefs about the materiel
balance and not the other way around. Ideas concerning what each nation
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can or cannot do, in both military and political uses, with their
capabilities may represent the real characterization of military
strength that individuals carry around in their heads.
These considerations could lead us to include national will in
perceptions of the military balance. Similarly, technological ingenuity
and economic resources may be viewed as important components of military
power, particularly when relative military power is viewed as a
developing and changing status. The perceived direction of this change
may affect the perception of the current strategic balance.
The NATO Central Front Balance
Compared with the strategic sector, the NATO Central Front
balance probably involves a more complex set of capabilities,
especially because of manpower and mobilization factors, political
and alliance relations, troop and population morale, the longer time
period over which, in the event of war, military capabilities would
probably be exercised, and the numerous interactions over this longer
period of time of all the complex strategical and tactical elements
that compose warfare involving large numbers of troops with all their
supporting arms and services. Room for the intervention of the unpre-
dictable seems particularly great in NATO scenarios.
All these factors affect not only the definition of the central
front balance but render extraordinarily difficult the task of arriv-
ing at a statement of the "real" or "true" balance with which perceptions
are to be compared. This difficulty already existed in the strateqic
sector but is almost certainly magnified in the NATO case. Thus, for
example, the "real" balance certainly is affected, on the NATO side,
n
by the reliability with which alliance forces would, in the event of
war, perform their roles, and on the Soviet side, on whether the non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact forces fight loyally with the Soviets, do not fight
at all, or actively sabotage Soviet military action. Not only will
the "real" balance be different according to the; probabil ity of these
events, but the perceived balance will similarly vary as one or another
perceiver attaches more or less importance or plausibility to this or
that factor.
The tendency to use numerical indices (number of divisions,
number of aircraft, number of tanks, etc.) may occur here just as it
can and does occur in many perceptions of the strategic balance. But
in the NATO case perceivers are more likely to give weight to
factors such as morale and political forces. These may produce a
perception of the balance that deviates markedly from a perception
based largely on materiel and manpower, that is, on material forces.
Strategic balance is likely to be viewed by most perceivers in
terms of its significance for an intercontinental nuclear war having
relatively few major variants. The NATO balance may, on the contrary,
be viewed through a greater range of possibilities -- a full tactical
nuclear war on all NATO fronts down to a "border straightening" opera-
tion. In any event, perceptions of the NATO balance probably should
be described relative to various strategic objectives of the two sides,
and this will require investigating these objectives as they exist in
the perceiver' s mind (if their spontaneous statements are being
examined) or perhaps imposing a specific definition of these objectives
on the perceivers (if they are being interviewed).
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It is possible, of course, to assess U.S. and Soviet forces in t.prms
of some abstract definition of strength that ignores any particular
use or application of them. The balance then is viewed as a function
of certain characteristics (such as number, speed, accuracy, weight,
reliability) whose goodness is a linear function of the size
of the numbers and bears no specified relation to any objective or
situation. This abstract, rather than war fighting, characterization
of the forces is less likely to dominate perceptions of the NATO bal-
ance than it does perceptions of the strategic balance.
The Naval Balance
To some extent the naval balance is not easily separable
from the strategic balance since the latter includes the sea-launched
missile forces and capabilities for operating against them. Like
the strategic and NATO balance, the naval balance may present itself
to subjects not as a certain set of forces but rather in terms of who
is capable of doing what to whom. The perceived relation between
physical and functional capabilities may be far from simple.
People may carry around images of strategic intercontinental
conflicts and NATO wars as independent forms of conflict, but are not
so likely to think of naval warfare as occuring independently of
either a NATO conflict or an overall strategic war. A limited naval
warfare in some portion of the globe certainly is not to be excluded
but it is an empirical guestion whether many people think of the naval
balance in this way. On the other hand, naval forces are readily
viewed as assisting in local interventions in various parts of the
world. The strength of U.S. and Soviet strategic and European forces are
15
most readily viewed in terms of the outcome of a conflict between
them, but the "goodness" or strength of U.S. and Soviet naval forces can
easily be viewed in many circumstances in terms of each nation's
relative ability to perform vis-a-vis a third party rather than atgainst
each other. In this sense U.S. and Soviet naval forces may be .compared
in the same way as one compares U.S. and Soviet airlift capabilities in
contexts not implying an open conflict between the two countries.
The Global Balance
For the most part, military specialist may be most at home
in speaking of a military balance in various sectors such as the
strategic sector, the European (NATO) theater, or the naval sector.
Other perceivers of the military scene may, however, have images
or beliefs concerning some overall global military balance. This
seems to be involved in various expressions concerning shifts in
"global power," who can force the world to do its bidding, or who is
riding the wave of the future. The "global balance," to the extent
that it corresponds to a real image or idea in people's minds, is
probably more of a compound of military, political and economic
power than is true of the three individual sector balances considered
so far. It probably has a heavy strategic component. Perceptions
of "global power," where they. exist, may be the product of perceptions
of sector balances, but the inverse causality is not at all implausible,
16
PERCEIVERS
The principal classes of subjects, that is, perceivers, in which
we may be interested are:
Political leaders. How narrowly or broadly we define this
group will depend on the political structure of the country with which
we are dealing. We will generally want to include here the principal
advisers, official and unofficial, of the political leaders. One must
recognize that their public statements on the military balance will not
necessarily represent their views.
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Bureaucracy. Certain sectors of officialdom, especially in such
areas as national defense and foreign affairs are clearly of interest,
both because of their independent influence and their advice and in-
formation-giving functions to policy and decision-making levels.
Military. The military of a country are of interest for several
reasons -- as advisers to the government and as planners and decision-
makers whose decisions and policies may be influenced by. their per-
ceptions of the balance.
Parliamentarians. Parliamentarians are important because of
their policy and legislative responsibilities and their influence on
budgetary matters. Their accessibility through parliamentary debates
and political speeches, and their possible predictive value for the
perceptions of the less accessible political leaders give them con-
siderable importance.
"The Literati." Here I include journalists, academicians, pub-
licists, professional national security writers and analysts, and the
like. This is probably an important group in influencing almost all
other groups whose opinions are of interest. The effect of literati
perceptions can hardly be understood simply by examining their opinions
and the degree of agreement and disagreement among them. The influence
of the literati requires fairly intensive investigation of the ways in
which literati discussions, pronouncements, and debates affect each
other and finally enter into other forms of literature and into the
minds of the political classes, various special elites, and the public.
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Because of their actual or potential influence, the sources of the
perceptions of the literati is a subject of capital importance. The
role of political figures and government officials in influencing
literati perceptions of the balance is of particular importance, and
probably varies substantially in different societies.
The Public. This residual term embraces anyone not included
above, but more particularly it refers to the perceptions made avail-
able through public opinion polls, questionnaires, and academic
studies of various major population sectors.
The value of studying more accessible groups may be substantial
even though their perceptions of the military balance may be of less
interest. One aim of perception studies is to understand the effect
of particular types of events and information on perceptions. It is
likely that dramatic events and announcements produce similar reactions
in a wide variety of groups. The intrusion of nonrational factors
in perceptions may very likely tend to uniformize the responses of
different groups. Given the cost and difficulty of gaining accessi-
bility to some groups, studies of reactions to certain classes of
events in groups of lesser interest could still be worthwhile.
Naturally, the value of one group as a predictor of the reactions of
another group would be greatly increased if we could compare the
reactions of the two groups in two or three instances.
The Russians do not seem to share our almost exclusive concern
with high-level perceptions. They have considered it useful to influence
the perceptions of their ov/n and foreign publics on military affairs.
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What countries are most relevant to study?
The answer to this question will depend on which objectives of
perception studies are of primary interest. The perceptions of major
allies and of potential antagonists are clearly of interest. But the
policies of major allies are not independent of what lesser allies do.
Thus the perceptions of the military balance in a small country may
have repercussions in larger countries. In addition, in crisis situa-
tions, the position taken by a "minor" country may have crucial
positive or negative consequences over a very wide political and
military arena.
Similar considerations may apply to neutrals. The "one world"
character of today's international affairs makes it hazardous to
ignore "unimportant" countries. Some countries may deserve attention
not because of their political significance, but because responses
to certain types of events may be easier to study there. The ability
to extrapolate results is, of course, important in these cases.
Substantial attention should be given to the perceptions of
various sectors of the United States itself. It is almost certain
that the perceptions of important sectors in the United States are a
primary source for the perceptions of other countries. Besides, we are
likely to understand better how perceptions in other countries arise




With this section we enter into topics that are predominantly
empirical and require the clarification that only data can give. None-
theless, a few relevant comments can be made.
A knowledge of the sources from which people draw their percep-
tions of the U.S.- S.U, balance would serve two principal purposes: First,
it might enable us to infer the perceptions that people hold of the
balance. Obviously this may be a risky type of inference. First,
exposure to a source does not necessarily mean attention to what the
source provides. Second, we cannot assume that people either believe
or agree with the information or attitudes expressed by the sources.
Third, not everyone using the same information will come to the same
conclusion. However, for some population sectors of special interest,
such as the political leadershio, we may be able to specify sources in
which confidence is high and thus be able to make less risky inferences
concerning the perceptions of the group. Besides the mere preference
by a perceiver for certain sources may in itself provide us with a qood
guess as to his views. Second, a knowledge of the sources from which
people draw their information is indispensable for understanding how
perceptions are formed and changed.
We often think of the sources of perception as information on
the military balance conveyed either by the written or spoken word.
However, perceptions of the balance can also be shaped by the political
and military actions of countries. Anything from shoe-banging in the
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United Nations to the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1963) may influence
perceptions of the balance. Actions as a source of perceptions point
up the fact that the same input may provide different people with
rather different conceptions of the U.S-SJJ, balance. Aggressiveness may
be viewed by some as an indication of superiority and by others as an
expression of frustration and a sense of inferiority.
The effect of inputs on perception may be highly variable whenever
information about the U.S.- S,U, balance is of an indirect character and
leads to judgments of the military balance only by a process of inference.
Thus we can distinguish media information on military capabilities from
the media's influence through its presentations on political -military-
economic events that influence judgments of the balance.
When information sources and perceptions of the balance coincide,
we should not assume without further investigation that the informa-
tion sources have produced the identity noted. The information
sources may have been chosen largely because their statements agree
with the judgments and attitudes of the subjects involved.
An important objective in studying sources of perceptions of the
military balance is to understand not only the influence of sources
on subjects but the influence of one source on another. We need some
knowledge of how information and beliefs percolate from one source to
another source and finally becomes available to this or that sector of
the population. If we content oursel vesonly with the knowledge of
the source that immediately provided the information to a subject, we
have only a limited idea of what the information process is. We need
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to trace out how the source in question got its own information and
established its own perceptions. Relations among the media, between
official and unofficial sources, public and private sources, foreign
and native sources will presumably all be involved.
Research on sources of information should seek to establish their
credibility for different audiences.
Some subjects acquire their perceDtions by assimilating various
bits of information on the balance which get integrated into a parti-
cular image of the military balance in their minds. Other subjects do
not seek such information or even if they are exposed to it, do not
assimilate it. What they assimilate are judgments enunciated by persons
who are deemed reliable. Their perceptions of the military balance are
essentially perceptions of the views of their "opinion leaders."
The political class often has to communicate its views on a
subject to the country. They may have both a private perception of
the balance and a public one. One should not discount the incentives
they have to make private views of the balance accord with publicly
expedient views.
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
The distribution of perceptions by their reality status, that is,
by their coincidence with or deviation from reality is another empirical
topic; here we only provide a few comments elaborating on those made
earl ier.
Difficulties in relating perceptions to reality may stem from
decreased certainty about the reality, increased complexity of the
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perception, decreased clarity in the perceptions, or the noncommensura-
bility of perception and reality. If research is
based on interviews, some matters concerning the perceptions can be
made subject to clarification, although we may find that in asking for
clarification we are leading the subject to express opinions on matters
which he has not previously thought about or about which he has no
conviction. Clarification may not be possible in the case of materials
taken from printed sources.
If both reality and perceptions are expressed by a complex of
statements, representation of deviations from reality is difficult.
Often there is no way of establishing what elements have been put into
a complex assessment and what weights have been attributed to them.
Deviations of such perceptions from the reality assessment may represent
differences with respect to what is viewed as relevant rather than
disagreement on the facts.
The reality with which we wish to comDare a perception is in
fact another perception, ours, in which we have high confidence. On
the other hand, the perceptions of our subjects may vary considerably
with respect to the degree of confidence that the perceiver has in them.
Thus we may find that certain perceptions accord with reality but the
perceptions are held with a very low degree of confidence; this needs
to be taken into account when we affirm the coincidence of reality (our
perceptions) and the perceptions of others.
There are two different aspects to a statement concerning the
deviation of perceptions from reality. Let us suppose that the
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advantages or disadvantages in some aspect of the balance is expressed
by ratios. A reality judgment may, for example, give the United States
a 3:2 advantage. Perceiver X may express his perception as a 3:2
advantage for the Soviet Union, and perceiver Y may attribute an 8:1
advantage to the United States. On arithmetical grounds perceiver Y
is further from reality than perceiver X. On the other hand, Y is
closer to reality insofar as he views the advantage as lying with the
United States, whereas perceiver X views it as lying with the Soviet
Union. There is no contradiction involved here, but the example points
to the need to distinguish deviations in amount and in direction.
One must suppose that if we study perceptions over a considerable
range of perceivers, periods and military sectors, we will generally
find that the deviations of perceptions from reality vary considerably
in both amount and direction. There may be some aspects of the military
balance that at particular periods are yery highly classified and most
perceptions may deviate substantially from reality, except in incidental
cases where accordance with reality results more from an untutored
guess than from any real knowledge or understanding. Assuming, how-
ever, that in most cases the deviations of perceptions from reality
are distributed over a considerable range of values, we will want to
account for these variations. Some rather obvious questions suggest
themselves. Are the deviations associated with the class of perceivers?
Thus do the perceptions of the "literati" accord more with
reality than, say those of political leaders or parliamentarians or
the public. Do perceptions o^ the balance accord better with reality
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in strategic warfare than in the NATO area? Have Derceptions of the
military balance shown a greater tendency to accord with reality as
time has gone on and information has increased? Do dramatic individual
events (e.g. Czechoslovakia 1968) produce shapp changes in the
deviations?
Charles Wolf has pointed out that at a given moment perceptions
may deviate from reality but correspond with reality if the deviation
is measured consistently with either a lead or a lag. It seems reason-
able to suppose that for relatively well-informed subjects interested
in military affairs the lead hypothesis is likely to apply, whereas for
ill-informed persons and those relatively uninterested in military
affairs the lag hypothesis is more relevant. For an informed and
interested person the prospective picture is probably just as interest-
ing or even more interesting than current or past situations. He may
thus assimilate information concerning rates of change which may lead
him to develop a perception of the present situation which anticipates
the future. The disinterested person is more likely to ignore the
future and the present, and it may take some time for changes to make
an impression on him thus producing a lag. One difficulty with the
foregoing is that if in fact an individual is wery interested in, and
very well -informed about, military affairs and the military balance,
one might suppose that he would be able to avoid the tendency to predate
the future that produces a lead deviation. The hypothesis seems more
applicable to those who are moderately interested and informed.
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Perceptions may show an inverse relationship to reality over a
substantial period. This might occur in a situation in which a
country with low capabilities makes strenuous efforts to persuade the
world to the contrary and succeeds in so doing. This seems to be what
in fact the Soviet Union did durinq the postwar period up to 1961-1962.
The Soviet Union, very sensitive to any imputation of weakness, expended
a great deal of effort to convince the world that it was making
enormous progress in nuclear weapons, manned bombers, and missiles.
The Soviet Union's attempts to conceal military weakness did in fact
lead substantial parts of the world to view the military balance over
a number of years as quite the reverse of what it was.
A thorough account of the perceptions of the military balance would
try to explain certain aspects of perceptions already reviewed: the
degree of confidence in one's judgment; the stability of perception;
the affect attached to perception; the complexity or simplicity of
perceptions (which is not the same as deviation or accordance with
reality); the tendency to view the balance in terms of rates of chanqe
rather than comparisons of the current status; variations in preferred
information sources on the balance; interactions among sources;
tendencies for perceptions to lag or lead; the variability of perceptions
with respect to clarity and fuzziness; and variatiors in the elements
incorporated in perceptions, to mention only some.
In preceding sections we have necessarily touched on various
mechanisms which bear on the explanation of perceptions of the military
balance: the amount and nature of information available, the class of
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perceivers involved, the sources available, the tendency for perceptions
to be formulated in terms of materiel or in terms of warfiqhting
capabilities, the effect of crises on perception, the impact of first-
hand visual perception of military materiel and operations, to mention
only a few.
THE IMPACT OF PERCEPTIONS
It is generally assumed, and quite correctly, that the military
forces available to.<nations have played an enormous role in shaping
political as well as military history. It is evident that until such
time as they are actually brought into play, the effect of these forces
on the behavior of nations is completely dependent on the perceptions
of them. When they are brought into play, the consequences of the real
as distinguished from the perceived balance of forces show themselves.
But even during war itself, the perception of the forces as distinct
from the forces themselves continue to play an important role.
The impact of perceptions of the military balance might be better
understood if we examined how such perceptions in the past influenced
political and military behavior. In earlier ages the fate of a king
or a great noble not infrequently rested on the outcome of a single
battle. Wars were often periods of mobilization and transportation of
troops, leading to a single big confrontation with the enemy in a
decisive battle, often with disastrous consequences for one side. Since
the outcome of a single battle was a chancy matter, subject to many
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unpredictable occurrences, the outcome of war itself became almost
equally chancy. Political advisers especially and some rulers from
ancient China through to the 16th century in the West continually
stressed the dangers of wars in which one's fate depended on the out-
come of a single -- and therefore unpredictable -- battle. To avoid
serious fullscale battles that in one day could lose him a kingdom,
Louis XI developed forces whose perception by his enemies, rather
than whose action in battle, would gain him his objectives. Awe-
inspiring fortifications, troops in a ready status, and forces of
substantial size were intended not so much to win battles as to make
them unnecessary. Such situations have an interesting resemblance to
the position of the major nuclear powers. Strategic nuclear war by
becoming, relatively speaking, a war with one big battle reduces war
again to the point where one's fate rests on the uncertainties of a
single event. Possibly a nuclear power might believe that a one-battle
nuclear war is more calculable and less chancy than the one-battle
wars of the Dast; but given the stakes in a strategic nuclear conflict,
it would not take much caution to realize that this increased
calculabil ity, if it exists, is offset by the areatly increased losses
if the calculations go wrong. In short, then, the aggressive nuclear
power of today is perhaps in the position of Louis XI who feared to
risk all on one battle but nonetheless used his military forces to
gain his ends. Perceptions toaether with sparing military use sub-
stituted for fullscale military action.
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In democracies the perceptions of the public have considerable
importance because they affect both the freedom of leaders to expend
funds for military purposes and may limit their freedom to utilize
forces in being for various political or military purposes. The
morale of forces themselves is not unrelated to how they perceive
their relation of strength to those whom they may or are going to
meet in battle. The Soviets have consistently acted as if they believed
that the perceptions of masses in the democracies concerning the
military balance have a significant political effect. And it seems
evident that indeed it does. Within the Soviet Union itself the Party
takes steps to ensure that the Soviet peoples have a firm conviction
that their military forces are superior to those of any other nation.
U.S. efforts in this direction used to rely largely on the efforts of
certain patriotic societies and on July 4th oratory. Nowadays the
exigencies of funding and congressional debate and the freer flow of
information often mean that the images disseminated of U.S. military
forces relative to other military forces are hardly those that
July 4th orators would prefer. The varying conseguences of overly
optimistic and overly pessimistic perceptions need to be determined
and distinguished.
Because of their influence on budgetary action and political and
military planning, the perceptions of political leaders and parliamen-
tarians are obviously of great importance. There are several problems
of first-rate importance here. Do parliamentarians provide greater
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support for a military force that they feel is inferior to that of a
potential enemy or are they more inclined to take supDortive action if
they feel that past expenditures in the military sector have given
their nation forces superior to anyone who might challenge them? May
i
not a conviction that past expenditures have led to military inferior-
ity inspire defeatist budgetary and political action whereas a con-
viction of military superiority may stimulate further interest in
maintaining this superiority (rather than a do-nothinq attitude as is
sometimes supposed)?
One aspect of perceptions of the military balance that is of
particular interest is the fear of one's own strength. This seems to
be a contemporary phenomenon. There has Drobably not been in the Dast
a period in which a nation or some orominent sector of it has shown
great anxiety because of its own military strength. Today, a significant
strain of thought sees great nuclear or in general military strength
of one's own nation as leading to irresponsible or immoral behavior on
the international scene. Thus perceptions of actual or potential
superiority in the United States have in some sectors led to demands
for reducing this suDeriority. Perceptions of military inferiority may
not, in these groups, stimulate apprehension but rather a sense of
relief and satisfaction that the political and military freedom of
national leaders has been constrained by this inferiority.
CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to raise and systematize questions and
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problems relative to research in the area of military balance
perceptions. As stated in the introduction, it is no more than a
general map of what as yet remains a vague and amorphous area of
research. As work progresses in the field, it will be possible both
to refine the map and to revise it. Considering the need of defense
policy-makers to have a better understanding of the perceptions
element surrounding the development and use of military forces, it




THE MISSING DIMENSION OF U.S. DEFENSE POLICY:




In comparing the overall strategic conduct of the United States
with that of the Soviet Union, a sharp contrast emerges between the
obvious Russian emphasis on the psychological dimension of military
policy, and the equally obvious neglect of this dimension in the
military policy of the United States.
The essentially psychological concept of deterrence has been
prominent in U.S. defense planning for many years, and yet force-
structure and weapon-system decisions are still made without explicit
consideration of the impact of these decisions on others' perceptions
of U.S. military power. For example, the entire structure of the
Soviet armed forces reveals the intention to capitalize systematically
on the widespread tendency to evaluate military Dower in simple
numerical terms; American force planners by contrast, tend to be guided
by organizational preferences for high unit-quality, and tend to
discount numbers per se. In the strateaic-nuclear sector, for
example, it has been U.S. policy to remove weapons from the inventory
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as soon as they failed to meet the most exacting criteria of modernity.
As against this, it has been Russian policy to retain any weapon which
could still be represented as serviceable. As a result, some 980 ICBMs
and 322 B.52 bombers have been withdrawn from U.S. operational forces
over the last decade and a half, while the Soviet Union has with a few
exceptions, retained in service virtually every strategic weapon it had
ever deployed.
There were sound strategic, economic and technical reasons for
withdrawing weapons such as the Atlas ICBMs from the operational in-
ventory. By the time the SAL negotiations were in progress there were
no Atlas ICBMs in the inventory to keep or withdraw. But the Minuteman
I force was still intact. At a time when it was obvious that the force-
ceilings of a SAL accord would reflect primarily the numerical status
quo, U.S. decision-makers nevertheless chose to remove them to make way
for the Minuteman 3s, instead of merely adding the new weapons to the
old, as the Russians were doing with SS-lls and SS-9s.
There was a critical inconsistency in U.S. policy,
which denied all importance to purely numerical factors in the context
of force-structure decisions, and which then proceeded to give full
diplomatic recognition to "mere numbers" in the context of international
negotiations. The immediate effect of the policy was to set the stage
for the advent of Russian numerical superiority in ICBMs -- a superiority
formally recognized in the SAL-1 accords. The broader impact of the
decision was manifest in the transformation of third-party perceptions of
the strategic balance.
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While there were a good many disparate factors at work in the
Minuteman I decision, there can be little doubt that a major common
denominator was the general tendency to ignore or at least discount
the importance of perceptual factors. The notion that numbers alone,
or any other "visible" indices, had a certain definite value in them-
selves could hardly have influenced decision-making since the perceptual
dimension of deployment policy is refractory to quantitative evaluation -
unlike the engineering or financial dimensions -- and indeed it would
have to rest on vague and unsystematic propositions about what others
may or may not think about American strategic power. In a decision-
making process that became increasingly mechanistic, particularly
after 1961, in which greater and greater emphasis was placed on
comparisons of variables that are easily quantifiable, wholly un-
quantifiable notions could hardly play a significant role. Even if
admitted into the decision-process, which rarely happened, unsub-
stantiated contentions about the psychological (and therefore political)
repercussions of force-structure or weapon-system decisions were
thereafter discounted to the point of insignificance.
It is important to recognize the generality of the phenomenon.
With a consistency that would be remarkable if it were accidental,
Russian force-structure decisions have tended to maximize the perceptible
manifestations of Soviet military power, while an equally consistent
neglect of Derceptual factors is evident from the character of American
force structures. Far from being an isolated exception, the contrast
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between the unilateral withdrawal of the Minuteman I force and the
retention of the Soviet SS-7s and SS-8s is reproduced in virtually
every sector of military power, from the number of army divisions to
the armament of surface combatants.
Under present plans for example, the U.S. Army is to have a
total of 16 active divisions, while at the last count the Soviet Army
had more than ten times as many, 168. The overall manpower ratio, by
contrast, is of the order of 2.15 to 1 . It is known that only about
one-third of the Russian divisions are deployed continuously at full
strength, so that a direct comparison would have to include American
reserve and National Guard forces also. Moreover, U.S. Army divisions
are, of course, much larger than their Russian counterparts. If
reorganized on Russian lines, with smaller divisions and still smaller
division-slices (i.e. with diminished manpower in support and service
forces outside divisions), and with the same proportion of under-
strength units, the U.S. Army could deploy roughly 73 "divisions" with
its present manpower level, thus reducing very considerably the apparent
numerical imbalance between the two armies.
While some have advocated such a Soviet-style organization for
purely military reasons, there is no reason to believe a priori that
the ground-force organization of the Soviet armed forces is in fact
strategically and tactically superior to the American. In particular,
it has not been demonstrated convincingly that the Russian emphasis
on ready combat power as opposed to sustained combat capability, or
Russian methods of whole-unit replacement and in-unit training are
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preferable to American priorities and methods. There is thus a
prima facie case against the great strains and costs of such a
reorganization -- if strategic and tactical effectiveness are the
only "outputs" to be maximized.
4
But if the comparison includes the perceptual -political dimen-
sion, it is no longer possible to reserve judgment on which of the two
force-structures is "better": it is abundantly clear that ever since
1945 the Soviet Union has gained great political net benefits from the
perceived superiority of its ground forces over those of the United
States in Europe and those of NATO as a whole. And it is eaually
obvious that these images of a superior Russian army have derived from,
and have reflected the superior number of Russian divisions more than
any other single index of ground-force capability.
In countless official statements reference has been made to the
threat posed by the "160 Soviet divisions" or "200 Warsaw Pact
2divisions." These were, of course, Western statements, in almost
every instance aimed at domestic audiences in conjunction with the
annual budgetary struggle over defense expenditure. But the Russians
for their part have also used their information channels to amplify
and project images of a war-winning Soviet army.
In the 1950s, these images of Russian predominance on the
ground served to counteract equally prevalent images of American
superiority in air power and technological superiority in general.
In the 1960s, such images served to counteract perceptions of American
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superiority in strategic-nuclear forces of the two sides, images of
a vastly superior Soviet ground force capable of overrunning Western
Europe still persist.
There is no need to summarize here the post-1945 history of East-
West relations in Europe in order to demonstrate that the Soviet Union
has gained more than a mere psychological satisfaction from the wide-
spread impression that its ground forces were vastly superior -- by
orders of magnitude -- to those of the West. By translating what was
at most a small measure of actual tactical superiority into the
appearance of overwhelming strength, the Soviet Union has made tangible
gains in the diplomatic arena, and continues to do so.
In the absence of conflict, the political shadow cast by European
perceptions of Russian superiority on the ground sufficed to induce
Western governments to make important concessions to the Soviet Union,
accommodating Soviet demands that would otherwise have been rejected
out of hand, or worse, ignored. The impact of this perceptual advantage
has been manifest across the full range of East-West interactions in
Europe, from the status-of-Berl in negotiations to the conduct of West
European trade relations with the Soviet Union. It is of course
difficult to disentangle the multiple factors involved in the conduct
of such relations. But neither is it essential for the argument to
do so: the central fact that should never be lost sight of is that
the Soviet Union remains much less important than, say, Italy. As
a source of raw materials, it is quite outclassed in the energy sector
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by any one of several Persian Gulf oil exporters, and in the food
and fibre sector, by the United States. As a source of investment
capital and technological know-how for Europe, the Soviet Union ranks
with Liechtenstein rather than with, say, Austria. Hence the unique
importance of military power as a constituent of overall national
power for the Soviet Union.
The great factor which the leaders of Western Europe have had
to contend with is the purely military strength of the Soviet Union,
and they have done so by a mixture of deterrence and conciliation.
In the latter lay the payoff as far as the Russians were concerned.
It may be argued that in making concessions to the Soviet Union -
the concessions which translated Russian military strength into actual
political leverage -- the leaders of Western Europe were not being
deluded by false images of Russian superiority on the ground, but were
rather motivated by realistic appreciations of the "true" balance of
military power. According to this line of argument, the fact that
the Russians deployed their ground troops into many divisions while
U.S. and NATO forces were organized in fewer and larger divisions, was
quite irrelevant, for policy-level appreciations of the balance of
power were not based on misleading divisional counts but rather on
"actual" Russian capabilities, as well as on the imputed propensity
of the Soviet Union to initiate a conflict.
Common sense would suggest that the national leaders of sophisti-
cated European nations could hardly make an error so crude as to
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compare units that were quite unequal. But against this presumption
there is a mountain of evidence which demonstrates beyond doubt that
the terms of the comparison are almost always much closer to those
3
suggested by simple divisional counts than, say, manpower counts.
Comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground capabilities based
on the single index of, say, the actual troop strengths available
to the two sides would be grossly inadequate, but at least they would
be meaningful, if only partially so. By contrast, comparisons of
divisional counts alone, strictly speaking, are auite meaningless, given
the order-of-magnitude inequality between the units thus being
counted. And yet Western perceptions of Russian superiority on the
ground do not correlate with the fractional advantages yielded by
manpower comparisons but rather with much wider margins of advantage,
which correspond quite closely to the meaningless comparisons of
divisional counts. The consistency of this pattern of perceptions is
much too great to make the correlation coincidental.
Further evidence of the saliency of purely numerical indices is
provided by another popular token of Russian superiority: the greater
number of Russian battle tanks as compared to those of NATO in Europe.
It is of course true that the Russian inventory of battle tanks has
always exceeded by far that of the NATO forces in Europe, or indeed of
NATO worldwide. But it is also true that in comparing the strength
of a defensive alliance with that of a force poised for the offensive,
a straight comparison of the number of battle tanks on each side is a
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very poor quide to the relative capabilities on the defense and the
offense respectively. It would be more useful, for example, to
compare Warsaw Pact tank capabilities with NATO anti-tank capabilities
(in which tanks do play an important role). As another approximation,
it would also be less misleading to evaluate Russian mobility forces
as against NATO firepower, air support, and mine warfare capabilities.
But in fact, such comparisons are hardly ever found in statements of
"the military balance" in Europe. Instead, great prominence is given
to the "40,000 tanks of the Russian Army," or to the "20,000 tanks"
of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe as opposed to the "7,000 tanks"
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of NATO in the central sector.
Quite apart from the tactical -operational considerations which
invalidate the comparison, and aside from the inherent inadequacy of
any comparison which excludes the "software" of morale, leadership and
planning in counting the hardware, there is also the fact that Russian
tanks have lost their former qualitative superiority, and are now on
average considerably inferior to their British, West German and
American counterparts. In spite of all these reasons for rejectinq
out of hand the simple tank count as an index of military power,
numerical tank comparisons are still featured as key indices of ground
force capabilities.
Much the same state of affairs prevails in the naval sector of
the super-power competition. From small beginninqs, and in particular
from a grossly inferior qualitative base, the Soviet Navy has qrown in
quantity and apparent quality to the point where it can no lonqer be
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dismissed as an antagonist to the U.S, Navy. Indeed there have already
been the first suggestions that the proper goal of US naval policy
should now be to attain some form of "parity" with the Soviet Navy,
or at any rate to concede some semblance of parity in the framework
of bilateral naval limitation accords.
Given the utter superiority of the US Navy when the naval com-
petition first began in the immediate aftermath of the Second World
War, and given the heavy investment in naval power made by the United
States since then, the success of Russian naval planners has been
spectacular, in some ways more striking than Russian achievements in
other sectors of the arms' competition. Without for the moment
questioning the capabilities of the Soviet Navy under realistic
politico-military assumptions, it must be recognized that in the eyes
of the world the Russian Navy has achieved some sort of rough parity
with the US Navy.
Once again, the perceptual factors that have served to form the
impression in men's minds that the two navies have become somehow
equivalent in power are denoted by their simple character: straight-
forward ship counts, and equally simple visual imagery, pseudo-
qualitative in character. (Soviet warships are commonly described
as "bristling with weapons.") It is ironic that the numerical parity
between the two fleets was not brought about so much by the Soviets
themselves as it was by the deliberate policy of American naval
planners. Between 1969 and 1975 the number of U.S. Navy vessels was
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reduced from 976 to 483 through the accelerated retirement of older
and less capable warships. This drastic cut in the size of the fleet
may or may not have been justified (the Dost-decision increases in
operating costs certainly strengthens the argument in its favor), but
*
right or wrong, the decision implied a very strong preference for
unit quality as opposed to mere numbers, and a strong preference for
a fleet of fully operational warships over a much larger fleet kept
at a lower level of readiness. These preferences presumably reflected
strategic calculations about the respective worth of quality versus
quantity—and not merely bureaucratic tastes and traditional preferences
It is therefore noteworthy that at the very time when the decision
to opt for quality was being implemented, official Navy spokesmen,
and prominent retired officers, began to popularize comparisons of the
US and Soviet fleets cast in terms of the total number of warships
deployed, and even in terms of "ship-days" in particular areas of
5 /deployment. (Considerable currency was for example given to assess-
ments of the naval balance in the Eastern Mediterranean on the occasion
of the October 1973 crisis which were stated exclusively in numerical
terms.) Thus the very people who decided to reduce the numerical
strength of the Navy in order to upgrade present and future quality,
immediately proceeded to neglect qualitative factors altogether in
popularizing straight numerical comparisons between the Soviet and
US navies.
It is, or should be, perfectly clear that the US and Soviet
navies cannot be usefully compared by simple ship-counts, or for that
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matter in terms of gross tonnage -- in which the US. Navy remains
superior by far. Given the profound structural differences between
the two navies, not even detailed and sophisticated materiel comparisons
are of any use. For example, the U.S. Navy has a variety of offensive
air capabilities as well as an opposed-landing capability of major
proportions, while Soviet capabilities in these respects are still
embryonic.
Nor can comparisons between the two fleets be made on the
basis of the presumed outcome of naval battles. For one thing, the
outcome of combat scenarios is predetermined by their tactical and
strategic assumptions to a degree unique to naval warfare. More
important, the utility of the two fleets is not determined only by
what they could do to each other in the event of all-out warfare
between the Soviet Union and the United States, but also by what they
could do to others, in less improbable circumstances. For example, in
the context of a "normal" Middle East crisis, the ability of the
Soviet fleet to destroy the Sixth Fleet in an all-out "splendid"
missile strike is simply irrelevant: in realistic political terms
what matters is that the Sixth Fleet could land troops and provide
air support (or air defense) for American clients in the area, while
the Soviet Navy would have the sole option of launching an all-out
attack against the Sixth Fleet or else doing nothing of substance
(unless the shippinq of local powers is a worthwhile target for attack
or defense).
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All such considerations are now obscured by the prevalence
of simplistic numerical comparisons. Reiterated endlessly in official
statements before Congress, in speeches widely diffused by the media,
these ship-counts have created images that have become international
political realities, with manifest consequences on the attitudes of
political leaders the world over. While from the Soviet Union there
issues a steady stream of glorification of the Soviet Navy the message
relayed by American media stresses the inadequacies of the US Navy
and the loss of its former superiority; almost always the prime
emphasis is on the ship counts. Whatever the pressures of the
Congressional appropriations process, the public relations' stance
of the Navy should come under close scrutiny, for these comparisons
of U.S. and Soviet naval power though aimed at domestic opinion in
fact shape third-party perceDtions of the naval segment of the overall
balance of military power. As such, these comparisons play a significant
part in determining the respective standing of the two superpowers,
and therefore their influence on the world scene.
PERCEPTIONS AND THE POLITICAL UTILITY OF ARMED FORCES
The political utility and military effectiveness of a given
structure of armed forces exist in different worlds, one the world
of appearances, impressions and culturally-determined value-judgments
of international politics; the other, the world of physical reality in
actual warfare. This fundamental difference, that is the difference
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between force and power , has only been clearly analyzed quite recently
in the literature of political science. Without delving into the
complexities of the distinction, some of the more salient differences
may be noted: force is definitive, its operation being physical,
unambiguous and direct. Power, on the other hand, is indirect since
it is a function of what others are willing to do in response to the
tacit or explicit demands of the powerful. Power must be recognized
by others if it is to function whereas force functions in of itself.
Hence the central ity of perceptions in the workings of power, and their
crucial role in determining the political utility of armed forces.
If "true" combat capabilities were always perceived correctly,
then all distinctions between power and force, or between political
utility and military effectiveness, would not matter at all from the
viewpoint of defense planning. If there were perfect information, and
if the assumptions under which forces are evaluated by all parties
were identical, actual and perceived capabilities would always have to
be identical also. But in reality there are many factors which tend
to make for a significant and sometimes gross divergence between the
two.
First and most obvious is the simple problem of information.
Only a handful of the 142 governments now represented in the U.N.
have independent means of intelligence collection with which to
establish what weapons and what forces are deployed by the United
States, the Soviet Union and any other power not immediately adjacent
to them.
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Second, there is the problem of evaluation. Even with perfect
data on all the tangible aspects of military power, it remains impossible
to arrive at uniform assessments of power balances, which convert
materiel and human inputs into true potential combat capabilities, by
taking due account of the intangibles of training, managerial efficiency,
morale and leadership. Hardware comparisons are not merely inadequate
on their own, but worse than useless. They do not so much convey only
a part of reality as obscure reality altogether. On the other hand, as
soon as evaluations go beyond the tangibles, they must include sub-
jective assessments of genuine imponderables, such as leadership and
morale. And when this is done--as it must be done -- evaluations will
cease to be uniform even if all evaluators have access to identical
data on the tangible components of military power.
Third, there is the problem of salience. The relevance of
different types of combat capability differs sharply accordinq to the
roster of antagonists. The extensive anti-submarine capabilities of
the U.S. Navy may be an important segment of the deterrent spectrum
vis a vis the Soviet Union with its large submarine force. But the
same anti-submarine capabilities would not count for much in deterring,
say, Syria, which has no real submarine force at all. Even where the
contrast is less extreme, it will readily be appreciated that the
salience of a given array of capabilities differs from context to
context, and specifically, that the physical reality of U.S. military
capabilities breaks down into many separate perceived realities vis
a vis as many separate antagonists.
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For these reasons, the images of military capabilities perceived
by others may differ greatly as between different perceivers. In
general, perceptions will not be an accurate reflection of the
"objective" reality of physical capabilities as revealed from time to
time by the test of actual warfare. It follows that the optimization
of combat capabilities will not ensure simultaneously the optimization
of the "power" projected by any given force-structure. Hence if the
overall politico-military "output" of the nation's investment in its
military establishment is to be maximized, explicit consideration must
be given to the perceptual factor. Indeed the latter must be elevated
into a major criterion of force-planning and deployment decision-making,
In other words, in order to extract maximum benefits from U.S. military
forces, their structure and modes of operation must be deliberately
aimed at projecting images of power, in ways that are readily absorbed
by the world-wide "audience" of political actors and opinion-makers.
THE MODALITIES OF PERCEPTION
Complex though they are, the data which describe physical weapon
capabilities will at least be uni-dimensional : if the range of a
missile is stated at 5,000 miles, this will be so whether the audience
for the statement is the high command of the RAF or an Indian peasant.
By contrast, for the reasons listed above, perceptions of military
power will differ as between different classes of perceivers.
Vie can distinguish between at least three classes: (a) policy-
makers and inner elite members with access to privileged information
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(and technical advice), and with a strong professional interest in
politico-military issues; (b) media operatives and other opinion-
makers with access to large information flows, not necessarily
detailed and with a less concentrated interest in politico-military
issues; (c) the general public, with access only to the data conveyed
by mass media, and whose level of attention to politico-military
issues varies from the very intense (e.g. in countries at war) to the
very low, the latter being altogether more common.
A second distinction can be made a priori as between different
types of national systems. For practical purposes, at least four
categories of countries may be usefully distinguished:
Type I systems: economically-developed modern societies,
with democratic forms of government. In these, the per-
ceptions of all three classes have an impact on the total
policy process. This group includes the United States,
most NATO members, the Dominions, Israel and a few other
countries.
Type II systems: hiqhly centralized totalitarian societies.
In these, only the perceptions of Class A (policy-makers
and inner elite) will have an impact on policy-formation
over the short-and medium term. This category includes the
USSR and the CPR, Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea.
Type III: under-developed, modernizing larger states whose
governance is authoritarian but not totalitarian. In these,
49
the perceptions of classes A and B (opinion-makers), both
count, but not the perceptions of class C (mass publics).
This category includes Brazil, Eqypt, India, and Iran.
Type IV: under-developed small states with ruling micro-
elites which have no access to worthwhile privileqed
information. In these class A and class B perceivers
cannot be usefully separated: both rely on imported
mass-media information which is usually of Western origin.
This category includes most of the 142 members of the U.N.
From the above categorization it can be deduced directly that
the following groups of perceivers are of practical significance:
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
A A A None
B B
C
The omission of class C perceivers in Type III countries follows by
definition: even if their opinions counted for something in the policy-
making Drocess, there is no practical way of reaching this group.
Radio media may convey facts and figures to this audience, but in the
absence of the necessary context such facts and figures are bound to
be virtually meaningless. The omission of all classes under Type IV
is explained by the dependence of the one relevant group (the small





Western -- or more rarely Soviet — media: while the former are
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already covered under Type I, Soviet media are in any case beyond
reach. No matter what steps could be taken to enhance the visibility
and perceptual impact of American power, controlled outlets such as
TASS would process the information unfavorably.
It is obvious that the perceptions of class A observers in Type
I and Type II countries are of central importance: they collectively
determine those balances of perceived power which govern the external
conduct of the most important states on the world scene. Nevertheless
it is by no means self-evident that these two groups ought to be the
principal targets of perceptual manipulation addressed specifically
at these groups as opposed to all other groups. This
because class A observers in Type I and Type II countries are likely
to be refractory to such perceptual manipulation: while a shift in the
perceptions of such groups would count for much more than a similar
shift in the perceptions of any other groups, it is also likely to
be very much more difficult to achieve. For one thing, it is to be
expected that data derived from UjS, actions would reach class A
observers in both types of countries throuqh the medium of sophisticated
channels of information with a high technical content. Such channels
ought to filter out factors that distort perceptions of military
power, and the technical analysis of the incoming data will normally
resist manipulation.
It remains to define -- a least conceptually -- what military-
force characteristics are liable to be salient in the perception of non-
technical observers. What follows is a brief review of propositions
which seem most plausible.
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(1) Time is discounted. The general tendency is to anticipate
future changes in military capabilities. An obvious example is the
public reaction to such events as the Soviet test of a fission device
in 1949. The reaction was not that the Soviet Union would become more
"powerful" in X years, when it would deploy operational forces equipped
with fission bombs; it was rather that the Soviet Union had become
more powerful, as of the time word of the fission test was released.
Even though this foreshortening of time was based on error (i.e. the
failure to take deployment lags into account), the impact was real
nevertheless: the Soviet Union did become more powerful, in that its
ability to deter or compel -- a function of others' reactions to its
presumed capabilities -- increased as soon as the news of the fission
test were released, by the United States.
Time is also discounted in a more subtle sense: there is a
general tendency to aggregate military capabilities, economic resources
and technical ingenuity into a common perception of power. While
defense planners must contend with the fact that in a central conflict
it will probably be impossible to convert economic resources into
deployed military capabilities in a timely manner, it appears that
even class B perceivers in Type I countries continue to treat the
mobilization potential of societies as part of their current strength
on the world scene.
The most direct consequence of the discounting of time is that in
determining perceptions of military capabilities, especially in com-
parative terms, the impact of perceived rates of change may equal or
52
outweigh the impact of current capabilities. A statement such as
"in 1985 the Soviet air force will become more 'powerful' than the
USAF unless . . ."is not perceived primarily as meaninq that the
USAF is more "powerful" now; instead it will tend to enhance perceptions
of Soviet air power in the present. The common practice of U.S.
spokesmen, official and otherwise, of stressing Russian progress in
this or that sector of the competition therefore has a particularly
negative impact on third-party perceptions of the balance of power.
(2) There are sharp differences in the perceptual impact of
different kinds of information about military capabilities, at any
rate as far as non-technical observers are concerned. Initial
guidance on the relative ease of absorption of different forms of
information can be provided by the content of commercial advertising
(correcting for cultural bias); this is particularly useful because
of the objective feedback that guides its content (i.e. sales figures).
By inference from the practices of commercial advertising, the follow-
ing propositions may be derived:
a) Force-level figures are readily absorbed
because numbers are conceptually simple in
themselves, (as opposed to non-trivial quali-
tative information). However, if numerical
descriptions of military forces are to have
a strong perceptual impact, the units involved
must be vividly meaningful to the audience.
53
For example, "divisions," "tanks" and -- to
a lesser extent -- "ICBMs" are meaningful ..
units, in the sense that non-technical observers
believe that they understand what these terms
describe. This is so even if in fact the meaning
of these units is being misunderstood -- which is
especially likely to be the case in comparisons of
different national forces, where combat formations
are often unequal in substance even if their nomen-
clature is identical
.
b) Further if numbers are to have an impact, con-
text must be supplied, usually by means of compari-
sons. For example, the statement that the Soviet
Union has 1,618 ICBMs may be interpreted to mean
that the Soviet Union is weak, since a good many
non-technical observers seem to think that the
super-powers have "thousands" of ICBMs. By contrast,
the statement that the Soviet Union has 1 ,618
ICBMs viz. 1,054 for the United States is readily
understood in a broadly correct sense, (i.e. the
Soviet Union has "more").
c) While numbers are readily absorbed, they are
not computed easily. Hence the perceptual impact
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of multiple numerical statements is actually likely
to be degraded, unless the implication of the numbers
is cumulative, (e.g. "The Soviet Union has 600 more
ICBMs, and 200 more SLBMs . . . "viz. "The Soviet
Union has 600 more ICBMs but 250 fewer bombers, 200
more SLBMs but 300 fewer cruise missiles . . . etc.")
d) Performance data is not readily absorbed unless
a clearly understood index of normality is provided.
In describing the constituents of military power this
will usually be a maximal benchmark, (e.g. the "world's
fastest aircraft" viz. "aircraft flown at Mach 3.3").
e) Qualitative information may be readily absorbed
also, if it can be conveyed in visual terms, or at
least in vivid verbal imagery. Non-technical observers
can see an aircraft carrier, in life or photography.
Past exposure to either will enable such observers
to visualize aircraft carriers on the basis of non-
visual information. By contrast, non-technical observers
cannot visualize radar or sonar eguipment. The
same consideration applies to the generally higher-
impact information on capabil i ties-in-use. Again,
non-technical observers can visualize the meaning
of "three tank divisions advancing . . . but they
cannot visualize the (possibly much more striking)
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performance of radar, sonar, or other such systems.
Verbal imagery may be vivid and perceptually effective
even when the operations described cannot be seen at all,
as in the case of a successful ballistic-missile
intercept ("Like hitting a fly in outer space;
like hitting a bullet with a bullet . . . ").
f) Actual personal exposure to the reality of
on-going military activities can have a wholly
disproportionate impact on perceptions of mili-
tary capabilities. An observer exposed to the
sights and sounds of flight-operations on board
an aircraft-carrier may thereafter discount all
kinds of less vivid information that would counter-
act his own personal impressions of formidable
power (e.g. data on Soviet anti-carrier capabili-
ties).
g) Non-technical observers tend to be over-
impressed by technologically-advanced qualitative
features of military equipments, regardless of
their actual contribution to force-effectiveness.
Hence "nuclear aircraft-carrier" has a greater
impact on non-technical perceptions than "aircraft
carriers". Similarly, the importance of bombers
may be discounted because of a tendency to regard
56
them as "old-fashioned," as compared to ballistic
missiles. (Given enouqh exposure, the cruise
missiles may in turn displace the ballistic missile
as the advanced strategic weapon par excellence.)
As some of the above will have shown, perceptions find their
place in frames of reference which are themselves the cumulative residue
of earlier perceptions. The perceivers are "educated" progressively
through exposure to successive layers of information. Most of the
world's supply of data on military power emanates from the U.S.
Department of Defense. The remainder largely originates from specialized
publications with good access to U.S. defense officials and defense
contractors. Soviet and other adversary primary sources provide only
a small fraction of the military data, and hardly any numerical data
at all.
Similarly, information on military capabilities world-wide reaches
the global audience -- elite or otherwise -- primarily through American
media channels, notably the weekly newsmagazines, the major newspapers,
news-agency reports and technical journals. Non-American Western media
convey a distinctly smaller amount of data on military capabilities.
Non-Western media, including Soviet media, convey very little original
data-in fact even specialized Soviet military publications rely almost
exclusively on data quoted from Western media in covering U.S., Soviet
and Chinese military capabilities.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
The propositions set out above are no more than hypotheses;
they need to be elaborated in much greater detail and then tested
through opinion research, especially elitq-opinion research. But it
is not premature to consider the possible implications for U.S. defense
policy. Three broad policy approaches to the problem present themselves.
The first would be to formulate and implement a purposeful information
policy for the Department of Defense on the lines of institutional
advertising. The idea would be to augment the political "output" by
existing force-structures and modes of deployment by enhancing the
images of power they generate, and by overcoming their perceptually
negative features. Elements of such a policy would range from, say,
detailed and repeated explanations of the vast difference between
Soviet and U.S. Army divisions, to the systematic exposure of elite
observers to suitable U.S. capabilities in action (e.g. many more visits
to aircraft carriers especially when engaged in flight operations),
to the upward redesignation of combat formations. This cosmetic
approach would required no actual changes in force-structures and
modes of deployment. The recent redesignation of U.S. Navy warships --
whatever its motives -- is an example of such a cosmetic policy in
action: Large destroyers have become cruisers, the patrol frigate has
become a guided-missile frigate, and so on.
The second approach would seek to change the reality, rather than
to attempt to present an unchanged reality differently. An example of
this more drastic approach -- which may entail more military-organizational
58
costs than political benefits -- would be to restructure the ground
formations of the U.S. Army so as to yield 32 smaller divisions instead
of the planned 16, or even to produce 160 "combat groups" (=battal ions).
Another kind of structural change would be to change the configuration
of USN warships so as to augment their visible armament (presumably at
the expense of invisible but more useful capabilities). A non-
structural change in the mode of operation of current forces, would
be to increase the exposure of USN attack submarines. (Their
capabilities are usually overlooked in the semi-official estimates of
Soviet and US, Naval capabilities in Mediterranean conflict scenarios
which are now in circulation.) It is evident that if taken to extremes,
this approach would lead to the deployment of "cardboard" military
forces, on the lines of the Italian army and navy of the inter-war
period, which were used in effect as theatrical props, to support an
activist foreign policy.
But in a less extreme form, this aDproach is not to be dismissed.
There are for example a good many tactical analysts who already advocate
the abandonment of the large-division Army (and Marine) force-structure
for purely military reasons, without regard to the (greater) perceptual
impact of more units, albeit smaller ones. Similarly, there are a
good many naval analysts who question the wisdom of continued investment
in small numbers of very large hulls in the presence of the single-
shot ship-killing missile. Again, such analysts argue the merits of
more and smaller hulls independently of the possible impact on world-
wide perceptions of U.S. naval power that a larger fleet might have. Much
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the same line of argument is followed in regard to tactical aircraft
and battle tank design. (The investment cost of a 35-ton tank with
simple fire-control and other ancillaries might be not much more than
a third of the expected XM-1 cost.) With regard to each of these
questions controversy continues. In circumstances where the merits
of the case are evenly divided on cost and military-effectiveness
grounds, introduction of the perceptual factor under this second
approach might legitimately swing the balance.
There is finally a third approach to the problem, one which
would avoid the extremes of the minimalist "cosmetic" approach on the
one hand, and of the maximalist approach of perceptual -optimization on
the other. This third approach would legitimize the perceptual dimension
of defense policy, making it an accepted component of the overall
problem of maximizing the political-military utility of the defense
effort as a whole. Under this approach, estimates of the perceptual
impact of the various alternatives under consideration would be taken
into account in the decision-making process, along with the established
variables of cost, technical performance, tactical effectiveness,
strategic suitability and so on.
In practice, this would entail the development of "perceptual
impact analyses" that would be injected on a routine basis into the
decision process on weapon-system procurement, force-planning and
peacetime force-deployment. Detailed guidelines for the conduct of
such "perceptual-impact analyses" cannot be developed in the abstract,
but would require ad hoc formulation, consistent with the particular
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nature of the audience, the salient forms of communication and the
major features of the pre-existing perceptual -pol itical context.
For example, a perceptual -impact analysis of a small augmentation
(or reduction) of the US ground forces in West Germany would entail
a different "audience" than a perceptual -impact analysis of the B.l
bomber program, and it would also entail different forms of com-
munication and a different pre-existing context.
In the former case, it might be determined for example that
the primary audiences are West German and other NATO class A and
class B groups, as well as the Chinese and Russian class A audience,
more or less in that order of priority. The primary forms of com-
munication are liable to be indirect, with the German mass public
receiving the data through German media -- which are apt to transmit
the information without the gual ifications and mention of counter-
veiling factors that the original official release is liable to
include, and which American media are more likely to include. Salient
features of the pre-existing perceptual -pol itical context might include
the high profile of Soviet ground capabilities, and the residual
uncertainties that still attend the American commitment to European
defense. In the second case on the other hand, the primary audience
for the B.l bomber program is the Russian class A group; the forms of
communication will include internal Soviet intelligence channels, and
the pre-existing perceptual-political context may include notions of
manned bomber effectiveness -- a residue of Backfire advocacy --
while the notion that bombers are generally "old-fashioned" is much
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more likely to be prevalent among secondary audiences such as those
of Western Europe.
Having determined what are the relevant audiences and forms of
communication, and having defined the salient features of the pre-
existing perceptual-political context, the next step would be to
formulate tentative guidelines for the perceptual dimension of the
decision. At this stage all sorts of questions would arise: Does
the German public know how many US troops are in Germany? Or rather,
what proportion of the public a generally accurate notion of the
number of troops? To what extent is the number of troops regarded by
class A and B audiences as important per se in NATO deterrence? How
does this square with the seemingly still prevalent idea that NATO
strategy is primarily strategic-nuclear, with a tripwire ground force
component? Or is this idea no longer current? and so on. The
hypothetical guidelines themselves (generally based on the propositions
set out in Part III above), and such subordinate questions would next
have to be defined precisely so that they can be tested through actual
opinion research, primarily elite-opinion research. Finally on the
basis of tested theories a reasoned and documented perceptual input
would be made into the decision process, alongside with the cost
analysis, tactical strategic and branch-preference inputs. While
never as exact as inputs based on actual (not planned) costs and actual
(not expected) performance, the perceptual inputs thus developed should
not entail conspicuously greater uncertainties than many of the
established criteria which now govern defense decision-making. Politics
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and perceptual analysis are not exact sciences, but then neither is
the study of war.
Especially in regard to the first example given above, it may
be objected that the perceptual-political variables are already intro-
duced into defense policy, for example, through State Department
interventions on such issues as LJS. troop deployments in Europe and
Korea, and the deployment of the Sixth Fleet. (In regard to the
latter, the degree of detailed attention is such that consideration of
the possibility of withdrawing one of the two carriers in the Fleet
suffices to evoke strong State Department objections.) It is true
that in these established practices there are the rudiments of a
perceptual-political input for defense policy, but it is clear that
this is a very inadequate for it is confined to a very few issues,
notably deployment decisions of particularly high visibility. There
are no such inputs for force-structure planning or weapon-system pro-
curement decisions, and neither does it seem likely that agencies such
as State or the International Security Affairs Office of the Defense
Department would be qualified to provide detailed and continuing guidance
on the perceptual -political dimension of these areas of decision.
CONCLUSION
It was argued above that it is not possible to extract the
maximum politico-military benefit from the nation's expenditure on
its military forces, unless explicit consideration is given to the
perceptual effects of their configuration, structure and modes of
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deployment. It was further argued that it is well within the scope
of the relevant disciplines and methods to evaluate such perceptual
effects in a manner sufficiently unambiguous to allow the resulting
data to be introduced in the decision-making processes of the Depart-
ment of Defense. (This last proposition may be tested through case
studies of perceptual -impact analyses of major decision alternatives.)
It remains to devise procedures whereby the perceptual dimension of
defense policy can be integrated within the established processes of
decision. This last problem fortunately transcends the scope of the
present study.
NOTES
1. Virtually ewery press article touching on the issue includes a
comparison of Warsaw Pact and NATO military strength case in terms of
divisional counts; few articles proceed to mention other indices
(e.g. manpower totals or quality). Hardly any compare aggregate troop
quantity and force quality .
2. E.g. successive British Defence White Papers and U.S. "posture
statements."
3. See R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence :
The Soviet Union and Western Europe (London: IISS, 1975) and Ken
Booth > The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1972
(London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1974).
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4. These particular figures come from the 1974-1975 edition of the
Military Balance (London: IISS, 1974) p. 93. As the present writer
has pointed out elsewhere [The US-USSR Nuclear Weapons Balance
(Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1974), pp. 1-6.] most published assessments of
the military balance are cast in terms of materiel or human inputs
,
and not in terms of the capability outputs . It is understood that
output comparisons require the complex and uncertain evaluation of
actual combat capabilities, while input comparisons are conceptually
simple and may ever be definitive. This does not alter the fact that
input comparisons are sometimes quite meaningless, and almost always
grossly misleading.
5. Detailed reference would be pointless. Among countless examples
official and otherwise, a recent ship-count statement is quite remark-
able. In the Philadelphia Enquirer , October 30, 1975 (o.2B), RADM
Wycliffe D. Toole, Jr. is reported as follows: "Our Navy, today, has
only 483 ships .... The Soviets now have about 1,700 ships . . .
that is gray-painted ships . . . Some experts have put the real strength
of the Soviet Navy at closer to 2,200 ships."
6. As a bureaucratic tactic, the quality-quantity switch may of course
make ample sense. In terms of world-wide perceptions of US naval power,
it has been a disaster.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MEASUREMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS BALANCES:






This chapter is concerned with the problem of how one measures
the capabilities of different countries relative to specific weapons
systems (such as fighter aircraft or diesel attack submarines). After
introducing and critiquinq some methods currently employed, the writers
suggest and illustrate the use of an alternative technique entailing
multiple attribute utility (MAU) measurements. The technique
explicitly incorporates the perceptions of relevant experts in
assessing how different countries rank relative to a particular weapons
systems balance.
CURRENT METHODS OF EVALUATING MILITARY BALANCES
We will briefly review current methods employed in evaluating
military capability in order to establish a baseline from which to
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assess the utility of any new methods. One of the most commonly used
measures is overall production costs, the inference being that cap-
ability is related to these costs. A second method involves assigning
dollar values to specific technical capabilities. The Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) utilizes such a method which
values weapons systems by taking into account technological factors
such as speed, pay load, and technological innovation, as well as pro-
2
duction costs. This method recognizes that the military caDability of
weapons - and the role they play in international relations - is not
reflected in economic value alone.
A third approach which we call the inventory approach involves
counting types of equioment such as tanks, fiqhter aircraft, or sub-
marines in order to create a balance sheet. Those who construct such
balance sheets often proceed to a somewhat higher level of measurement,
incorporatinq in some way the performance characteristics of the
weapons systems on the balance sheet. John Collins 1 Library of Conqress
3
Study provides a good example of this phenomenon. Referring to the
disparity in the tactical airlift balance favorinq the Soviet Union,
he states that "this disparity is disproportionate, because nothing
in the Soviet inventory matches the performance characteristics of the
4
U.S. C-130 fleet, which is easily the world's best."
A fourth approach is the formal aqqreqation of performance
characteristics in order to assiqn quantitative values to specific
weapons systems. This approach can employ the statistical technique
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of factor analysis, in which the characteristics of a weapons system
such as an aircraft (speed, turning radius, thrust-to-weight ratio,
maximum payload) are statistically combined to produce factors such
5
as air superiority and ground support. In another variant of this
approach, ratio measures of capability are created by the simple
product of speed, payload and combat radius. In a third variant,
the Defense Intelligence Agency has developed a Theoretical Weapons
Effectiveness score, a multiplicative index combining lethality (yield
x rate of fire), accuracy (1 /CEP) and survivability (reliability x
mobility x vulnerability). Scores have been developed for over 200
Soviet weapons systems.
CRITIQUE OF CURRENT METHODS
Although the above survey of current weapons capability assessment
3
techniques was necessarily brief, it is complete enough to demonstrate
some basic methodological weaknesses. First, there is \/ery little
attention paid to the validity and reliability of indicators. For
example, SIPRI's valuation technique does not indicate the coding rules
for assigning scores to weaDons systems. The research cannot be
replicated and hence lacks validity. A second problem involves the
assumption in all of the methods that the indicators of military cap-
ability are linear. It is more likely that a weapons system will reach
the "no value" point long before the indicators used reach zero. Also,
68
the current methods do not take into account the law of diminishing
returns, or any other curvilinear^ function. A third weakness is the
lack of attention paid to aggreqation rules when multiple indicators
of military capability are employed. Does one add or multiply? A
fourth issue can be termed the "balance for what purpose" problem.
Most of the methods are not reqion or mission-specific. Despite the
wide variety of methods, most can still be categorized as "the baseball
statistician's approach." It provides the decision-maker and analyst
with a set of numbers but provides little guidance as to how to use
them to solve specific problems. "Because the decision maker cannot
understand or assimilate thousands of numbers, all only indirectly
related to the question at hand, he has no choice but to select out a
few, combine them with a large does of intuition and political savvy,
9
and make a seat-of-the-pants decision."
Perhaps the most basic weakness of these methods is the total
lack of attention paid to the role of perceptions in evaluatinq military
capability. Analysts seek to explain deterrence and arms races using
dollar valuation techniques without first demonstrating that nation-
states in fact react to money spent by their rivals and/or enemies.
Speed, payload and combat radius are assumed to be the performance
characteristics which nation-states key on in making national security
decisions. Much of this inadequacy is due to confusinq actual combat
experience with quite different phenomena such as deterrence or arms
racinq. Detailed analysis of battle outcomes may reveal the imDortance
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of characteristics which might not be important when used to explain
an arms race. For example, U.S. analysts assessing Latin American
fighter aircraft needs would probably conclude that slow aircraft with
maximum payloads would be most useful in likely combat scenarios. Yet
the Latin American preference is clearly for fast, sleek fighters.
What is needed is some method which can incorporate into this evaluation
of capability what the Latin American air forces perceive as important.
Only then can we hope to understand and forecast the development,
production^or acguisition of military capability.
MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTE UTILITY MEASUREMENT: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Faced with the above problems, particularly the problem of incor-
porating perceptions, we have applied multiple attribute utility measure-
ment (MAU) to measuring weapons system capability. The basic idea of
MAU measurement is that eyery outcome of an action (in our case, the
production or acguisition of military eguipment) has a value on a
number of different dimensions. The technigue involves discovering
these values, one dimension at a time, and then aggregating them across
dimensions using a suitable aggregation rule and weighting procedure.
Judges or experts are used to determine both values and weights. The
technigue involves a clearly defined set of steps:
Step 1. Identify Issue for Study
For the purposes of demonstrating the method, we have selected for
assessment the sea denial capability of attack submarines. Two different
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scenarios were used. First: guerilla-type attacks by submarines
against either merchant ships or non-missile surface combatants.
Second: a war-at-sea scenario. In both scenarios it was assumed that
the surface unit was alert to the possibility of attack but lacked air-
4
borne ASW (antisubmarine warfare) support. The main point in spelling
out these scenarios is to make the evaluation of weapons systems
realistic by relating their capability to a particular scenario, but
selecting scenarios that are not only typical but also of most interest
to the user of the evaluation.
Step 2: Identify Entities to be Evaluated
Torpedo-firing diesel submarines are the entities being evaluated.
Step 3: Identify the Relevant Dimensions
of Value for Evaluation of the Entities
What are the components of sea denial (submarines) which define
their military worth? U.S. naval experts agreed on the following list
of dimensions for submarines.
Submerged Displacement Number of Torpedos
Submerged Speed Torpedo Guidance Systems
Submerged Endurance Acguistion Technigues




Effective Range of Torpedo
SLAM (submarine launched anti
ship missile) Capability
Capability of County to
Operate Equipment
Step 4: Weight Dimension
12
Using Delphi or any other aggregating technique, " agreement must
be reached regarding the rank and weight of the above components in
contribution to the total military worth of the system. This is the
heart of the MAU approach.
Arguments over public policy typically turn out to hinge
on disagreements about values. Normally such disagreements are
fought out in the context of specific decisions, over and over
again, at enormous social cost each time a decision must be made.
Multiple-attribute utility measurement can spell out explicitly
what the values of each participant (decision-maker, expert,
pressure group, government, etc.) are, show how and how much they
differ. By explicitly negotiating about, agreeing on and (if
appropriate) publicizing a set of values, a decision-makinq
organization can, in effect, inform those affected by its de-
13
cisions about its ground rules.
The dimensions must be weighted preserving ratios. The least
important characteristic is assigned a score of 1, with subsequent
characteristics weighted by asking how much more important (if at all)
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is it than the least important? The mean importance weight for each
characteristic is then calculated. Some examples from the sea denial






Submerged Displacement 3.3 2.80
Submerged Speed 4.7 1.51
Number of Torpedo Tubes 4.0 3.63
Torpedo Speed 6.3 1 .97
Effective Range of Torpedo 6.2 2.14
Acquistion Techniques 7.3 1.75
These weightings point out several of the characteristics of MAU.
First, it is apparent that you can get judges (in this case N=6) to
discriminate among dimensions. Second, the level of agreement varies
considerably, as evidenced by the standard deviations.
Step 5: Judges Construct Utility Curves for Each Dimension
The judges are now asked to draw a graph. (Figure 3.1) The X-axis
of each graph represents the plausible range of performance values for
the dimension/characteristic under consideration. The Y-axis represents
the utilities (1-10) associated with the corresponding X values. This
is the second crucial aspect of MAU. Recall that one of the major
problems with current measurement schemes is the assumption of linearity
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At this step in the MAU procedure, the researcher has an opportunity
to determine empirically the shape of the characteristic's contribution
to the military worth of the entity/weapons system being evaluated.
Shown below (Figure 3.1) is a curve submitted by judges for the
characteristic "Submerged Speed" in evaluating its contribution to
the sea denial capability of a submarine.
There are two aspects of this curve-drawing procedure which need
elaboration. First, there is the point of zero utility. It is
obviously possible either to force a consensus using a Delphi approach,
or report the lack of consensus in terms of a mean and standard deviation.
If the above curve was the first iteration, a new consensus curve with
the mean speed of 8.1 knots representing zero utility would be suggested
as the group solution. The second part of the curve of interest is the
maximum utility point. Here you ask the judge at what point will more
of a certain characteristic not add any more capability for the scenario
under discussion.
Step 6: Aggregate Utility Curves
Edwards et al. reviewed the literature concerning the problems in-
volved in aggregating individual utilities into group utility functions.
They concluded that averaging presented an acceptable method for resel-
14
ving disagreement among judges. Given this conclusion, there are two
ways to average the curves. First, as previously mentioned, some sort









The second approach includes using the judges' utility curves
directly to average the values for each dimension. In the "Submerged
Speed" curve previously shown, a submarine with a submerged speed of
10 knots would receive a utility score of (0+0+0+1 .5+2. 5+3.8 )/6 =1.3.
It was necessary to take six individual utility readings, sum them, and
divide by the number of judges.
Step 7: Calculate Entity/Weapon System Utilities
At this point in the process, the anajyst marries the results of
Step 6 (utilities for each dimension) with those of Step 4 (weights
for each dimension). This is also the most hazardous step methodolog-
ically, since the analyst must decide how to combine the dimensions --
addition or multiplication. Although the theory behind aggregation is
15
rather complex, we will briefly describe the issues involved. If we
simply add the dimensions to come up with a score for a submarine, we
assume that if one of the dimensions is zero (e.g. for submarines,
torpedo speed), it can be compensated for by a high value on another
dimension. In a theoretical sense, therefore, very few weapons systems
could be evaluated using the additive rule. In reality, however,
weapons systems rarely are produced with a total lack of value on a
dimension, allowing us to use the additive rule in most cases. For the
submarine study, the weighted utilities of all the sea denial components
of submarines were added, producing the following selected results.
(Maximum score is 20.00).
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Scenario #2
Type 209 SS 19.75
Oberon SS 18.18
Foxtrot SS 17.44
Guppy III SS 17.23
Tiburon SS 9.59
Scenario #1
Guppy III SS 20.00
Foxtrot SS 15.42
Type 209 SS 15.38
Oberon 14.78
Tiburon 10.24
Note that the judges have been able to discriminate between
scenarios. A Guppy III SS in the sneak attack scenario has a maximum
amount of capability but is definitely less capable against more oppo-
sition. The opposite is true of the German 209,- which fares much better
in an open sea environment.
Step 8: Integrate Human Factors
Probably the most frequent criticism of quantitative approaches
to valuating weapons systems is that the system's value will depend
on terrain, tactics and operator proficiency. Hence the effort at
combat modeling. However, it is the assumption of this research that
decision-makers key on a few basic variables. One of these
is the ability of a nation to
operate the equipment. It became quickly apparent that the MAU tech-
nique could not be applied in this case, since there were no indicators
such as speed, turning radius, etc. which could be applied to questions
of competence of operator, maintenance proficiency, logistics, etc.
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The search for an alternative method was constrained by the fact
that it had to produce ratio level d&ta which could be mathematically
combined with the platform utility scores developed in Step 8.
The method selected was the constant sum method. The method
calls upon the judge to consider ewery possible pair of instances.
Within each pair, the judge is asked to divide 100 points between
the two instances in accordance with the absolute ratio of the greater
to the lesser. The judges in the sea denial study were asked to eval-
uate a specific country's capability to successfully operate torpedo-
firing diesel submarines in an open sea denial mission. The instructions
suggested that evaluations might be based in part on a demonstrated
capability to perform the open ocean mission, the presence of the tech-
nology and training necessary for successful accomplishment of the
mission, and the ability of a particular nation to man the platforms
with competent crews. The purpose of the suggestions was to focus the
judge's attention on an evaluation of the personnel factors.
A judge who evaluated Egypt and Syria with a 50-50 score is saying
that their personnel capability is equal. If another judge rates Israel
-
Tunisia 30-20, he is saying that Israel's navy personnel are four times
as capable as Tunisia's. The aggregation technique used to go from the
individual splits to a ratio scale is straight-forward, but lengthy, so
the reader is referred to Torgerson's Theory and Methods of Scaling .
Some examDl es of the scores produced by this method are listed below.















The judges have one final task, that of assessing the relative
importance of human versus equipment factors for each of the scenarios.
In the cast of the diesel submarines, the factors were judged to be
roughly equivalent. The total score, therefore, for an Iranian 209 SS
in scenario 2 = 14.26+19.75 = 34.01. The same submarine in Iraqi
hands has a value of 5.87+19.75 = 25.62.
Step 9: Assign Country Capability Score
The final step in the process is to produce a country score. In
our above example, the value of 34.01 calculated for an Iranian 209 SS
submarine is multiplied times the number in service. It is here that
the value of creatinq ratio-level data is appreciated, since this final
step can only be taken with ratio data. Excerpted below are some examples
of country scores for scenario 2 sea denial capability, evaluating only
submarines.
Turkey 3297 Greece 1511
North Korea 3006 South Korea








AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MAU 'APPROACH
As the reader has most likely concluded, there is much more to
the MAU technique than has been summarized here. However, assuming
that this brief introduction to MAU has been sufficient, we now return
to our original set of problems in order to assess whether in fact MAU
is a step in the right direction.
Briefly reviewing our critique of current methods, we can see
that MAU directly addresses the questions of data validity and relia-
bility. An indicator of military capability is said to be va 1 i
d
if it
is an "adequate measure of what it is supposed to represent." We are
also told that "concepts are judged not by their truth or falsity, but
by their theoretical utility." It is apparent that thds "validity" is
greatly influenced by the perceptions of those using it. Data re!
i
ability
is even more related to perceptions, since it concerns whether or not
an indicator of military balance "yields results that are consistent in
successive measurements of the same case." Do successive observers
looking at the same phenomenon all see the same thina? By explicitly
involving the decision-maker (or his analysts) in the construction of
the indicators of capability, valid and reliable indicators are much
more likely to emerge.
30
The second problem of linearity is overcome in that MAU gives
the judges an opportunity to depict curvilinear relationships if they
exist. Third, although we did not go into it in great detail in this
paper, MAU quite explicitly addresses the problem of how to agqregate
the dimensions of military capability. And fourth, the technique
clearly focuses on the balance associated with the use of a specific
type of hardware in a mission-oriented scenario. It does not focus on
general balances such as the overall naval balance.
By far the biggest contribution MAU has made to the process of
evaluating military capability is its explicit incorporation of per-
ceptions. To highlight these contributions, we refer to Luttwak's
chapter in this book in which he outlines several problems encountered
when non-technical observers assess military balances. In essence,
these problems result from not considering perceptions. Does the MAU
technique alleviate any of these problems?
Luttwak points out that force-level figures are readily absorbed
because numbers are conceptually simple in themselves. MAU is parti-
cularly susceptible to misuse on this account. Numbers have a way of
being locked in once calculated. For example, will the personnel score
for Saudi Arabia be changed as their performance improves? Only if
the judges opinions are tapped on a systematic basis. It is also
prudent to build into any data analysis system based on MAU a range of
values, so that the analyst can conduct sensitivity tests wtih his
indicators.
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Luttwak also talks about numbers requiring a context. The
scenario-specific aspect of our example confronts this problem
directly. A third issue raised concerns the fact that individual
numbers are readily absorbed but an accumulation of numbers may not be.
This is a problem that can be readily solved with a data retrieval/
display system capable of taking basic MAU findings, storing them,
and trending the balances over time. The fourth issue is that per-
formance data are readily absorbed, but only if a clearly understood
index of normality is provided. MAU specifically provides an oppor-
tunity for the decision-maker (or his analysts) charged with computing
capability to provide such an index, i.e. during the construction of
the weights and utility curves. The judges are specifically asked to
show at what point a weapons system has zero utility. More importantly,
this is a psychic baseline reflecting the multitude of variables being
processed' by the human brain.
Luttwak also refers to the problem of qualitative information
being absorbed only if it can be conveyed in visual terms or in verbal
imagery. The constant sum approach used to calculate country personnel
scores in our study relies heavily on verbal imagery. In many cases
the judge will have worked with foreign navies, read intelligence
reports, etc., all of which contribute to the image he has of a country's
naval personnel. It was the one step in the process where the components
of the attribute could not be disaqqregated, and the total image was
relied on.
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Luttwak's last two observations are the most relevant to MALI.
He hypothesizes that personal experience of the reality of on-going
military activities may have a wholly disproportionate impact on per-
ceptions of military capabilities. This is clearly a danqer for MAU
in that judges may be biased in this regard. On the other hand, MAU
forces the judge to look at all of the components of a particular
system, one at a time, thereby increasing the probability that a U.S.
naval pilot judge will not underestimate Soviet anti-carrier capabilities,
And finally, there is the problem of non-technical observers giving
greater value to technologically advanced features in military equip-
ments than is warranted by their actual contribution to force-effective-
ness. In a sense, the MAU technique is neutral regarding this problem,
since all the technique can do is make clear the preferences of the
judges. If Peruvian Air Force officer judges heavily weight sDeed
and sleekness in evaluating fighter aircraft capability, so be it.
The advantage is that these biases are in the open and can be taken
into account.
Overall, the MAU technique appears to solve many of the problems
involved when perceptions are not considered. In addition, the technique
explicitly recognizes that human experience and analytical capabilities
cannot be duplicated by a machine. MAU builds on these human judgements.
On a related point, human analysts who serve as experts constantly up-
date their knowledge. Any data system which periodically taps this
83
knowledge automatically updates itself in a fashion impossible to
duplicate. The flexibility of the technique should also be mentioned.
If your judgement-based balance proves to be in error (e.g. your cal-
culated imbalance caused you to react in a fashion that was counter-
4
productive) you have an explicit record of how the faulty balance was
calculated. Such a system forces the decision-maker to look at which
analysts were on the mark and for what reasons. It tells you how much
of a consensus you have amongst your experts regarding a specific
balance. MAU allows the decision-maker to close the feedback loop.
Do perceptions match reality? For example, did the increase in
sea denial capability of country X really force rival
country Y to acquire the same, as your exDerts predicted?
PROBLEM AREAS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
There are certain questions that have been raised in regard to
applyinq the MAU technique to the evaluation of military capabilities,
the answers to which serve to hiohlight the strengths, weaknesses and
potential of the method. First, there are a host of technical questions,
particularly regarding the aggregation rules. The key problem for those
using the method are those weapons systems with extreme values on a
particular dimension. To this point, MAU has been used for the sea
denial and air superiority missions. Further work on other missions
and weapons systems will be required before these technical problems
are solved.
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A second set of questions revolve around the selection and
availability of experts. If a method relies totally on expert judg-
ment, such a problem is not trivial. If one is concerned with an
objective, technical statement of the military balance, the problem
indeed exists. However, if we assume that balances are constructed
and utilized by policymaking organizations, the MAU approach is more
useful. The guiding principle here is that the policymaker will task
a clearly defined group of experts, normally from his organization.
One only has to look at the varying estimates of the Soviet Navy
within the U.S. government to see this phenomenon at work. This
approach is obviously well -suited to the bureaucratic politics model
of policymaking. There is no "objective" version of the balance, only
various "organizational" versions. Therefore, the problem of using the
best judges is much easier to solve.
A third aspect of the MAU technique which some have questioned is
the idea that the overall capability of a weapons system cannot be
evaluated in a rigorous sense without disaggregatinq it into capability
dimensions. We have conducted a significant amount of tests which show
that experts can reliably rank-order specific aircraft and ships as to
capability. However, the multi-dimensional aspect of modern weapons
systems does not allow the expert to evaluate how much more capable
one system is than another. There are methods available to translate
rank-order data into interval level data. But as we have seen, the key
to calculating country capability scores is creating a ratio score for
85
a weapons system which can then be multiplied by the number in the
inventory. In a sense, there is a dilemma. On one hand, MAU assumes
that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, an assumption which
does not completely capture the essence of a weapons system. On the
other hand, a weapons system is too complex to evaluate it holistically
without running into the perceptual biases mentioned earlier.
Finally, it must be stated that MAU is a method reserved for specific we
balances. In no way should the method be used to construct a total
military capability score for a country. The most we can expect from
such a method is a series of balances analogous to the various dials
and meters on an aircraft. Each dial, in our case a mission-specific
balance, represents an accurate reading, but only the pilot or the
policymaker can combine them fora.net assessment of the overall situation.
The fact that such a new assessment may be fraught with errors and
biases does not detract from the necessity to construct valid and
reliable weapons balance estimates which incorporate perceptions.
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THE STATUS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
SUPERPOWER STRATEGIC BALANCE:
DIFFERING AMERICAN VIEWS*
Senator John Culver and twenty-two otlwr senators of both parties sponsored a unique
gathering of some of the well-known participants in the ongoing debate over U.S.
security policies. The congressional conference was held on May 11-12, 1977 in the
Caucus Room of the U.S. Senate. T!ie Honorable Stuart Symington returned to the Senate
for the first time since Iiis retirement to moderate a wide-ranging discussion that focused
on defense priorities and prescriptions for the next quarter-century. The twenty-three
panelists, not all of w!wm are quoted here, represented a thorough mix of professional
experiences and points of view. Their opening remarks, in which they assess the super-
power balance as well as what they sec as important strategic trends, are excerpted below.
SENATOR JOHN CULVER:
Seldom
in our history has the United States faced such crucial decisions about national security
policy, decisions with such far-reaching consequences. We have emerged from one war
in Southeast Asia with no clear national consensus other than to avoid a repetition of
that particular kind of conflict. We are facing a rapidly changing world in which many
of our long-established ideas and approaches are being challenged by new constellations
of problems and forces.
In assembling this distinguished panel, every effort has been made to get the best
exposition possible of differing opinions in the wide spectrum of national defense
philosophy. Only by considering all sides of these issues can we hope to attain insight
and overview.
*Originally published as "Documentation: U.S. National
Security-1 977-2001," International Security , II, 2 (Fall, 1977),
pp. 171-183. Excerpted here with the permission of the President
and Fellows of Harvard College.
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PAUL N1TZE (Chairman of Policy Studies of the Committee on the Present Danger;
former Under Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and U.S. SALT Delegate):
(of.national defense)
It seems to me that one must look at the problem/as beini; twofold—what one can
achieve through arms control and then what is necessary to add through our own defense
program. The intention is that the total of what one gets through arms control, plus
one's own weapon development program, results in balance and in- a maintenance of
crisis stability. I think this is important to the peace of the world and important to our
defense—simply an important foundation for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
The question has been asked, "What is the status of the United States' ability to defend
itself against attack in the 1977-19S5 period?" I would consider that to be a misformula-
tion of the problem. I do not believe that the Soviet Union wants war. I believe they
intend to accomplish their objectives without war, if possible. I think it is important that
there be a balance and that we maintain crisis stability through the combination of arms
control and of the defenses which we ourselves deploy.
RAY CL1NE (Executive Director of Studies at Georgetown University Center for
Strategic and International Studies; former Deputy Director of the CIA and Director of
Intelligence and Research at the State Department): I think Secretary Nitze is correct in
saying that the danger that confronts this country in the period we are talking abou'
is not that the USSR will decide to rain nuclear bombs on this country or even on our
allies in Western Europe. The danger is that the Soviet Union intends to continue to
change the global balance of power—military, economic, and political— in a direction
unfavorable to the United States. It seems to me that they have been fairly successful in
starting trends in that direction which, if continued into the 19S5 period, will leave us
in a much diminished position of power and influence. In a sense, we are like decaying
gentility, facing adverse circumstances without deciding what to do about them.
I think the real dilemma that confronts this country is that we had a period of excep-
tional strategic good fortune in which our political, economic and military links to
important nations around the world —nations that wanted our friendship, wanted our
cooperation, and above ail, did not wish to be dominated by any totalitarian power,
particularly not by the Soviet Union—chose to work with us and strengthened our influ-
ence in diplomatic and strategic affairs. The alliance system is what is threatened today,
because of the growing feeling that the Soviet Union is on a dynamic upward course in
rll of the aspects of national power—not just the military aspect
—
and that the United
States is not very clear about what it should do in the face of that kind of challenge.
It seems clear to me that the key factors in international power and influence have to
do with the intangibles more than with the concrete military and economic facts of life.
Those intangibles are a sense of clear and coherent national purpose, a strategy for the
country in its interests and national affairs .^nd, above all, a coherence of political will
—
a political determination to prot?c' the nation and to carry out its strategy, whatever
it may be.
HERBERT SCOVILLE (Secretary of the Arms Control Association: former Deputy Direc-
tor of the CIA): I do nor believe that the strategic balance is as delicate at the moment as
some would have us believe. In fact, I think both superpowers have such large strategic
forces that any changes that can occur in a short period of time will not seriously alter
that balance at all. Secondly, I think that the strategic balance is very stable at the
moment. There is no threat th.u either side c^n destroy a significant portion of the
deterrents of the other side.
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On the other hand, this situation may not Inst very long—not that the deterrent as a
whole is going to be eroded, because there is no visible threat to the submarine—for there
is an increasing threat to the land-based ICBM part of our force. It is the new weapon
programs on the part of both the Soviet Union and ourselves which, over a period of
time, will decrease this stability. The development of MIRV, heavy ICBMs with improved
accuracies on the part of the Soviet Union, the MX, and 'the Mark 12-A warhead for the
Minute Man III are all examples of destabilizing technology.
I think we are much stronger than perhaps the general public has any concept of. I do
not agree with Ray Clinc that the trend is all that disturbingly against us. Not only have
we in the last five years increased the sizes of our strategic forces at a more rapid rate
than has the Soviet Union, but I do not see any sign that that is particularly changing.
It is true that we are now finishing our MIRV programs while the Soviet Union is
just starting theirs. But we have programs for a whole series of new generation strategic
weapons which will still further increase the war-making potential of our strategic
forces. So I see nothing to indicate that we won't continue to have an advantage,
although I find this advantage somewhat mythical and not very practical since neither side
can use these forces anyway.
The security of all of us would be much better off if instead of these buildups on both
sides, we went to arms control measures, particularly those arms control measures
which would affect the qualitative race. Numbers don't make much difference anymore;
the real threat is with new types of weapons.
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FRED WARNER NEAL (Chairman of the International Relations Faculty at Claremont
Graduate School; Chairman of the Executive Committee on U.S. -Soviet Relations): It
seems to me that our discussion can only be meaningful if it is placed in the overall
American foreign policy context, especially with reference to overall American policy
towards the Soviet Union.
So far as the hardware is concerned and so far as the Soviet military buildup is
concerned, there is, of course, a wide opinion in the United States that the Soviet Union
is ahead of us in certain categories. What is more significant, I think, is what the
perception is in Moscow. I don't think the perception in Moscow is like that at all. The
Soviet Union for a great many years has very much been behind the United States in ail
weapon categories. What it has been doing for a decade, at least as i"^d to be said in
trotting races, is coming up fast on the outside. They won't stop—short of some kind
of international agreement—and perhaps not even then, because of a suspicion that the
Americans will keep going ahead. And the Americans will not refrain from going ahead
because of a suspicion that if the Russians do achieve what they think is equalny, rhey
won't stop.
EARL RAVEMAL (Adjunct Professor of American Foreign Policy, SA1S, Johns Hopkins;
former Department of Defense official): I would agree with Paul Nitzc's statement that
we should consider in conjunction the qu-rstion of arms control and the question of the
unilateral policies that we apply to the design of our forces. To a large extent the
objectives of arms control are the same as the objectives toward which we design our
strategic forces.
I don't have any doubt that some kind of a mutually agreeable arrangement will be
worked out between the United States and the Soviet Union, roughly within the time
limits of the present interim agreement and roughly within the parameters of the
October 1976 version of the accords of November 1974— that is, the modifications of
numbers and the possible remedies for the current stalemate over the Soviet Backfire
bomber and the American cruise missile programs.
But 1 think it ought to be recognized that such an agreement will not satisfy nearly
all American strategic thinkers on the issue of strategic stability. There will still be
contention and arguments that the Soviets will be capable within these negotiated limits
of building the kinds of forces that might be, in a crisis, capable of destabilizing the
strategic balance. And I think that the arguments of those who take this pessimistic
view should not be ignored. I think they have to be countered, and they have to be
countered not only in words, but by a program oi supplementary American moves,
unilateral if necessary, to reestablish the balance.
We can tailor our forces in the direction of reestablishing and ensuring strategic
stability, but we cm do it on the down side. We can do it with fewer weapons and
less of a force. In the case oi strategic arms competition, less is not less, less can be more.
But less certainly can be enough.
WILLIAM F COLBY (Former Director of the Centra! Intelligence Agency): I think the
subject of our strategic power must be looked at without a myopia. This is a problem
that our country has had in many situations where we focus on only one problem of the
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strategic situation. The most outrageous example of that was when we focused on the
military aspect of the Vietnam War and made a mistake of ignoring for many years the
political and guerrilla aspects. When we look at the strategic balance in the world today,
we should not only look at the large weapons systems that we and the Soviets confront
each other with, but we also need to look at the conventional weapons and the many
other problems that wc have. Our most serious threats today probably are in Western
Europe on the conventional level—conventional threats which we for years have thought
to meet by going to nuclear warfare on the tactical level.
Furthermore, I believe that there are real strategic problems ahead, and that we have
to put the fact of the imbalance of economics and of so;ial good in the world into our
equation when we think of strategic security. Indeed we can spend great sums of
money matching large Soviet weapons, and ignore the sums that would be necessary to
match Soviet conventional force. But expenditures must also be used to conduct positive
political and economic programs with respect to that three-quarters of the earth's
humanity that lives in the third world so that wc can get these peoples of the world to be
our friends instead of our enemies. Indeed such underdevelopment is the most dangerous
problem we have. We cannot look upon our own budgetary problems as an argument
to support how little we arc spending on economic programs and assistance and trade
relations with these parts of the world. By worrying only about strategic weapons we
will indeed be fighting the wrong war. We need to avoid another myopia in which we
focus on a numbers balance in weapons, and instead turn to a consideration of what
is sufficient to meet the threat—the threat in the super weapons, the threat in the conven-
tional weapons, but also the threat in terms of economic and political chaos around
the world.
CHARLES YOST (Aspen Institute Program in Communication and Society; former
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations): I am happy to note that there seems to be
general agreement that the Soviet Union is unlikely to'initiate a direct attack upon us.
As Mr. Scoville has pointed out, the size and character of our arsenal is such that
strategic deterrence cannot be eroded or shortened in a space of time, particularly our
submarine based deterrent.
Well, if this is so, what is the major threat? I don't always agree with Henry
Kissinger, but I would like to read one sentence from a statement he made just before he
left the State Department. He said, "I would say that if there is a conflict between the
Soviet Union and us, it is much less likely to occur as a result of a Soviet attack than as
a result of a conflict that maybe neither of us foresaw, under which we were drawn
through a series of escalating moves."
In other words, I think World War I is a better guide to our current dangers than
World War II. If that is correct, I would suspect that our major danger is one that has
been referred to by several of the speakers, competion in the third world; these 100 new
states where the escalating, competitive moves by both superpowers could lead us into
a war that neither has planned nor wanted. One of our central security concerns should
be to find means of restraining and controlling this competition. The danger arises from
the Soviets attempting to upset in some of these critical thud world areas what they sec
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as an unfavorable situation. And there I feel that we should engage in a much more
serious negotiation with them in order to avoid this eventuality. As Mr. Colby suggests,
we should concentrate on putting more of our resources on strengthening countries
themselves so that they are much less susceptible to foreign exploitation.
REAR ADMIRAL GENE LA ROCQUE, USN, Ret. (Director, Center for Defense
Information): Several times die term "military balance" has come up. I don't think that
there is such a thing as a military balance. It is the military imbalance, and it is
disequilibrium, it is instability; the military on both sides cannot live with a balance.
The job of the military is to win, and I think we ought to take that into account as we
deliberate. Unfortunately, though, if you use the term "military balance," and it is
current today, you can persuade the American people that if you just pur a little more
weight on our side it will bring things into our favor, and then we are all going to be
safe. But the U.S. has been ahead of the Soviet Union by at least five years in the develop-
ment of every major strategic weapons system.
Appropos of the SALT talks, I think if we look realistically at the ones that have taken
place, none of them have really significantly increased our national defense or our
national security. That is not to say that we ought not to continue them, but basically we
are less secure after the SALT agreements than we were before we started. We are less
secure today with the more money we spend and the more weapons systems we develop
than we were before we undertook them.
I think we could take some very positive initiatives, and sober initiatives, in recogni-
tion of the fact that we can destroy all life on this planet. Just about three months ago
China tested one nuclear weapon, and the people in Philadelphia and Baltimore were told
to stay inside and wash their vegetables. One nuclear weapon. We are talking about
unleashing some 20,000 strategic nuclear weapons, and if we use all of our tactical force
as well, as are talking of 50,000 nuclear weapons, so that it is not a matter of hiding in
the ground for a little while; we are talking about destroying all life on this planet.
I think the United States ought to suggest and agree to stop testing nuclear weapons
for a period of two years. It wouldn't hurt us a bit. I think we ought to stop building
more nuclear weapons for a period of two years. Simply stop spending more each year
for our military budget.
LT. GEN. ROYAL ALLISON, USAF, Ret. (Consultant on oil and energy; former
United States SALT Delegate): When we were engaged in the SALT negotiations, I was
asked rather frequently during the period that we were here in Washington as to why
I thought the Soviets wish to negotiate with us on strategic arms After the first and
second sessions, it seems to me that the Soviets wanted to negotiate a position that
would be publicly looked upon as one of strategic equality with the United States. That
kind of strategic equality is purely a matter o! perception. We must be sure that we
perceive our own strengths correctly, that we perceive the Soviet strengths as correctly
as we can, and when we consider our own strength we do not do it by counting compara-
tive weapon systems and fatalities. Those kinds ol evaluations can be very misleading.
1 want to make some more specific comments on weapons A'.td negotiations. I will do
it in the reverse order, because I think we are strong. The United States should not fear
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to negotiate at any time at any place with anyone. When we started the SALT negotia-
tions we considered— I considered, and I believe those of us with whom I was working
considered— it a first step in a long, long haul. We were going to have to have patience.
We should not expect an immediate solution. There were no quick answers to these
things. Sometimes as I read what is written these days, I wonder if these commentators
remember how difficult it was to get the negotiations started, and that when they were
started we were saying to ourselves just what I am saying now, that we are in this for a
very long haul.
Now the second thing on weapons—numbers arc not the sole answer. I believe very
deeply, however, that one of the most important offsetting factors for the United States
is our technology, our scientific ability, our research and development—essentially the
ability that we have proved over the years to do the very nearly impossible. We have
had men walk on the moon, for example, and no one else has. So when we talk about
weaponry and numbers, I suggest that we should always reserve to ourselves the right
to let the minds of men create what the minds of men will create. We don't stand the
chance of a snowball in a hot place of verifying qualitative controls on technology.
This being the case, we should think long and hard before we forego the right to develop
ourselves the things that we know we can, and we believe the other fellow might develop
if he had time.
JOHN STEINBRUNER (Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University;
Editorial Board Member, International Security): Let me underline a few things which
I think are going to become of great importance over the period we have been talking
about. We live in a world in which political crisis appears to be academic. It will require
different conceptual ideas to master the many issues in this area having to -io with
command and control. Exercising intelligent military command over far-flung, very
extensive military forces with peculiar vulnerabilities requires far more study. We
really have got to put this at the center of our defense planning and we have not done so.
The second point I would try to underline is that I think we ought to recognize that
we have a very bad history in interpreting the Soviet Union. We have been wrong
about them in their strategic programs and in important respects since the mid 1960s.
These errors come about for honest reasons. The Soviets are very difficult to read. They
don't tell us as much as we would like to know. Yet it is becoming increasingly
important that we get it right.
So I believe that one of the most important strategic problems of the future is simply
better intelligence analysis of the enemy. We have been very casual and somewhat
ideological in this respect for a number of years, and I think we have to get much more
sophisticated about understanding the enemy that we definitely have.
COL. JOHN COLLINS, USA, Ret. (Senior Specialist in National Defense, Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress) : It is pretty clear to me that increasing Soviet
capabilities across the board, not just strategic nuclear capabilities, leave the United
States less secure than it was a few years ago. I would suggest to you all, as an example,
that essential equivalence is the poorest possible force structure standard that the United
States could use in approaching the SALT table. It clouds our true requirements. It
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causes us to react to Soviet holdings rather than to our own needs. It causes us to buy
things we don't need and at the same time to slight the things we do.
I can guarantee to you that there is no way to reverse that trend until we find some
way to identify our true requirements. That is not going to happen until we can relate
all of these forces and funds to an agreed foreign policy, which we do not have today,
and until we can relate all of these forces and funds to a sound military strategy, which
we do not have today— in fact, we don't even have an effective way to formulate
conceptual strategy in the United States. It is certainly not being done in the Department
of Defense. It is not being done in the Joint Chiefs of Stalf. It is not being done in any
of the military services. You think perhaps that the National Security Council is going
to pull all this together, that this is where the conceptual planning takes place. I car. tell
you that that is false.
The National Security Council is geared to crisis management, not to conceptual
planning. I would like to tell everybody that will listen to me that strategy is like
research and development. It has two pieces. One piece is called basic scientific research,
and the other is called applied technology. In the field of strategy, there isn't- anybody in
the United States, to my knowledge, who is really on the basic scientific research side.
Everybody who thinks he is playing strategy in this country is on the applied technology
side, and as a result the decisionmakers at the top levels of your government are playing
with strategic concepts that were put together 10 or 15 years ago to satisfy requirements
which have long since disappeared.
You can spend this Treasury dry without insuring better security unless you find some
effective way to relate forces and funds back to strategy and foreign policy. That is
my message.
LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM, USA, Ret. (Professor of Advanced International Studies,
University of Miami; former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency): Those who
believe that strategic equivalence and parity is a reasonable point of view for the United
States forget one thing, and that is that our society demands that in all of our military
planning we yield the initiative to our adversary, because we cannot base our forces on
the proposition that we will attack or launch aggression against our major adversary.
Any military man can tell you that parity plus initiative is superiority.
In the last six or eight years the curve for the United States has been generally down-
ward. I would take it that Dr. Scoville was talking about having more individual war-
heads or something. But if you take the general trends in those same capabilities that
have been downward for the United States, upward tor the Soviet Union, at some point
the lines either have crossed, are crossing, or will cross. That is the important matter,
not what the precision o( the balance is today.
DEREK LEEBAERT (Research Fellow, Harvard University; Managing Editor, Interna-
tional Security): Discussion of military power and the superpower balance—or imbal-
ance—could not he more timely. This administration has brought a new dynamic to the
development and deployment of nuclear as well as conventional weapons. But what
remains to be considered lor the coming quarter century is how this power will be
translated into international influence in a time of decreasing military utility.
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We not only have to question what wc actually mean by "security," but we must
appreciate that traditional global military assessments are becoming increasingly
anachionistic. One thinks of NATO as it approaches its thirtieth anniversary. In this
case alliance cohesion is far less threatened by external military aggression than by
internal disarray. Economic, political, and sociological concerns have become integral
parts of any defense calculus.
Perhaps the most provocative part of any security-related prognosis is the new
distribution of both defense expenditures and the proclivities to use force. According to
ACDA, military outlays for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the less developed countries
rose 23, 29, and TOO percent respectively. Other indicators, such as defense spending as
a proportion of GNP and expansion of military manpower, also greatly favored the
underdeveloped rather than the developed world. What is even more distressing is that
"gunboat diplomacy" is becoming vastly more commonplace in the third world as it is
shunned as valueless by the Western democracies. The examples can be easily recounted.
New influences in a new context, then, must be central to our discussion.
PHILIP KARBER (Vice President of BDM, Inc.; Consultant to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense): What we need to point out today—and here I disagree with General Graham
—is that in the last few years, granting a trail-off following the Vietnam War, the trend
in U.S. defense expenditures is decidedly upwards. There are not two curves crossing
someplace out on the horizon; rather there are two curves going up. And in the case
of the United States, let's be very specific in overall dollar terms. I have the budget figures
in front of me. The fiscal budget 1976 in total obligational authority for the United States
was $110.8 billion. The estimate for 1977 is $116.9 billion, an increase of 5 percent.
Furthermore, even in the slight reductions that Harold Brown has made in the budget
proposed by the Republican Administration, this Administration is proposing an
increase this year in real dollar terms of 3.5 percent. So the U.S. trend is up.
I would also raise an issue that we haven't discussed here before— that of nuclear
proliferation. I would hope that somehow we might bring the arms race between the
United States and the Soviet Union a little bit more under control through negotiation
so that we can devote more of our diplomatic and political resources to being concerned
about the problem of the future—other countries getting the bomb.
I think in that area it would be in our interest to cooperate with and to get further
agreements with the Soviet Union, to end now the friction that is clearly occurring
between the two countries so that we can look to the important problems of the future,
one of them certainly being proliferation.
SENATOR CULVER: If I understand the tenor of the discussion today, it essentially
discounts the likelihood of an active nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. But it
seems to me that one of the most likely scenarios one might envision, given nuclear
proliferation, is not only the more obvious possibility of introduction of nuclear weapons
in war because of the proliferation of "scorpions," but the more likely problem posed by
sub-government action, terrorists, and civil war. Here certain elements of even less
stability possess a nuclear capability and wish to employ it in scenarios of terrorism or
sabotage or blackmail.
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More specifically, given the relative case of attaining a crude nuclear weapons
capability—a capability with nevertheless devastating intimations— I am thinking more
in terms of someone in New York who calls President Carter and indicates he has the
bomb and is going to blow up New York if certain demands are not met.
What is the capability of the United States in its current defense posture or intelligence
determination to cope and deal with that kind of situation? 1 would suggest for the sake
of our discussion that it may well be a far more realistic threat to our survival and
political, economic, and social stability.
Secondly, what actually are the most important components of strategic power? But I
think that this more specifically raises questions as to what are the elements over
and above the simplistic arithmetic of the military balance, which everyone has also
agreed has had limitations in effecting an accurate assessment and evaluation of the
balance. What about the largei questions that necessarily should be part and parcel of
an appropriate evaluation of the strategic balance as distinguished from the military
balance?
Again, the qualities and strength of the economic system that is enjoyed by the major
powers, the political confidence in their institutions, the morale and the welfare of their
people, and most importantly, the reliance of potential allies on the respective sides are
all parts of any assessment of the balance. It has been suggested that the Russians are
8 or 12 feet tall, and what not. Cut the Soviet Union is the only nation in the world
that currently is not only surrounded by forward positions—even tactical and strategic
nuclear threats. But it is also the only communist country that is surrounded by hostile
communist powers.
In the event of a conventional initiation of war what arc the implications of the
political reliability or unreliability of allies? How docs that impact on the balance and
relative military strength? I have thrown out a couple of things, but I think we should
really focus on two issues here—one is *he larger strategic general balance and its
equilibrium (including the elements and factors that should be addressed in such an
assessment), and secondly this more likely contingent threat to our security and survival
posed by the nuclear capabilities of subnational groups and terrorists.
HERBERT YORK (Professor of Physics, University of California-San Diego; former
Director of DDR&E at the Defense Department): 1 want to comment on the question of
terrorism whether by individuals or small groups. 1 think that nuclear terrorism has
been considerably exaggerated—exaggerated on several grounds. The great terrorists of
history have all been chiefs of state, not private individuals who have somehow gone and
gathered and stolen some plutonium or some other kind of dangerous material at the
time. The prime danger is proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, and their
possible use by those states in some uncontrolled way. 1 also think that the stories about
how ca^y it is to build atomic bombs, while not literally false in the strict technical sense,
have always been greatly exaggerated. It is nowhere near as easy as people have sug-
gested. The probability of being caught is much higher than has been allowed for, as is
the probability of failure in a dangerous mode. So I don't agree with the implication that
I believe I heard here— the possibility that the use ot nuclear weapons may be more
common to terrorists than to states. It is quite the reverse.
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MAJ. GEN.CEORCE KEECAN,USAF, Ret. (Former Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence): I am glad to report that for the first time in 20 years Dr. York and I have
something to agree on. Talk of economic, psychological, subversive, terrorist acts and so
forth, I think, have obscured the strategic and tactical questions.
The point I would like to make is this: there is a remarkable body of Soviet evidence
that is widely available but seldom read and examined in the free world on questions of
military balance, on the questions of total conflict, and how they view and treat
surprise. There are not only strategic, tactical, and psychological implications, but also
discussions of how these factors are involved in negotiations. That evidence is available.
There is a great breadth of translated material on the subject.
With regard to the central character of those materials, it has been my observation
that the Soviets have an absolute obsession with strategic power in its broadest dimen-
sion whether involving economics, the arts of diplomacy, or trade negotiations. They
must come out ahead. This is all a part of the entire dimension of Soviet power with
which we must cope. But I think where I enter the picture is at the baseline of all of
this—the strategic questions—and there the merits are important.
The Soviets are determined to hold the high ground of strategic superiority because
their doctrine, unlike, ours, is not focused at avoidance of war. They instead focus on
being able to prevail in war and conflict in all of its dimensions—nuclear, conven-
tional, tactical, scientific, and technical.
What you see today is 60 years of crushing their peasantry, bleeding their economy,
and disregarding the legitimate needs of society in order that they could advance in this
power calculus. Such military advancement is what they seek.
WILLIAM WHITSON (Chief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Con-
gressional Research Service of the Library of Congress): I would like to address myself
to Senator Culver's second question.
We all, I think, have correctly identified almost every factor by which people gain
strategic and tactical power. But I believe his second question is really how do we
measure the trade-off between military power versus economic and political power
—
particularly when we have to translate that measurement into budgets, into legislation,
into forces and programs, ct cetera. This really relates to John Collins' comment in terms
of that kind of calculus. We really have no adequate bureaucratic procedure today. We
have taught ourselves to handle military strategy separately. But in search for the
trade-off, I am reminded really of the central question: Should we structure our forces
in terms of what makes us feel more secure, quite apart from what others may perceive,
or should wc structure our forces in order to make the Soviets stay more worried, or
the Chinese? And we get different answers on the questions if we focus on one part
of the question versus the other.
The Chinese— really as late as the end of the Vietnam War, according to their docu-
ments—believed that the United States had, considering everything, superiority over
the Soviets. They didn't believe this solely because of our material power but instead
because of our flexibility, our ability to move and project power.
Chinese observers worry now about one thing, I think, that has perhaps not yet been
discussed by this group. They worry about our national will, our consensus, our ability
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to achieve national agreement. And they call that the fear of Munich, a lack of firmness
which others have raised at this table.
SEN. EDWARD KENNEDY: 1 believe that it is totally appropriate to think now of what
national security really means in terms of the American people, as'well as to our allies
overseas and to those who depend upon American will and its capacity to respond in
strategic as well as conventional warfare.
I think security means many entirely different things to people in other parts of the
world. In fact, someone just came back from the World Health Conference this weekend.
He stated that there are SO million children that are born every year. Ten million of
them are being immunized yet many millions of them arc dying, despite all the petitions
of those ministers of health and social welfare. Global instability will certainly come from
parents that see the more affluent and wealthier countries—whether they be the Soviet
Union, the United States, or the countries of Western Europe—able tc deal effectively
with the most basic and fundamental issues of human compassion while they are unable
to deal with such needs themselves.
The fact is that over the next 25 years the world population will double and that
anywhere from 75 to SO percent of those are going to be brown and yellow and red
citizens. What, then, are going to be the real matters of issue that are going to be before
us? As we look to security requirements in the year 2000, would we not be wise to begin
to anticipate the issues of population and food production and the various other basic
and fundamental questions of social justice? How are we going to deal effectively with
third world countries?
Finally, the issue of basic political stability, as we talk in terms today about the
West and the alliance, will depend on many new factors, such as European communism,
all of which will have the broadest implications for future U.S. relations with the Soviets
and the Chinese.
Senator Symington tlicn encouraged the participants lo present specific policy options
for enhancing U.S. security in the remaining decade- oj the century. Despite the Jiljcr-
enccs in perception indicated by the preceding statements, the later discussions revealed
several areas of genera! agreement: deep concern over a not-too-distant world of many
nuclear powers, an acceptance of t!ic likelihood of increased uses o( economic coercion,
and an appreciation lor tlie inseparability of third world development and international
stability. Questions surrounding the superpower strategic balance are of course
especially timely. Yet much of the ensuing discussion expanded on the new influences
that wcic noted in ihe opening statements, such i.s terrorism, increased defense spending,
conflict over scarce resources, third world despair, population, revolutionary technol-
ogies, and so forth. This reflected the concerns of nearly all of the spcr.soring senators
that a popular preoccupation -with the strategic debate tended lo obscure these equally
complex, and potentially more dangerous, problems that will afject U.S. security for at
least the next twenty-five years.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY FACTOR




When analyzing the relative alignment between communism and
capitalism, Soviet spokesmen have, since 1917, contended that the
"correlation of world forces" is constantly shifting in favor of
communism. Yet explanations of the underlying reasons for this shift
have differed considerably over this time span. In view of the Soviet
Union's obvious inferiority in concrete areas such as the military or
economics, Lenin generally avoided discussion of individual factors in
the "correlation of world forces" calculation, preferring to treat it
as a whole or as an assessment of amorphous "class" forces. When
Stalin shifted priorities from "world revolution" to "socialism in one
country," this was reflected in a change in emphasis in the "correlation
of world forces" assessment so that the impact of conflicts within and
between capitalist states, rather than between the two systems, was
cited as the reason for the further shift in the world alignment. One
major exception to this rule was the importance attached to the defeat
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of Nazi Germany, which led to the creation of the "socialist community"
in Eastern Europe.
Only with Stalin's successors did it aqain become common to assess
the "correlation of world forces" in terms of a direct capitalist-
communist dichotomy. To a significant degree, this derived from the
need to explain why intersystemic war was "no longer inevitable,"
despite the West's military superiority. Thus, in the interpretation
of the "correlation of world forces," Khrushchev was able to justify a
premise, which otherwise defied communist ideology. As in the case of
Lenin, Khrushchev was deliberately vague in defining the dominant
element(s) of the "correlation of forces" assessment, often changing
emphasis to meet immediate requirements. Sometimes, as a corollary of
the new stress on "peaceful coexistence" between the two systems, the
economic factor was accented. Frequently, in conjunction with the
revision of the Stalin-Zhdanov "two-camp" thesis, the role of the newly
emerging states, that is, those former colonies which adopted pro-
socialist policies, was highlighted.
At other times, especially when seeking to wring concessions from
the West or to deter the West from some course of action (as during the
Suez crisis of 1956, the Berlin crisis of 1958, and the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962), Khrushchev focused upon the military component in the
"correlation of world forces." Indeed, Khrushchev frequently sought to
deceive Western leaders with boasts of Soviet military superiority.
On occasion, he asserted that the Soviet Union possessed "the absolute
weapon" so that an intersystemic war would end "with the destruction of
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capitalism." Again, during a 1960 visit to Austria, Khrushchev
claimed that the Soviet Union was militarily the world's most powerful
3
country. In essence, Khrushchev tried to create uncertainties. in the
West with regard to the strategic balance, with the intent that such
uncertainties would constrain Western foreign policy activity.
To whatever extent this approach was successful, it was offset in
the early 1960s as the United States gained a better satellite surveillance
and U-2 overflight capability. Thus, the "missile gap" myth that
Khrushchev had worked so hard to create soon dissipated under improved
U.S. reconnaissance techniques. It was at this juncture that Khrushchev
made the decision to install strategic weapons in Cuba as a quick and
cheap method of countering U.S. strategic superiority. Detected
before they became operational, however, the missiles were withdrawn
under U.S. pressures. At the time, Khrushchev threatened to use the
missiles and planes in Cuba against U.S. territory and to employ Soviet
submarines against American ships, but by far the most ominous warning
came from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov, who assured
one U.S. official: "Never will we be caught like this again."
In essence, the "correlation of world forces" concept beaan as an
amorphous idea of "class" relations. It proved to be a handy tool for
Lenin and later Stalin to justify or oppose certain courses of action
insofar as the assessment was not independently verifiable through the
calculation of any concrete indices. Under Khrushchev, "correlation of
world forces" became an instrument not only to formulate Soviet foreign
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policy, but also to constrain Western freedom of action. In this
respect, Khrushchev found that emphasis on the economic factor or
newly emerging states had some propaganda appeal, but turning these into
direct^ foreign policy gains vis-a-vis the West was difficult. Con-
versely, he believed that, if he could convince the West of a shift in
the "correlation of military forces," significant gains might follow.
Khrushchev's problem, however, was that his assertions of military
superiority were grounded on deception, not fact. Once this deception
was revealed, the former constraints on the West disappeared. The
prime example of this change in attitude was the determination of the
U.S. during the Cuban missile crisis.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the current leadership's
concept of the "correlation of world forces" and to assess the role and
importance that the leadership attaches tc the military factor within
the overal concept.
THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP'S VIEW OF THE
"CORRELATION OF WORLD FORCES"
In the current Soviet literature, the "correlation of world forces"
concept is defined as the aggregation of all domestic and international
indices and factors which impact on the relative alignment of capitalism
and communism. Indeed, Soviet commentators describe the "correlation
of world forces" as a multi-dimensional concept, which encompasses "the
correlation of class forces and the struggle of classes both in individual
countries and inthe international arena, taking into account those real
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forces -- economic, political, moral, and others -- which stand behind
c
these classes." (Emphasis in original.) In fact, the number of factors
which may be included in the "correlation of world forces" assessment
is open-ended and limited only by objective circumstances. As one
Soviet spokesman has explained, "the mobility, dynamism, and change-
ability" of the "correlation of world forces" is a reflection of the
"complexity and multitudinous aspects" of the concept wherein "the
part played by some factors is growing, that of others is diminishing;
they interact and sometimes cancel out one another."
According to their nature, the elements within the "correlation of
world forces" fall into two categories: (1) the material component,
which includes the economic and military factors, and (2) the non-
o
material component, which covers the socio-political and ideological
factors. One major reason for this distinction in Soviet literature
is the fact that the material component is capable of a quantifiable
calculation on the whole, whereas the non-material component has to be
qualitatively evaluated for the most part. Quite obviously, qualitative
assessments present certain problems for the determination of a
foreign policy which is to be "scientifically substantiated." How-
ever, Soviet spokesmen are adamant that both components must be weighed
because the non-material factors "are inseparably linked with the
material factors; it is often difficult to separate one from the other."
Despite this problem, "correlation of world forces" assessments
are said to serve three functions. First, they provide not only a
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historical background but also an accurate description of the state
of international affairs at any particular moment. Second, since
clashes in the international arena are ultimately determined by the
"correlation of world forces," these assessments provide a long-
range historical view of the prospects of world development. Third
and perhaps most importantly, they provide the scientific framework
in which critical choices are made from among a wide range of foreign
Q
policy strategic and tactical options.
As a long-term analysis of historical trends, the "correlation of
world forces" assessments appraise the "aggregate of events" within an
extended "epoch." Thus, while individual successes and failures will
affect the "correlation of world forces" at any given moment, gualitative
changes have been few. Indeed, to this point contemporary Soviet
commentators identify only three major stages in the historical
development of the "correlation of world forces." The first stage
began with the Bolshevik Revolution, when the first socialist state
emerged as a counterweight to the "imperialist-capital ist states."
The second stage started with the defeat of Nazi Germany, the apoear-
ance of communist-controlled states in Eastern Europe, and the breakup
of the old colonial empires. The third and most recent stage is dated
from the period 1969-70 and is closely connected with the "fundamental
restructuring" of international relations allegedly occurring as a
result of the onset of strategic nuclear parity between the two super-
powers. While the first two represented relative
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changes in the "correlation of world forces" during which the Soviet
Union made significant gains vis-a-vis the United States, the third
change was characterized as an absolute change in the capitalist-
communist alignment such that the Soviet Union was no longer inferior
to the United States. As it will be shown later, the distinguishing
factor here was the public recognition given to the 1969-70 shift by
the Western leadership. In this sense, the third shift in the "corre-
lation of world forces" marks an especially important milestone in the
historical development of world communism.
9
Yet, three caveats must herein be noted. First, the East-West
relationship is viewed from the perspective of a "zero-sum" situation.
Every loss by the capitalist side is seen as a positive gain from the
communist side, and ewery communist achievement is considered a net
loss for caDitalism. Therefore, while qualitative changes are said to
transpire only infrequently, Soviet analysts are quite sensitive to
specific events and indices, which may have great accumulative affect
for the overall trend in historical development.
Secondly, it is noted that, while the "correlation of world forces"
is a multi-dimensional concept, the objective international situation
precludes the uniform development of all factors. Insofar as the Soviet
Union is only one of many actors in international affairs, the Soviets
are not always in a position to manipulate the various elements to the
fullest extent desired. Consequently, the importance of individual
factors will be uneven and may tend to fluctuate over time.
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Thirdly, on the subjective level, there is no requirement that all
elements of struggle must be actively and equally pursued by the Soviets
or their opponents at any given time. Indeed, it is pointed out that
states will emphasize those forms and methods which, in their opinion,
are most effective in a given situation. While there are no "neutral
areas," the degree of competition enjoined in any individual area is
dictated by such notions as feasibility, opportunity, and necessity,
as well as the staunchness of the opponent to assume the struggle.
This also means, therefore, that the imoortance attached to individual
factors in the "correlation of world forces" will not remain constant.
Such importance will change as foreign policy potentials and tactics
change.
As a result some Soviet spokesmen have discussed the relative
importance of the various factors within the "correlation of world
forces" assessment. Some have suggested that the military element
is the most significant, others the economic element, while others
1
still stress the interdependence and interation of all elements.
A closer examination, undertaken directly below, of Soviet views on
the third historical stage in the correlation will reveal, however,
that the leadership accepts the military element as the decisive factor
in the fundamental restructuring of the correlation characterizing
the third stage.
THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE THIRD STAGE IN THE
"CORRELATION OF WORLD FORCES:" ORIGINS AND IMPACT
In the Soviet world view, the Western capitalist states are, by
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definition, aggressive, militarist, and the source of all wars.
Moreover, it is claimed that they are feverishly making military
preparations to attack and destroy the communist camp. Lest anyone
should mistakenly surmise that the nature of "imperialism" has changed
in the era of detente, CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev set forth
the line that "although the possibilities of aggressive imperialist
"I o
actions are now significantly reduced, its nature remains as before.'*
However, the Soviets contend that a countervailing trend has been
gaining in importance and influence over recent years. It is based on
the so-called "realistic forces" or "sober-minded circles" in the
West, who have come "to an understanding of the limited role of
military force in the contemporary world and the hopelessness of con-
verting military might into a fetish to which economic and domestic
"1
3
political interests are sacrificed. Still, is is pointed out that
even this stratum of the bourgeoisie has not ceased to be the "class"
and ideological opponent of communism. This stratum is "realistic"
not because it has undergone an essential change in nature, but rather
because it was "forced" by objective external circumstances to adopt
14
a new position. It differs from the "reactionary" stratum only by
the fact that it perceives an external constraint on its ability to
pursue an aggressive and militarist foreign policy.
While the "reactionary forces of the U.S. military-industrial
complex" are never depicted as defeated and powerless, it is claimed
that President Nixon's election represented a triumph for the "realistic
15forces." In essence, it is claimed that the Nixon administration was
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"forced" by a new "correlation of world forces" to dispense with its
postwar policy of acting "from a position of strength," to acknowledge
the Soviet Union as an equal participant in international affairs, to
accept peaceful coexistence as the guiding principle of international
4
relations, and to enter to a detente or "relaxation of tensions" with
the communist states. Such a change, it has been stressed on numerous
occasions, was not the result of U.S. "goodwill" or morality, but a
realistic assessment of the fact that the Soviet Union had attained
strategic nuclear parity with the United States. Commenting on this
point, one Soviet spokesman observed that "recognition of Soviet-U.S.
parity in strategic armaments was a soecial factor behind the realization
by Western ruling circles of the new realities of our day and the
«il 6
corresponding correction of their political line. The new situation
of military parity "forced U.S. ruling circles to revise their foreign
policy and military concepts," declared an authoritative study of Soviet
foreign policy. In sum, it is maintained that the new military
balance had and continues to have "a sobering influence on sensible
18
circles in the capitalist world."
From the Soviet standpoint, an objective "proof" of real strategic
nuclear parity is not the issue at hand. Soviet public sources have
neyer demonstrated an interest in concrete comparisons of the numbers
and qualities of the two superpowers' weapons. Indeed, the Soviet
leadership has traditionally avoided any public acknowledgement of
even the most rudimentary military information either for its own people
or for discussion at arms control and disarmament negotiations. Proof
11 i
of the parity situation is drawn from statements by American govern-
ment officials and academics and other authoritative Western publi-
cations. The important factor, then, was the perception and public
admission by Western decision-makers that strategic nuclear parity had
occurred and that this situation was cause for a reexamination and
modification of U.S. foreign policy.
As noted earlier, it was this factor of Western perception which
distinguishes the third shift in the "correlation of world forces"
from the previous two. While the first two represented significant
gains for the proponents of communism, only the third was recognized by
U.S. leaders to be of sufficient magnitude that it required the U.S.
to re-examine and, subsequently, modify its foreign policy.
Also important was the fact that the military component was the
decisive component which forced the U.S. to its new perception of the
"correlation of world forces." In essence, therefore, despite occasional
statements to the contrary, it becomes evident that the Soviet leader-
ship recognizes the overriding significance of the military component
for all of the other areas of competition. In other words, Soviet
military might, particularly its strategic nuclear capability, is the
foundation for the attainment of success in all other areas of struggle.
Such emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons does not infer that the
Soviets have been little concerned with tactical and theater war-fighting
capabilities. Indeed, Soviet motorized combat vehicles and artillery --
to name but two items -- have been significantly improved. It only
means that in the "correlation of world forces" calculation primary
concern is attached to strategic nuclear weapons.
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Given this general background, it is now necessary to turn
attention to the more specific utility attached to military power, as
well as Soviet attempts to increase this power as a means to further
shift the "correlation of world forces."
<•
SOVIET VIEWS ON THE UTILITY OF WAR AND THE ARMED FORCES
Historically, the tendency among American leaders has been to
view the use of military forces or the threat of the use of military
force as a means of last resort and, then, only to restore the status
quo. It is employed only when all other avenues have proven inadequate,
In such instances, as events following World Wars I and II, the Korean
War, and the Vietnam War" illustrate, the cessation of hostilities has
been cause for the rapid dismantling of wartime capabilities.
The Soviets, on the other hand, have looked upon military might
and the threat of military might as an integral part of Soviet foreign
policy. As one Soviet observer pointed out:
Unquestionably, military force plays a qreat role in relations
among states. The status and size of the actual armed forces
and the military-economic potential of states are factors,
which to a significant degree determine the part played by a
state or group of states in the development of contemporary
, 19international processes.
From the Soviet perspective, military power creates certain political
and military advantages which can be,-, and indeed must be, exploited
to the detriment of the opponent.
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On the political side, the Soviet leadership views military power
as a vital instrument. This derives from the fact that "imperialism
20
normally retreats when faced by a superior force." It is only the
existence of a powerful Soviet military instrument that "restrains the
ardor of the most aggressive imperialist circles and blocks the path
21
of their aggressive intentions." Indeed, it is constantly emphasized
in Soviet literature that "the gains of the toilers of the USSR and the
other fraternal countries would undoubtedly have been threatened if
the military might of the socialist community, primarily the Soviet
Union, had not protected them from the aggressive imperialist forces
In other words, despite continuous assertions of overtaking the West
economically, it is the military component which is accepted as the
key element from among the various elements that can be brought to
bear against the West.
Even outside of the direct Soviet-American relationship, Soviet
commentators claim that the decisive factor in the postwar success of
"national liberation" movements was the existence of a strong Soviet
military. It is maintained that the Soviet armed forces prevent the
Western states from effectively dealing with pro-communist factions in
the Third World. 23
On the military side, the Soviet leadership rejects the contention
that nuclear weapons have made wars inconceivable. Following the last
Nixon-Brezhnev Summit, for example, Brezhnev observed that "it would be
completely dangerous if the opinion became firmly established in public
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circles that everything is now completely in order and that the
24
threat of war has become illusory." Thus, Soviet commentators
continuously declare that "the danger of war continues to be a grim
25
reality of our day." This means that, as first espoused by Clausewitz
and later adopted by Lenin, war continues to be a weapon and instrument
of politics, a fact which will be nullified only with the demise of
capitalism and is in no way linked with the improvement of weapons.
As one Soviet political officer explained:
The thesis of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation
of politics by military means remains true under conditions
of radical changes in military affairs. The attempt of
some bourgeois ideologues to prove that nuclear missile
weapons remove war outside the framework of politics and
that nuclear war is outside the control of politics, has
ceased to serve as a weapon of politics, and will not be
its continuation is incorrect in a theoretical resDect and
reactionary in a political respect.
The corollary of the possibility of war, from the Soviet perspective,
is the necessity to develop and maintain a military capability not
merely to repel an enemy but to attain victory over him. Commentators
frequently invoke Lenin's dictum that "victory is won by he who has
27
the best equipment, organization, discipline, and the finest hardware."
While such statements appear to reflect the dominant line, they
must be balanced with the observation that some dissent has been recently
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registered in the Soviet press. For example, several high ranking
Soviet officials have suggested that a new world war between the two
28
superpowers "could turn into the destruction of civilization."
Even Brezhnev has declared that "if the presently accumulated supply of
' 29
weapons were launched, mankind could be completely destroyed."
Indeed, the Director of the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has gone so far as to
proclaim that mutual assured destruction is a fact of life. According-
ly, he observed:
The military-technical revolution has led to the creation of
the most destructive means of war, which surpass by many times
anything that was used in previous wars. A situation has
arisen in which the belligerents can not only destroy each
other but also severely damage the very conditions of man-
kind's existence. Nuclear-missile war can no longer be a
rational means of attaining political aims in international
relations. From this standpoint, war ceases to be a contin-
30
uation of politics, as it was defined in his time by Clausewitz.
In sum, since a world nuclear war would destroy civilization,
including the superpower combatants, neither can reasonably use it to
achieve political aims. Consequent to this view is the premise that
pursuit of military superiority over the opponent will not provide any
appreciable advantage. The prominent Soviet military analyst, General
Major R. Simonyan, doctor of military science and frequent commentator
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on military matters in Krasnaya zvezda , maintained in June 1977 that
"indeed, with the equality of strategic forces and when both sides
possess weapons capable of destroying all life on earth many times
over, neither the addition of new batches of weapons nor the raising
of their destructive force can yield any substantial military and,
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still less, political advantage."
These dissenters may be representative of a certain deviant segment
of the Soviet leadership. Conversely, as many Western observers
contend, they may be espousing merely a propaganda line for Western
consumption. The task here is not to judge between these two possi-
bilities. It is sufficient for present purposes only to note that,
while such viewpoints are not new in the Soviet Union, they are not
characteristic of the prevailing Soviet position. The dominant (that
is, the official) line posits that military power retains both political
and military utility in the nuclear era. It is necessary, therefore,
to examine Soviet attempts to shift the "correlation of military
forces" in its favor.
SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO SHIFT
"THE CORRELATION OF MILITARY FORCES"
As noted earlier, the Soviets view the "correlation of world
forces" from the perspective of a zero-sum game. This equally applies
to the correlation of individual elements in the overall alignment.
In concrete terms, this means that the "correlation of military forces"
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is considered to be a dual process, wherein it is important not only
to buildup Soviet forces but also to inhibit U.S. /NATO buildup as much
as possible.
The Soviets seek to portray the arms race as Western-inspired,
especially by the U.S* military-industrial complex which derives "huge
profits" from the constant improvement of weapons and the further
development of new systems. Especially dangerous, charged one Soviet
political analyst, is the Pentagon's preparation of "a broad program for
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the development of new systems of mass destruction weapons." In this
connection, Soviet spokesmen severely condemn specific U.S. weapons
systems, such as the B-l bomber, the Trident submarine, the cruise
missile, and the neutron bomb, as well as more esoteric types utilizing
binary gases, anti-matter, genetic weapons, nerve gases, lasers, and
33
geophysical properties. The Soviets argue that unless such weapons
and systems are banned the Soviet Union will be "forced" to respond to
their development by creating systems which it would otherwise never
consider producing.
Indeed, to this end the Soviets have introduced a United Nations
proposal for a world disarmament conference to reach a ban on further
qualitative improvements leading to "new types and new systems of
34
weapons of mass destruction." The rationale for the proposal was
first voiced by Brezhnev, who spoke in mid-1975 on the urgency
to conclude an agreement on the ban on manufacturing new
categories of mass destruction weapons, and new systems
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of such weapons. At the level of present-day science
and technology there arises a grave danger that an even
more terrible weapon will be created. The common sense
and conscience of mankind impose the necessity of erec-
ting an insurmountable barrier to the appearance of such
35
a weapon.
Since that time, Soviet publications have consistently maintained that
the Soviet Union is fully prepared to conclude such an agreement, but
is prevented from doing so only by the intransigence of U.S. "reactionary"
forces. In light of past experience in trying to get basic quantitative
data on military manpower and equipment from the Soviets, it is quite
obvious that the Soviet proposal for banning "new weapons" serves
nothing but a propaganda function. If the Soviets have refused basic
quantitative data, it is unrealistic to expect that they would supply
the extensive information on Soviet research and development capabilities
to verify any agreement on banning "new weapons." In advancing a
proposal that has great popular appeal in the abstract, the Soviets are
not in the least concerned with simultaneously advancinq the specifics
which would make an agreement feasible.
Similarly, the Soviets proposed to the U.N. in September 1973
that all Security Council members reduce their military expenditures
by ten percent and use part of the savings to aid the developing countries.
Again, a proposal with worthwhile intent in the abstract had no possibility
in practice. It was impossible not only because the PRC, a Security
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Council member, would assuredly have vetoed it, but also because the
Soviets absolutely refuse to acknowledge the true level of Soviet
military expenditures. In the Soviet budqet, defense spending is
given as a single, one-line figure of approximately 17 billion rubles
i
or about 23 to 25 billion dollars. Thus, while the proposal may
have had some propaganda appeal among Third World elites or Western
arms control and disarmament advocates, its real objective was to por-
tray the U.S. as the "imperialist" leader which prefers the arms race
to disarmament and Third World development.
Consistent with this image-making is the Soviet depiction of U.S.
initiatives in the arms control and disarmament arena. Those proposals
that the Soviet Union wants to accept are presented as having been
"forced" on the United States. For example, two Soviet commentators
noted:
Despite obvious reluctance of the Western countries to
enter into genuine disarmament, the radical change in
the correlation of forces in the international arena in
favor of socialism, the transformation of the world
socialist system into the leading force of the present
day, and the acknowledgment by the capitalist coun-
tries of the nuclear parity between the U.S.S.R. and
the U.S.A. produced a new atmosphere for negotiations
that let the problem of disarmament gradually move
37into the area of the possible.
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Those proposals that the Soviet Union wants to reject are chastized
as U.S. attempts to achieve unilateral advantage. According to the
Soviet formulation, there presently exists an "essential balance"
between Soviet and American strategic nuclear capabilities as well as
between U.S.S.R. /Warsaw Pact and U.S. /NATO forces in Central Europe. 3
When the Soviets refused even to consider President Carter's March 1977
proposal to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), which aimed not only
at the limitation but the actual reduction of some weapons, they did
so on the basis that "the U.S.A. is striving to revise the Vladivostok
agreement on strategic arms limitation, to gain for itself a one-
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sided military advantage, and to undermine the Soviet Union's security."
Likewise, in refusing to give up the numerical imbalance created by
past Soviet/Warsaw Pact buildups, Soviet spokesmen have characterized
Western proposals for assymetric disarmament in Central Europe as an
attempt "to change the correlation of forces in Central Europe in favor
of the West."
d°
Complementary with this diplomatic offensive is the Soviet program
of military construction, encompassing "the aggregate of economic,
socio-political, and specifically military measures and efforts of the
state, which are carried out in the interests of preparing and waging
41
wars and in the interests of strengthening its military power." As
a writer explained in Krasnaya zvezda , "V. I. Lenin regarded the defense
potential of a state as the organized unity of economic, moral-political,
42
and specifically military potential."
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In the moral -political sphere, the Soviet armed forces have
created a parallel political structure, the Main Political Administra-
tion (MPA) of the Soviet Army and Navy, among whose responsibilities
are the indoctrination of soldiers in the norms of "communist morality."
Each year Soviet officers and soldiers are required to partake in a
system of political training in the form of lectures, independent
study, and seminars. Officers undergo fifty hours of indoctrination
training annually, about half of which is given to seminar lessons.
Training of non-officers is more frequent, as much as two hour sessions
twice a week. In addition, the MPA supplements the indoctrination with
"socialist competition" and "criticism and self-criticism" campaigns for
the purpose of whipping up and checking on the ideological conditioning
of troops. The ultimate sanction against defects in this sphere is
the fact that political and moral qualities are taken into consideration
in the selection, placement, and promotion of soldiers. As the Chief
of the MPA has noted, "the selection and placement of cadres is a
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political question, not a technical one."
In the economic sphere, Soviet spokesmen frequently observe that
there exists a close connection between Soviet economic and military
development, because "the economy serves as the foundation of defense
44
might." Accordingly, one Soviet military officer and doctor of
economic science stated:
Our defense might directly depends on the utmost growth of
the USSR's economic might. This dependence is becoming closer
122
and closer as a measure of the interrelationship between war
and the economy and the growing demands of the army and navy
45
for material resources.
Moreover, Soviet commentators openly acknowledge that the 10th Five-
Year Plan adopted in 1976 will emphasize those areas which are most
beneficial for weapons development and, therefore, "will be the
foundation of new increases in the Soviet Union's economic and defense
might.
While it is not possible to determine what the Soviets will spend
on military development in the 10th Five-Year Plan, there is every
reason to believe that the previous trend will continue. In a dollar
comparison of U.S. and Soviet defense programs, the Central Intelligence
Agency pointed out that the costs of Soviet defense programs exceeded
U.S. authorizations in every year since 1970. In 1974 prices, Soviet
programs in 1975 (less pension expenditures) cost 50" more than U.S.
programs. In terms of constant U.S. prices, which measure growth in
real terms, there has been a continuous growth during the period 1965-
1975 of about 3 percent per year (as compared to the United States
whose authorizations in constant dollar terms have declined continuously
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since 1968 and since 1973 have fallen below the 1965 level).
In the military sphere proper, Soviet efforts aDpear to affirm
the Kuznetsov "never again" warnina of 1962. Since that time, the
Soviets have undertaken a military development proqram that has not
only overcome the former U.S. superiority but also created a capability
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beyond what many Western military experts consider necessary for
Soviet defensive purposes. Soviet active-duty manpower is more than
double the U.S.'s and the Soviet Ground Forces alone outnumber all
active U.S. forces by about 400 thousand men. Since 1962, the U.S.
has deployed only four new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
systems, while the Soviets have deployed ten. Subsequent
to the latest U.S. deployment in 1970, the Soviets have introduced five
new systems. Similarly, the U.S. has deployed only three new sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) systems since 1962, whereas
the Soviets have deployed four, of which three of the Soviet's were
introduced later than 1964 but only one of the U.S.'s. Moreover, Sec-
retary of Defense Harold Brown revealed in September 1977 that "the
Soviets have four new ICBM's under development, they are continuing
work on the SS-16, their mobile ICBM, and they are modifying four other
•
-t ,,48missiles.
Quite obviously present limitations do not allow for a total
assessment of Soviet military programs, but the point to be stressed
here is that such programs underscore the complete Soviet rejection of
any concept to limit plans for military development. In this respect,
Soviet military thinking is devoid of any concept akin to the U.S.
idea of "sufficiency" in military construction. In their formulation,
it is asserted that every achievement "must be considered only as the
next step in turn for the further raising of the armed forces' combat
49
might." This is particularly true insofar as the East-West military
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competition has switched "from the plane of a numerical buildup of
'big battalions' into the plane of qualitatively improving new
hardware.
"
According to the late Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy,
there are two basic trends in Soviet weapons development: (1) the
development of current arms and systems, and (2) the development and
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creation of fundamentally new systems. For many years, greater
practical emphasis was placed on a steady improvement in current weapons
instead of waiting for qualitative improvements that require some time
lag to design and produce. More recently, Soviet open literature
has begun to stress the need for developing fundamentally new systems.
As one Soviet expert explained:
Inasmuch as there are no limits to understanding
natural laws, so there can be no limits to the
application of these laws in technical designs.
From this point of view, the most terrible weapon
cannot be called absolute since in its stead can
come a still more powerful one based on the newest
52
scientific- technical achievements.
Given this view, the Soviets maintain that the quest for S&T
superiority is mandated not only for the contemporary advantages it
may give vis-a-vis a potential opponent, but also because superiority,
once attained, is not necessarily permanent. With this in mind, Grechko
wrote in The Armed Forces of the Soviet State that Soviet military-
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technical policy must orient research not only toward the solution
of "current" problems, but also toward "the solution of various long-
term problems whose results might find wide application in military
affairs in the future," especially "basic research directed toward the
discovery of yet unknown characteristics of matter, phenomena, and laws
of nature, and the development of new methods of studying and utilizing
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them for strengthening the state's defense capability."
SOVIET VIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE "CORRELATION OF MILITARY FORCES"
ON U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY
In the Soviet view, foreign policy is not formulated in the
abstract. It is determined by the interests and goals of the dominant
class. Since Soviet foreign policy supposedly reflects the interests
and goals of the "workers and toilers," it is claimed to be "peaceloving."
It follows that the military doctrine and strategy selected to implement
this policy would be "peaceloving" and "defensive." Conversely, since
U.S. foreign policy is allegedly a manifestation of the interests and
goals of "exploiters and oppressors," it is defined as "imperialist."
Thus, the military doctrine and strategy of the United States is
"imperialist" and "aggressive." Although specific elements of military
doctrine and strategy may change over time, their nature is constant.
Hence, the Soviet Union will always be the "defender" and the U.S. will
always be the "aggressor." In the words of one Soviet analyst:
V. I. Lenin taught that the real nature of war is determined
not by who attacked first, on whose territory war is being
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conducted, or whether the fightinq is offensive or defensive.
It is important to consider "what class nature the war bears,
for what reasons the war has broken out, what class is
waging it, and what historic and historical-economic
54
conditions provoked it."
Consequently, the nature of U.S. doctrine and strategy remains constant,
but its content has undergone significant chanqe.
The Soviets divide post-World War II U.S. military doctrine and
strategy into three stages, with changes occurring "roughly ewery
decade in connection with radical shifts in the correlation of forces
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in the world and the development of the means of armed struggle."
The first period from 1945 to 1960 was based upon the policy of con-
tainment, which gave rise to the strategy of "massive retaliation."
Accordinq to the Soviets, massive retaliation "envisioned the preparation
and the conduct of a 'preventive' nuclear war, which was considered in
imperialist strategy as a unilateral act of nuclear assault, against
the countries of the socialist community."" However, by the end of
the 1950's the U.S. was "forced" to re-evaluate its position because
"in all decisive areas of military affairs the Soviet Union was not
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behind the USA and in a number of areas passed ahead of it."
This reassessment led to the development of a new strategy, namely,
flexible response, which dominated between 1961 and 1971. While still
espousing to deal "from a position of strength," the new strateqy con-
sidered a growing "balance" of U.S. and Soviet strateqic capabilities,
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say Soviet commentators. Now nuclear war would not be unilateral,
but a mutual exchange of nuclear strikes. Further refinements of
flexible response included the concepts of escalation and two-and-
a-half wars.
At the beginning of the 1970s, strategic nuclear parity again
"forced" the United States to re-evaluate its military strategy. This
stage began with the enunciation of the "realistic deterrence" strategy,
relying on the concepts of strategic sufficiency, one-and-a-half wars,
strategic mobility, and limited strategic war. While acknowledging
that U.S. military power continues to grow, the Soviets stress that the
devolution of U.S. strategy reflects a decreasing utility of this power
as a consequence of the "objective changes in the correlation of forces
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in favor of socialism" -- which in this case means the growth of Soviet
military might.
In essence, therefore, the trends in U.S. doctrine and strategy
are significant not only for what it reveals concerning U.S. war-
fighting concepts, but also for its implications for the "correlation
of military forces" in particular and the "correlation of world forces"
in general. From the Soviet perspective, the reexamination and sub-
sequent modification of U.S. military doctrine and strategy roughly
"eyery decade" transpired because of the shifting "correlation of world
forces." Yet, beyond this, the changes in U.S. military doctrine and
strategy are, in a sense, a measure of the shift in the "correlation of
world forces" and a confirmation of the utility of Soviet military
development.
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Within this context, however, it is necessary to note that Soviet
analysts do find certain elements of the current U.S. military strategy
to be quite unsettling. Given the overall trend that U.S. military
might was being effectively constrained, the Soviets reacted quite
vehemently to the U.S. announcement of new positions on the use of
limited nuclear war and selective targetinq. Whereas previously
American strategy made an attack on Soviet territory very unlikely,
the new concepts heightened the possibility that Soviet territory
would now be more vulnerable to attack if conflict should occur.
Soviet analysts overlooked the proposition that the U.S. first-use of
nuclear weapons against selected targets would be a response to Soviet
tactical, conventional gains in Central Europe. They equated first-use
with preemption and charqed the United States was seeking to blur the
distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare.
In sum, therefore, the credibility of Soviet nuclear deterrence
has been somewhat eroded insofar as the U.S. apoears to no longer accept
the Soviet contention that an attack on the USSR's territory will in
all likelihood escalate to total nuclear war. Since nuclear parity
"forced" the U.S. to give up acting "from a position of strength" and
to accept peaceful coexistence, it is disconcerting in that a rejection
of U.S. unilateral military constraint may lead to the U.S. rejection
of political constraint. Indeed, since it is not the "goodwill" or
"rationality" of the West which restrains it, but rather Soviet military
power, any policy which alleviates U.S. restraint is -- in a zero-sum
calculation -- a policy which inhibits Soviet freedom of action.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, contemporary Soviet spokesmen maintain that the over-
all trend in the "correlation of world forces" is constantly shifting
in favor of communism. According to the Soviet definition, "correlation
of world forces" is an aggregate of all factors and indices that affect
the relative alignment between the two opposing systems. In actual fact,
the Soviet leadership's calculation of the "correlation of world forces"
relies heavily upon an assessment of the military component. This is
the fundamental element not only because Soviet military strength is
the single index that allows the Soviet Union to claim superpower status
but also because Western political decision-makers have officially
acknowledged the Soviet's attainment of strategic nuclear parity, and,
therewith, have modified their approaches to foreign policy.
Given the importance of the military factor, the Soviets have
utilized several methods to shift the "correlation of military forces"
further in their favor. On the one hand, they have tried diplomatic
and propagandists moves with the aim of haltinq or at least retarding
Western military construction. They seek to reinforce that sector of
Western opinion which contends that war in a nuclear era is unthinkable
and, therefore, not really possible. At the same time, the Soviet
leadership seeks to instill in its own oeople the conviction that war
is possible and that, as a consequence, great spiritual and material
sacrifices must be made in order to create a war- fighting and war-
winning capability.
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In an attempt to test the sincerity of Soviet claims to a radical
shift in the "correlation of world forces" due to the achievement of
strategic nuclear parity in 1969-70, the question frequently arises:
What have the Soviets done since 1969-70 that they would not have done
under previous conditions? Such a question implies the expectation
that the Soviets will use their new position to further communist
expansionist aims. One line of reasoning might extrapolate from Soviet
risk-taking of earlier and more vulnerable periods to suggest that the
stronger the Soviets become militarily, the more risks they will under-
take.
Such an argument may have some validity as exemplified by Soviet-
Cuban involvement in the Angolan War or by Soviet threats and mobili-
zation during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. However, it is too simplistic
to measure the Soviet perception of the shifting "correlation of world
forces" only in terms of overt Soviet military acts. Because of their
oast military inferiority, the Soviets have, by force o f circumstances,
developed a concept of power that is multi-dimensional. While such
power depends on military might, it is often manifested through economic
influence, ideological persuasion, and political prestige. Thus, from
the Soviet viewpoint, the current "correlation of world forces" frees
the Soviet Union to pursue many arenas of competition with the West,
while its level of military development gives the assurance that the
United States will not respond with a real threat to Soviet survival.
Moreover, there is no imperative that the Soviet Union must
something" with the new "correlation of world forces." The Soviets may
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find it quite sufficient that (1) the U.S. has acknowledged the USSR
as one of the two major actors on the international scene without
whose agreement the settlement of conflict situations as in the Middle
East would be impossible and (2) the U.S. has in the past three decades
modified not only its foreign policy but also its military doctrine
and strategy in consideration of increasing Soviet power. In this
sense, the Soviets have gained without risk to the Soviet Union.
Consequently, Soviet military might has developed into real power in-
sofar as it has achieved influence over Western behavior without having
actually resorted to force or the threat of force.
In conclusion, the importance of the military factor in the
"correlation of world forces" derives as much from the perception (that
is,- Western evaluation) of Soviet strength as it does from the weapons
of the Soviet armed forces.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE SUPERPOWER BALANCE, MILITARY POLICY, AND PUBLIC OPINION
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE,
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY*
by
Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the views of British, French, and West German
publics concerning national security issues and East-West relations.
Its goal is to identify some of the roles which these views have played
in the system of post-war East-West competition. Unlike many analyses
of public opinion, which emphasize the latest poll results, this paper
focuses on the analysis of trends in public opinion, since these trends
can provide us with a better understanding of the longer-term Drocess
of East-West competition. Polls commissioned by the United States
*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
should not be interpreted as representing the policies of CACI, Inc.,
the Center for Naval Analyses, or any other organization. The author
is grateful to Dr. Leo Crespi of the United States Information Agency
for his assistance in obtaining some of the data used in this paper.
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Information Agency are used as the principal data source.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first presents some
of the reasons why we would expect public opinion to have an impact on
(and to be influenced by) defense policies and East-West relations and
explicates some of the analytical problems which are involved in the
analysis of public opinion and its relationships with other factors.
The second section traces out some of the broad contours of Western
European public opinion. The final section presents an exploratory
analysis of the position of Western European public opinion within the
broader structure of East-West competition and of the relationship
between public opinion and the military balance.
PUBLIC OPINION, THE MILITARY BALANCE, AND EAST-WEST COMPETITION
The Relevance of Western European Public Opinion
Public opinion in Western European nations can be related to
defense policy in two ways: as an influence (or constraint) upon the
actions taken by leaders and as an object or target for mil itary/ foreign
policies.
Public Opinion as an Influence
The nations examined in this paper are parliamentary democracies.
Even in open polities such as these, simple electoral mandates -- in
which the policy preferences of citizens are directly translated into
government actions -- are unlikely to exist. Two factors can account
for the absence of simple mandates. The first is that in the course of
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making electoral decisions citizens can consider a wide variety of
domestic and foreign issues which are of varying salience to them. A
vote for candidate 'X' may or may not be a vote for her or his defense
policies; other concerns might be more salient for the bulk of the
4
electorate. A second factor standing in the way of clear mandates is
the unpredictability of the future. Surprises can occur (for example,
the 1973 Oil Embargo). The key defense issues at any point may be
matters which were not envisioned at the time of the most recent
election.
Even in the absence of simple mandates, however, more complex
relationships between public opinion and national security policies are
possible and, in some cases, even probable. Elections do allow voters
to make retrospective evaluations of candidates. As a consequence, in
many cases candidates will probably attempt to adjust their policy
stances (on national defense as well as other issues) to match the per-
ceived preferences of the voters, although the dynamics of this process
in the fields of defense and foreiqn affairs are not well understood.
At the same time, of course, candidates are also likely to attempt to
be leaders by persuading voters to accept their own set of policy pref-
erences. The dialectic between these two processes can result, over
time, in a rough general congruence between the distribution of pref-
erences among the electorate and the policies advocated by elected
officials, even in the absence of a detailed one-to-one correspondence
between the two. Hence, public views on defense issues are likely to
have some reflection in policy.
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On a more basic level, publics and leaders are constantly involved
in the definition of the issues which are of policy concern (for
example, What is the standing of human rights considerations on a
nation's foreign policy agenda?). Within any open political order a
continuing, often tacit, dialogue takes place in which the nature of
the issues (what is the menu?) as well as the positions which nations
should take on the issues (what should we order?) are defined and re-
defined. The relative standings of defense concerns on national policy
agendas are likely to be affected by this process, as are the longer
term political career prospects of candidate leaders.
To the extent that leaders define the universe of relevant issues
in the same ways as publics and take positions on the issues that are
reasonably consistent with popular opinion, public opinion becomes an
important type of resource which leaders can draw upon, leading to pol-
icies with greater 'resolve'. To the extent that inconnruencies exist
between leaders and led, the force of policy actions is likely
to be lessened.
Public Opinion as an Object of Policy
Public and elite opinions are identified as important targets for
foreign and military policy actions in Soviet and American writings on
defense issues. For example, recent posture statements by Secretaries
of Defense Schlesinger (1975) and Rumsfeld (1976) have expressed concern
with such psychological factors as:
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The need to maintain a rough equivalence between Soviet
and American strategic forces to ensure that major asym-
metries do not develop, thereby avoiding the possibility
that misperceptions about the balance might lead to pres-
sures, crises, and confrontations;
The requirement that U.S. planners be concerned with
the confidence of Western European allies in their abil-
ity to resist direct or indirect challenges from the
USSR; and
The need to consider the peacetime psychological impact
of military forces, such as the employment of naval
forces to achieve diplomatic influence.
An organizational reflection of these interests has been the
creation of the office of the Director, Net Assessment, within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. One of the concerns of this office
has been the assessment of the psychological impact of Soviet and
American forces.
Parallel concern can be found in Soviet writings. Georgi Arbatov,
the Director of the Institute of the United States of America and
Canada, has emphasized the importance of public opinion in considerations
of interbloc relations. Arbatov argues that tactics aimed at influ-
encing public opinion are one of the central elements of modern diplo-
macy. In his consideration of the role of psychological factors in
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the "correlations of forces" (or balance of power between the blocs),
Tomashevsky discusses the importance of "subjective" factors such as
public opinion in terms which are not far removed from those found in
American considerations of net assessment questions:
The complexity of the category of the balance of power and
its components is apparent also in the peculiar range of
objective and subjective factors. For example, the subjec-
tive factor -- evaluation by participants in international
relations of the relative strength of one another and of
the general balance of power, may sometimes play the role
of an element of the objective situation. Irrespective of
whether such an evaluation is correct or not, it may engen-
der certain actions and brinq about consequences of an
altogether objective nature, and a chanqe in the objective
balance of power. In this connection, the role of informa-
2
tion (and misinformation) is qrowing in world politics.
Soviet interest in the impact which their oolitics have uDon
public opinion in foreign nations is also reflected in the attention
which recent Soviet foreign policy writings pay to the results of
Western survey research. There is also reason to believe that the
Soviets are highly concerned with the ramifications which their foreign
policy actions might have upon public opinion with the USSR, particularly
4
insofar as it might influence the Soviet public's support of the recnme.
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Finally, as is the case in the U.S., this concern with the
importance of public opinion in interstate relations has had organi-
zation manifestations. For example, a recent assessment of the Soviet
Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada notes that it is concerned with the
analysis of American policies, opinions , and attitudes .
Analytical Problems
The analytical problems that need to be considered stem from two
interrelated factors: the nature of the data and the limited amount of
previous research dealing with trends in public opinion and/or with the
realtionship between these trends and other factors of interest.
Data Limitations
The most obvious problems encountered in the analysis of trends in
public opinion derive from the analyst's dependence on previous polling
efforts. The 'right' questions (in the analyst's eyes) may or may not
have been asked in the past. A sufficient number of data points for
trend analysis may not exist. There may be a sufficient number of item
repetitions for trend analysis, but with significant discontinuities in
the time series. The values taken by individual observations in the
time series may be highly dependent on the precise point at which the
item was asked (for example, imagine 1962 polls dealing with Western views
of the USSR taken before, during, and after the Missile Crisis). Attempts
to merge similarly worded items can encounter serious problems of item
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comparability. For the most part there are no clearcut solutions to
these problems. This paper responds to this type of problem by relying
on polls commissioned by a single source, which reduces comparability
problems. Given this research decision, there is no solution for the
problem of gaps in the time series other than to recognize their existence
and to consider what implications they have for the substantive con-
clusions of the analysis.
The data also present some less immediately obvious problems.
Most of the available poll items ask respondents to give their views
concerning a state of affairs -- their attitude or opinion concerning
an object (for example, 'who is ahead in the military balance') --
rather than their opinions concerning policy actions or behaviors
('given the state of military balance, what should our nation do about
it?') This is an important problem for two reasons. The first is that
policy preferences are by no means automatically determined by state of
the world assessments (the Kumean 'is '/'ought' dichotomy has its appli-
cations in the field of survey research as well as in epis temology).
For considerations of defense policy it is policy questions (what should
be done?) that are of the greatest interest, but these are the items
which are not, by and larqe, available. The second problem is that
the correlation between an attitude towards an object and subsequent
behavior is likely to be weaker than an attitude towards a behavior and
subsequent performance of the behavior.
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Once again no true solution is available. The most that can be
done is to postulate a plausible linkage relationship between public
opinion and presumed policy preferences (for example, 'spend more when
the balance is perceived to be going against the U.S.') and to empir-
ically determine if the hypothesized relationship holds true.
A second, subtle, limitation of the data is that public opinion
polls do not, by and large, deal with basic political cultural factors
and perceptions. Questions may deal with respondents' views of the
Soviet Union. Questions are far less likely to deal with the network
of perceptions in which these views operate (for example, is the Soviet
Union viewed as an aggressive or as a conservative state?) Once again
this is a type of limitation which cannot be surmounted, given available
data.
The final problem in this category has to do with the impact of
previous world views/policy agendas on the content of questions. The
policy agenda which is reflected in a set of survey results may or may
not correspond to the policy agenda of an analyst working at a later
point in time; some perceptions of what are 'major issues' have changed.
Once again, given a decision to rely upon survey data, the only response
that can be made to this problem is to recognize it and to be alert for
its possible impact on the analysis.
Limitations Due to the Limits of Previous Research
While there have been many studies of public opinion concerning
foreign affairs and defense issues, most have focused on the analysis
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of opinion, per se , over the short term (usually the most recent poll
results). Relatively little work has been done on the analysis of
trends and/or the relationship between public opinion and other facets
of the international system. Moreover, while some very good theoretical
work has been done on the dynamics of the way in which public opinion
is interrelated with policy (for example, the two-step and attentive
public models), relatively little emDirical work has been done which
traces the actual operations of these processes.
As a result of these characteristics of previous research, only
relatively weak theoretical 'priors' are available to guide this
analysis. The absence of strong research 'priors' has serious implica-
tions for the employment of regression analysis in the last section of
the paper, since it results in relatively weak specifications for
equations. These relatively weak specifications, in turn, have con-
sequences for the selection of the regression model to be employed in
the analysis, for the responses which are made to the problems of multi-
collinearity and autocorrelation, and for the way in which regression
equations are reported and interpreted.*
*Standard econometrics texts tend to deal with two classes of
problems: (a) situations where strong specifications (based on strong
theoretical priors) exist and where attention focuses on regression
parameters; (b) situations where almost no priors exist and where attention
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Ordinary least squares regression will be employed in the
analysis. While OLS cannot capture interactive causality of the sort
that is most likely present in the system under consideration, it is
fairly robust and relatively well understood. More sophisticated
alternative approaches which can capture interactive causal relations
require strong specifications of the sort that simply cannot be pro-
vided, given the 'priors' which are available.
The regression analysis will focus on the examination of common
patterns across indicators (for example, common trends in public opin-
ion and defense expenditures). In this analysis the pattern matching
components of OLS regression will be emphasized (variance explained and
the fit between actual and predicted values). Relatively little
emphasis will be given to regression coefficients (b's and B's), since
these have less importance in the absence of fairly strong specifications,
focuses almost exclusively on prediction. Many political science
problems fall into an intermediate zone, where some priors exist but
where strong specifications are not possible. The techniques to be
presented have been developed to deal with problems (such as the
Standing of European public opinion within a larger system of East-
West relations) which appear to fall within this intermediate range.
Considerations of space prevent a more detailed presentation of this
approach to regression.
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These coefficients will be used, however, to 'drive' the residual
analyses.*
In the analysis, the existence of multicollinearity and auto-
correlation will be noted, where appropriate. Because of the relatively
weak priors involved, it will not be possible to determine the true
causes of these 'problems' (for example, how to apportion variance
among predictors or whether autocorrelation is due to the omission of
one or more explanatory variables, to the mis-specification of the
mathematical form of relationship, or to some truly serially dependent
process). As a consequence, no response will be made to the presence
of either factor.
THE CONTOURS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION
Introduction
* A simple thought experiment can bring out the distinction in-
volved here. Assume that the regression weights in an equation were to
be artifically changed so that the signs and relative magnitudes of
2
weights varied but the net results, in terms of R and the fit between
actual and estimated values, did not change to any great degree. For
present purposes these alterations in the equation would not have an>
analytical consequences, since the fit between one pattern and some set
of other patterns (considered as a set) is the only point emphasized.
Obviously this would not be the case in a path analytical approach to
regression.
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This section outlines the views of Western European publics which
bear directly or indirectly on East-West security relations. It blends
a presentation of recent poll results with an. analysis of trends.
Greater emphasis is placed on the latter element which tends to be
neglected and which is the critical aspect for gaining a better under-
standing of the longer-term dimensions of East-West competition.
The section deals with a number of topics:
A summary of recent European views on defense subjects:
Perceptions of East-West competition;
Preferences regarding superpower parity and how these
preferences have changed over time-,
An assessment of trends in public perceptions of the
military balance and opinions of the superpowers.
The last subject will provide the basis for an examination of the
standing of Western Eurppean public opinion in the broader context of
post-war East-West relations. To the extent possible, the analysis in
this section will identify the views of the most highly educated com-
ponent of the publics, as well as those of the public at large, since
the former group is likely to contain many of the opinion leaders whose
views are likely to have greater policy import. For convenience (to
provide synonyms) the terms views, opinions, attitudes, and perceptions
will be used interchangably.
152
Recent Survey Results
The most recent (March 1977) views of European publics regarding
Soviet and American military strength are presented in Table 6.1.
Perceived trends in Soviet and American military strength are pre-
sented in Table 6.2.
On the face of things these are not ideal results from an American
perspective. Neither the current standinqs nor the perceived trends
favor the U.S. At the same time, however, attaching strategic import
to these results is not an unambiqious matter. Consider, for example,
the case of two American analysts, one an adherent of the Assured
Destruction school of strategic thinking and the other a believer in
Counterforce (and/or Damage Limitation). To the former these would be
reasonably acceptable standings, since the only point of crucial import
would be the percentages who perceived a substantial Soviet lead. To
someone in the opposite camp the results would be much more negative,
since more importance would be attached to the large percentaqes in the
"U.S.S.R. somewhat ahead" cateaory in Table 6.1. Here, as elsewhere,
the meaninq of the poll results deoends, to a larqe extent, on the
other factors and considerations.
Perceptions of East-West ComDetition
There is considerable evidence that European publics (and leaders
as well) do not view East-West competition solely (or perhaps even
primarily) in military terms. In 1972 general and university educated
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TABLE 6.1
U.S. -Soviet Military Strength: 1977 Polling Data
"How to you think the U.S. and the U.S.S.R compare at the present time
in total military strength (CARD)-U.S. considerably ahead, U.S. somewhat
ahead, U.S. and U.S.S.R. about equal, U.S.S.R somewhat ahead, U.S.S.R
considerably ahead?"
Grea t West
March 1977 Britain France Germany
No. of cases (1903) (993) (1008)
U.S. considerably 3%
n
7 J 10 J
3-. 15%
12Jahead 10% 16%
U.S. and U.S.S.R 19 27 35
about equal
U.S.S.R somewhat 34" 27' 25"
ahead
U.S.S.R considerab iy 16_ 50 7_ 34 9_ 34
ahead
No opinion 22 23 17
Totals* 101% 100% 101%
Net U.S. Ahead -40 -18 -19
Here and in subsequent tables, totals range between 99% and 101% due
to rounding approximation.
Source: United States Advisory Commission on Information (USACI),
The 28th Report (USACI, 1977), p. 183.
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TABLE 6.2
Shifts in U.S. -Soviet Military Strength: 1977 Polling Data
"Regardless of how you believe the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. compare in mili-
tary strength at the present time, do you see military strength currently










Source: United States Advisory Commission on Information (USACI),
The 28th Report (USACI, 1977), p. 183.
Great West









publics were asked the question presented in Table 6.3. Since more
than two alternatives were presented, the item is not strictly comparable
to the more recent military strength question presented in Table 6.1.
Nevertheless, publics can still be compared by subtracting those who
saw the IL'S.S.R. in first place from those who put the U.S. in that
position.
In the same survey, a more general national power question was
asked which was not restricted to military factors (Table 6.4).
In each country and for both sets of publics the U.S. is seen as
being stronger when all of the bases of power are considered than when
the Soviet-American comparison is focused (as in Table 6.3) only on
military considerations. When the respondents who put the U.S. into
first place were asked why they did so, the modal response attributed
America's lead to economic rather than military factors, though the two
were quite close in the case of West Germany.
Another dimension of the perception of East-West competition has
to do with expectations of conflict. Some non-survey data on this
Q
subject can be taken from the research of Kjell Goldmann.' Goldmann
uses content analysis to estimate leaders' perceptions of the likelihood
of inter-block conflict in Europe. Since the early to mid 1960s
leaders' perceptions (as measured by Goldmann) have been favorable,
indicating that inter-block conflict is perceived as being less likely.
Goldmann's conclusions are consistent with the findings of Lerner and
Gordon that only a small fraction of the Western European elites in
their surveys anticipated major inter-bloc war and that the primary
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TABLE 6.3
Military Strength: 1972 Polling Data
Now, which of the countries on this card would you say is the strongest
militarily at the present time: U.S., Soviet Union, Mainland China
(PRC), Japan, European Common Market Countries (as a group)"?
United West
General Public Kingdom ' France Germany
• U.S. ahead 29% 47% 50%
U.S.S.R ahead 45 . 28 31
U.S. -USSR -16 +19 +19
University Educated
U.S. ahead 38 59 55
U.S.S.R ahead 39 27 34
U.S. -U.S.S.R -1 +32 +21
• » •
•
Source: United States Information Agency, U.S. Standing in Foreign




Overall Strength: 1972 Polling Data
Considering all the things that make a country strong, what country would
you say is the strongest in the world at the present time?
•
United West
General Public Kingdom France Germany
U.S. 46% 61% 59%
U.S.S.R 29 16 22
U.S. -USSR +17 +45 +37
University Educated
U.S. 50 73 64
U.S.S.R 27 8 23
U.S. -U.S.S.R +23 +65 +41
Source: United States Information Agency, U.S. Standing in Foreign




Soviet challenge perceived by these leaders was political
.
These findings concerning Europeans' expectations of conflict
between the blocs and their evaluation of the Competition as a pre-
dominantly political context bear on the earlier survey results having
to do with U.S. and Soviet national power. Clearly, there is an
irreducible military component to the relationship between the blocs.
At the same time, however, if one regards East-West comDetition as a
long-haul process in which conflict is not anticipated over the shorter
term, then the political-economic and political-military components of
the competition take on greater relative importance, (if only because
they provide the resources required for future military efforts).
Viewed in this light, the finding that American standing vis-a-vis the
U.S.S.R. increases when all of the bases of power are considered and
that economic factors figure prominently in this evaluation takes on
increased relevance and 'qualifies' to some extent more narrow evaluations
of the comparative mil itary balance, such as those presented in Tables
6 .1 and 6.3.
Views of Superpower Parity
From 1953 through 1971 there was a striking shi ft in the opinion
of Western European publics concerning Soviet-American parity. In 1958
a majority of respondents in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic
of Germany and a plurality in France preferred a U.S. lead in military
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strength (Table 6.5). By 1971, a majority in all three nations
preferred for neither superpower to be ahead in nuclear weapons. This
shift in opinion is even more noteworthy because the questions used to
identify it are amonq the few items in the US I A surveys which index
policy preferences ("what would be best in your opinion?") rather than
state of the world assessments ("who is ahead?").
The February 1963 preference of publics in France and Great
Britain for "parity" of another sort between the superpowers is shown
in Table 6.6. It is probably no coincidence that the two nations in
which a plurality of the respondents favored a parallel removal of
American missiles also were the two states which had pluralttes in favor
of parity in Soviet and American military strength as early as 1964.
(Table 6.5).
Trends in European Assessments of the Military Balance
and Opinions of the Superpowers
Since the mid-1950s, US I A polls have repeated several items a
sufficient number of times to allow for time series analysis (though
there are some notable gaps in the time series). The most salient
items for present purposes are three questions having to do with
assessments of the military balance and qeneral opinions of the super-
powers :
"All things considered, which country do you think is
ahead in total military strength at the present time —
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8. Question: "Some people say that the U.S. should remove its nuclear
missiles from bases near the Soviet Union, just as the
Soviet Union removed its nuclear missiles from Cuba,
near the U.S. Others say that the two cases are quite
different, and the U.S. should not remove its missiles.



































Source: R. L. Merritt and D. J. Puchala Western European Perspective on
International Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 448.
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"Do you have a very good, good, neither good nor bad,
bad or wery bad opinion of the USSR?"
"Do you have a \/ery good, good, neither good nor bad,
bad, or very bad opinion of the -United States?"
The responses of the European publics are plotted in Figures 6.1
and 6.2.* The most significant items for present purposes are the
military balance questions plotted in Figure 6.1. While there are
significant discontinuities in the time series (for example, the
1966-1967 and pest 1969 values), some trends can be identified. The
profiles of opinion are remarkably similar across the three countries
Assessments of relative American military strength were lowest in
1960-1961, the period of the Berlin Crisis. Evaluations of relative
American strength increased in all three states after 1962, possibly
as a result of the Missile Crisis.
The Germans were consistently the most optimistic concerninq
America's standing vis-a-vis the USSR; the British were consistently
the most pessimistic.
*Following the practice of the USIA report from which these
data were taken, net standing scores are presented in the figures
and employed in subsequent analyses. The net standinq score for the
balance item is: U.S. ahead minus USSR ahead. The net standings for the
last two items are computed by subtracting the bad and very bad responses
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Figure 6.2 Opinion of Superpowers
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Turning to public evaluations of the superpowers (Figure 6.2),
other trends can be identified despite missing data. In all three
nations opinions of the U.S. were always more favorable than views of
the USSR. The West Germans tended to regard the superpowers in the
most extreme terms; the French were most often in the middle, with
neither extremely favorable nor extremely unfavorable assessments.
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 present the correlations of the three public
opinion items within and between nations. Opinions tended to be
fairly congruent across nations, particularly for assessments of the
military balance and views of the Soviet Union, (Table 6.7). A
striking point in Table 6.8 is that the correlation between opinions
of the Soviet Union and opinions of the United States were positive
in two of the three nations (with West Germany being the exception).
Apparently the British and French publics did not view the superpowers
in simple zero-sum terms, with improving assessments of the one being
accompanied by declining assessments of the other (it should be recalled,
however, that in all three nations the U.S. was regarded more favorably
over the entire period surveyed, see Figure 6.2).
PUBLIC OPINION IN CONTEXT
This section examines Western European public opinion within the
broader context of the system of East-West competition that has existed
since World War II. The first portion examines some of the potential
influences upon the course taken by public evaluations of the Soviet-







































*The first two letters in each variable code refer
to the country (UK « United Kingdom; FR = France;
WG = West Germany); the 'o' stands for opinion; the
last letter or letters refer to the type of opinion
(of the military balance = B; of the Soviet Union =
SU; of the U.S. = US). Hence UKoB refers to British
public opinion regarding the military balance between
the U.S. and USSR. N = 15 observations for oSU and
oUS variables; N = 10 for oB variables. All corre-
lations are computed using pair-wise deletion.
The use of tests of statistical significance with
non-sample data is a subject of controversy.
In this paper, correlations




























*N = 15 for correlations between oSU and oUS;
N- 9 for correlations involving oB and oSU or
oUS (1968 data is available for oB but not for
the other two variables).
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Western European public opinion as one potential influence upon national
defense efforts (defense burdens: defense expenditures/GDP). These
national defense efforts, in turn, affect the East-West military balance.
The analyses to be presented in this section are exploratory.
Relatively weak theoretical "priors" and trends are being used. The
complexity of the relationships which public opinion has with other
factors is undoubtedly being underestimated. As was noted in the first
section of the paper, in these analyses emphasis is placed on similarities
in patterns across variables, using covariation as an indicator of
potential interdependence in a complex system.
Other Elements in the Pattern of East-West Competition
Previous analyses have identified a number of facets of East-
West relations which might be related to European public opinion.
These factors can be grouped into five sets:
The articulated perceptions of Soviet and American
leaders regarding the state of East-West relations,
Comparable perceptions for the leaders of the three
Western European nations,
The state of the Soviet-American strategic balance,
The behaviors directed by the USSR to the three
Western European states,
the behaviors exchanned between the superpowers.
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The first two sets of factors will be indexed by using data
collected by Kjell Goldmann. Goldmann uses content analysis to
assess the amount of tension in East-West relations in Europe that
was perceived by leaders in NATO and WTO states. Based on an inter-
pretation of Goldmann 1 s arguments concerning the Soviet-American
strategic relationship between the superpowers, the third factor will
be identified and distinguished in terms of the amount of "objective"
tension each represented insofar as a stable/secure nuclear balance
was concerned:
Phase 1 1946-1947 (3) (Objective Tension Score)
Phase 2 1948-1956 (2)
Phase 3 1957-1965 (4)
Phase 4 1966-1975 (1)
In this scheme a low number indexes low levels of "objective'
tension in the strategic balance. In this sense the most balanced
period was the phase cf mutual second strike capabilities (parity),
1 966+. The next most stable phase was 1948-1956, when only the U.S.
possessed the capability to attack the other superpower's homeland
with a major strategic strike. This was followed by the period in
which neither superpower possessed significant nuclear forces. Finally,
the period which had the most objectively "tense" or "unstable" re-
lationship was 1957-1965, when both superpowers had counter-homeland
nuclear strike capabilities, but where the U.S. had a significant lead,
Parity, achieved sometime during the mid-1960s, ended this imbalance.
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This aspect of the relationship between the superpowers will be
indexed by the four values which follow each of the phases.
The final two sets of factors will be indexed by using event
12
data taken from Azar and Sloan. Two types of behaviors will be
considered: conflictual events (denoted by a subscript 'c') and
"cooperative" events (denoted by subscript 'a').*
Potential Influences Upon Public Views of the Soviet-American Balance
The first analytical question has to do with the potential
influences upon the course of public views of the balance in the three
Western European nations. Table 6-9 shows the correlations between
public views and the potential causal factors identified above.
*It is generally easier to identify conflict rather than cooperation
Some of the events included on the Azar-Sloan cooperation scale (and
other scales of cooperative behaviors) could be interpreted as indices
of interaction or participation rather than cooperation per se . In
this paper, the Azar-Sloan "cooperation" scale will be employed as a
measure of nonconflictual "activity" (hence the subscript "a") since it
includes cooperative as well as more neutral interactive behaviors,
yearly mean levels presented in Azar and Sloan will be employed in the
analyses. Where no value is presented for a given nation and a year,




Correlations of Opinions Concerning
Military Balance and Predictors
UKoB FRoB WGoB
USp .60 .72_ .83















*Key: p = Elite Perception Data
BLNCE = US-Soviet Balance Variable
Behavior Variables = Actor, Target, Type
(for example, US-SUc = American conflic-






















The results presented in Table 6.9 show that the opinions of
Western European publics regarding the Soviet-American military
balance varied over time in ways that were congruent with changes in
other facets of the hypothesized network of East-West competition.
Articulated American perceptions are salient in all three nations.*
Soviet perceptions of tensions are salient in France and West Germany.
National leaders' perceptions are significant in Great Britain and
France. The signs of all of these relationships are positive, with
"better" public views of the balance (better U.S. standings) being
associated with periods in which leaders perceived less tension in
East-West relations in Europe.
The "objective" status of the strategic balance is correlated
with "subjective" impressions of the overall military balance in tv/o of
the three nations (Great Britain and France). The sign of this corre-
lation reflects the scoring of the strategic balance variable in which
"unstable" periods have higher values.
U.S. conflicts towards the USSR (primarily verbal behavior) was
salient in France and Great Britain. The negative siqn of the relation-
ship associates periods of greater U.S. conflict with periods of
greater relative Soviet leads in the perceived balance. The views of
*In this paper, correlations greater than or equal to .30 in




West German publics were positively associated with Soviet conflict
towards the United States. With only three nations involved in the
comparisons it is difficult to account for national differences in
the salience and signs of individual predictor factors.
Soviet behaviors towards Western European nations were signi-
ficantly associated with public views of the balance in France and
West Germany. Once again, with only three nations in the comparisons,
it is difficult to account for the anomalous signs of the German
correlations.
In terms of the methodological strategy that has been adopted
for this paper, the most interesting way in which to examine the stand-
ing of Western European public opinion within the larger structure of
East-West competition is to use multiple regression analysis to determine
if the course of public opinion concerning the balance can be accurately
reproduced on the basis of some set of other factors. Because of the
limited number of degrees of freedom available, small sets of predictors
will be employed. USp was salient in all three nations and will be
used in all equations. The British and French equations will also
include BLNCE and US-SUc. These predictors were salient in both nations.
Their inclusion provides a balanced set of predictors reflecting psy-
chological, relational, and behavioral factors. The West German
equation will consist of USp, and SU-WGa and SU-USc. This provides a
mix of one psychological factor plus two types of behavior. The results





Multiple Regression Results, UKoB , FRoB, WGoB
R R^ SEE F DW
UKoB .78 .61 11.0 3.1 2.45
FRoB .85 .73 8.2, 5.6 1.56
WGoB .90 .82 8.6 9.1 1.19
*
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Figure 6.5 WGoB Results
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Given the constraints under which the analysis operates, the
results are quite favorable. The course of public views concerning
the balance appear to be reasonably well-connected with other facets
of the hypothesized system of East-West competition; the pattern of
public opinion can be reproduced on the basis of the other factors.
The British equation is the weakest. The oscillations in the 1953-
1961 period of the Berlin Crisis are underestimated (1961 is a bad
year for the French equation as well). Otherwise the fit betv/een
estimated and actual patterns is respectable. The F levels for the
equations are also respectable.
Public Opinion and the Military Balance
The first half of the section singled out public opinion as a
dependent variable, potentially influenced by a variety of other factors
The remaining portion of the section will deal with European public
opinion as a potential causative factor, as one of many possible
influences upon the military balance. The postulated relationship is
one in which opinions of the Soviet Union and of the military balance
influence publics' willingness to support national defense efforts.
Changes in public support for defense efforts, in turn, can influence
the balance by affecting resource allocation decisions. Opinions of
the Soviet Union and views of the balance have been selected because
of their apparent face validity as potential influences on support
for defense spending. National defense efforts will be assessed as
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defense burdens (defense expenditures/GDP). The course of national
defense burdens since the early 1950s is given in Figure 6.6 and Table
6.11.
German defense expenditures differ markedly from those of France
and Great Britain. The German curve is significantly lower and flatter.
This difference is probably due to a number of factors: Germany's dis-
armed status in the early 1950s, the relative size of the German GDP,
and the Germany's lack of strategic weapons and forces. Whatever the
precise causes, this German difference appears to have consequences for
later analyses of the influences that might act upon national defense
burdens (see below). Reproducing the pattern of earlier analyses,
Table 6.12 presents the correlations of oSU and oB with defense burdens.
The similarities in pattern are striking; all of the correlations
are above the .30 threshold being employed in the analysis. The
negative signs on the correlations mean that as opinions of the USSR
became relatively more favorable and/or as America's perceived
relative standing in the military balance improved, national defense
burdens decreased. As before, the Germans present the only anomalous
case: the positive correlation between WGoB and WGdb. This may be due
to the different form taken by Germany's defense burden since the early
1950s. Multiple regression results for these variables are presented
in Table 6.13 and Figures 6.7-6.9.
National defense efforts are undoubtedly influenced by many
factors in addition to public opinion (for example, the effects of
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Figure 6.6 Defense Burdens
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l TABLE 6.11
Correlations of European Defense Burdens
UKdb FRdb WGdb







Correlations of European Opinion
and Defense Burdens
UKob FRoB WGoB UKoSU FRoSU WGoSU
UKab -.59 -.68
FRdb -.64 -.88
WGdb + .59 -.37
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TABLE 6.13
Multiple Regression Results; UKdb, FRdb, WGdb
R R2 F SEE D-W
UKdb .84 .72 7.7 .40 2.00
FRdb .90 .81 13.4 .45 2.15
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the superpowers). Even so, the patterns of national defense burdens
can be accurately reproduced from knowledge of public views concerning
the Soviet Union and the Soviet-American military balance. All three
equations perform well. Interestingly, in light of differences high-
lighted previously, the fit is weakest for the West German equation.
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC OPINION AND MILITARY POLICY
For the reasons outlined in the first section, the analyses
presented in this paper have been exploratory. They have been based
upon a relatively weak base of theory and previous research. Even so,
on the basis of the results presented, we can come to some tentative
conclusions regarding the bearing which Western European public opinion
has for military policy.
The second section presented a number of significant trends and
changes in the views of Western European publics regarding such factors
as the desirability of Soviet-American parity, assessments of the two
superpowers, and views of the military balance. Some of the more
significant findings were that:
o In recent polls substantial percentages of Western
European publics perceive the Soviets as having an
edge in the military balance, with the significance of
this perceived lead being highly conditioned by the
strategic theory within which it is viewed.
o The United States fares much better in comparisons in
which all bases of national power (rather than simply;.
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military factors) are considered; it was further
argued that this was a reasonable perception if
East-West competition is considered as a long-haul
process in which conflict is not anticipated over
the shorter term.
o There have been striking shifts in the views of
Western European publics regarding the desirability of
parity; recent survey results show a strong stand in
favor of Soviet-American parity instead of a U.S. lead;
these findings are even more significant because the
items which index them are among the few poll questions
which focus on policy preferences.
The paper's most significant finding is that trends in public
assessments of the superpower balance and views of the USSR covary
to a substantial extent with other facets of East-West relations.
This was true both when public views were considered as a dependent
variable, potentially influenced by a variety of other factors and
when the potential influence of public opinion upon national defense
burdens was examined. This pattern of moderate to strong covariation
supports the earlier assumptions and arguments that public opinion
within Western European nations plays a role in the larger system of
East-West competition, both as an influence and as a subject of influence
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In turn, this lends support to recent tendencies within the U.S.
analytical communities to take a broader view of American political-
military affairs (as opposed to a focus confined strictly to military
factors) and to direct more analytical attention to the broader policy
context of factors such as public opinion within which U.S. defense
policy is formulated and implemented.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FRENCH PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. -SOVIET MILITARY BALANCES:




France historically has been the most independent of the NATO
states in her foreign and military policy, and she has probably gone
the farthest in generating uncertainties as to her intentions in the
event of a major U.S. -Soviet or East-West conflict. Her overtures to
the Soviet Union (especially during the deGaulle years), her develop-
ment of the force de frappe , and her withdrawal from the military
structures of the alliance -- all provide the basis for hypothesizing
that, if French observers viewed the military balances shifting away
from the U.S., they might in general be more apt than their NATO
collegues to recommend policies calling for greater aloofness from the
Americans or closer accomodation with the Soviet Union.
*This research was supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency
of the Department of Defense and was monitored by Gerald Sullivan and
Robert Young under Contract No. 3117. The conclusions contained in this
study are those of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the
Naval Postgraduate School, ARPA, or any other agency of the U.S. Government
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If the above hypothesis is plausible, then France is a particularly
interesting state to key on regarding third country perceptions of the
U.S. -Soviet military balances. There exists a number of ways for
structuring inquiry into French perceptions, and this chapter will
summarize some results of a fairly extensive study applying one
method -- i.e. the coding of twenty years (1955 through 1974) of
4
selected articles and items from a French journal viewed as repre-
senting particularly well the views of French government officials and
defense-ori ented intel 1 ectual s
.
DEFENSE NATIONALE
According to its masthead, Defense National
e
(referred to herein
as DN) inquires into the "great national and international questions,"
be they "military, economic, political, scientific." It is a highly
respected journal published by the Comite d' etudes de defense nationale
,
an organization somewhat akin to the U.S. ' s Council on Foreiqn Relations,
Its authors often consist of French qovernment and military officials,
including ministers and military chiefs-of-staff
.
The journal appeared 11 times a year, and a total of 219 were
published from 1955 through 1974. In 1963 one normally expected issue
failed publication, but the editors made up for it by increasing the
content of several published companion issues. The only year for which
statistical totals are not fully comparable with those of others is
1964 since the July number was missinq from the serial collection to
which the writer had access.
Each journal numbered approximately 175 pages and contained about
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10 articles and 25 to 30 "Chronicle" items (referred to herein as
"c.i.'s"). Articles accounted for approximately two-thirds of any one
journal. As suggested by the masthead, they did not necessarily deal
with military or defense questions but also with a wide variety of
other topices such as syndicalism, the UAR after Nasser, meteorological
satellites, or the relation between salaries, prices and unemployment.
Items found in the "Chronique" section took up about one-fourth of
each journal. Their purpose was to keep readers informed of current
developments in national and international military, naval, maritime,
and aeronautical affairs as well as NATO, international organization,
and French overseas matters. Most were moderate in length though some
were no longer than one paragraph while others were equivalent to or
approached full-length articles. The remainder of each DN issue was
devoted to advertisements and a "Bibliography" section which briefly




The writer read DN selectively and scrutinized an artile or c.i.
only if it concerned itself with one or more of the following topics:
(1) French policy toward the United States, the Soviet
Union, NATO, or the Soviet Bloc;
(2) U.S., Soviet, NATO, or Soviet bloc policy vis-a-vis
one another or France;
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(3) French weapons developments, defense policy, military
capabilities, or military activities but not as these
related to French colonies or Third World nations;
(4) U.S. and/or Soviet weapons developments, defense policies,
military capabilities, or military activities but not as
these were inspired by purposes other than keeping the
2
other superpower's military in check;
(5) the defense of Western Europe as a whole, or Central
Europe/West Germany, or of France;
(6) control of or hegemony in the various seas or oceans
of the world;
(7) deterrence, war, military strateqy or tactics (as, e.g.,
articles dealing with strategy in the nuclear age) but
excluding articles dealing with querrilla war.
The above criteria were intended to guide the selection Drocess so
that only relevant articles or c.i.'s -- relevant in the sense of con-
taining military comparisons -- world "surface" for investigation. I
started with criteria which were vague and refined them in the process
of almost cover-to-cover reading of the journals for 1955-56 and 1965-66.
That reading, plus further sampling, made it clear that, because of
consistently low utility, one could eliminate from further consideration
the "Bibliography" section, the "Overseas" section of the Chronicle,
and articles published under the recurring rubrics: "Science and
Technology" and "Economic Facts".
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The process of selecting articles or c.i.'s for scrutiny beqan
with a review of titles. On that basis alone, some seemed obviously
worthy of investigation while others seemed just as obviously irrelevant
the latter being immediately dropped from consideration. Titles on a
third group were sufficiently tantalizing or ambiguous to rate reading
the introductory and closing paragraphs as well as scanning the
material in between. All articles or c.i.'s deemed worthy of investi-
gation were then read to see if they actually did contain balance
3
comparisons. In all, 258 articles and 77 c.i. s were coded.
Coding Defense National
e
For. the purposes of this chapter, coding Defense National
e
meant
answering six questions. The first was: What military capabilities
are being compared? The categories of concern are comparisons of:
4
- overall strategic nuclear capabilities
5
- strategic bombs and warheads
- strategic missiles (aggregate)
- ballistic-missile submarines
o
- strategic aviation/strateqic bombers
9
- overall conventional or ground forces capabilities
- overall naval capabilities
- overall air capabilities
In the overwhelming majority of cases there was little difficulty
in deciding under which cateqory a comoarison belonged . For example,
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authors would simply come out and say something to the effect that
one side had nuclear, conventional, or naval superiority or more and/or
12better missiles, bombers, ships, and the like. ' Of course, different
authors may have had different conceptions as to what they meant by
what they said. For example, one group of authors viewed strategic
aviation as entailing only bombers capable of striking one superpower's
homeland by taking off from the other's while a second aroup seemed to
consider European-based U.S. tactical aircraft as strategic bomber
assets. In coding, this writer did not control for such differences
since attempting to do so turned out to be overly complicated and time-
consuming.
Partly for the same reasons, some comparisons of more-or-less
different capabilities were grouped together in one category. The
"conventional or around forces" category, for instance, rejected the
oft-recurring situation where DN authors would make general assertions
about Soviet conventional superiority but then restrict examples or
amplifying data to ground forces only. Because of the difficulty of
knowing under what category to code such references (a conventional
forces category or a ground forces category) and because of simplicity
and expeditiousness, this writer chose to form a category uniting both
capabilities and coded accordingly.
Sometimes a more difficult task than categorizing comparisons
was deciding if a comparison was intended in the first place,
concept of this study, the word "balance" (" equilibre
" in the French),
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was itself a source of uncertainty in this regard. At times the term
was used such that it was not clear if the DN_ author meant that the
superpowers were in balance, meaninq equal, or whether they were actors
in a balance, whatever its actual state miqht be. For instance, it is
not entirely clear how an author views the balance when he writes:
"French policy cannot iqnore the nuclear balance existing between the
superpowers." This writer had to make a careful study of the context
in order to decide whether to code such a reference. If nothing in the
context suggested that the DN author viewed both sides as equal, then
the reference was not coded.
On occasion reference was made to both superpowers in such a way
as to place them in a class by themselves, implying a comparison that
had them roughly equal. More than one article, e.g., contained the
admonition that France must continue her force de frappe and related
delivery system programs even though she had no hope of matching U.S.
or Soviet capabilities. This writer accepted that, in comparing France
with both superpowers, the DN author in a sense was also implying some
measure of rough equality between them since they together (rather than
just one) set the norm, the standard, against which the French program
was being measured.
Once this writer decided that the p_N author was making a comparison,
then that comparison was coded only one time per article or "Chronicle"
item. This coding rule applied no matter how often an author stated in
his piece that one or the other side was ahead or equal.
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The second question which guided the coding process was: Whose
capabilities are being compared? While the main thrust of this study
was to reach conclusions about U.S. and Soviet (i.e., US-SU) balances,
it was thought useful to code comparisons of NATO/West vs. Soviet Union/
Soviet bloc (i.e., N/W-S/S) conventional military capabilities. So
doing helped put into perspective the context in which the conventional
balances were viewed since it allowed one to ansv/er questions such as:
Is the naval balance viewed more in US-SU or N/W-S/S terms?
The Soviet Union was singled out as an entity on the S/S side
since there were many articles or items which specifically compared
NATO or Western eapabilities against those of the Soviet Union alone
vice the Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc. In contrast, there were no com-
parisons involving the U.S. alone versus the Soviet bloc/Warsaw Pact.
Less than a handful of Soviet comparisons involved or imDlied that
China was a member of the bloc.
Because the United States and Soviet Union were viewed as beinn the
undisputed primary competitors in all aspects of strategic weapons and
delivery systems, all comparisons relative to these systems were coded
as US-SU balances. This coding rule applied regardless of whether the
journal author may have referred to "East versus West" rather than to
the superpowers per se when making strategic system comparisons.
The third coding question was: Which side does the DN^ author see
as superior at the time of writing? In this regard mention has already
been made of those cases where DN authors talked of the superDowers
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being in a class by themselves, implying in this writer's view a com-
parison that had both equal. There were also instances -- occuring 15
times -- when some comparisons had to be coded as "split opinions"
(referred to as "s.o.'s"). These occurred either because the authors
were ambiguous or undecided as to whether one side was ahead or equal
or because they had one side ahead in some circumstances and its
adversary ahead in others.
An oft-recurring situation -- indeed, one which reflected standard
operating procedure in the chronicles -- was for a DN author to quote
or paraphrase without comment someone else's views on a balance. Since
the purpose of this study is to present DN perceptions of the balances,
it did not make sense for this writer to code, e.g., Chairman Khrushchev's
or Secretary MacNamara's views if these were presented in strictly
reportorial fashion. Hence, comparisons were coded only if the DN
authors seemed to subscribe or accept the views in question. Contextual
analysis was the method utilized to resolve ambiguous cases.
Contextual analysis was also utilized to deal with a similar but
relatively infrequent problem -- i.e., resolving ambiguities about
whether an author's statement about a balance reflected his views as to
which side was ahead at the time the author was writing . For example,
if an author writing in 1970 stated that the Soviets were ahead in
strategic missiles in 1959 but gave no indication that they were also
superior in 1970, then no comparison was coded.
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Questions four and five were simple to code. Four inquired into
whether quantitative factors played a significant role in perceptions.
Codinq consisted of noting those comparisons where numerical measures
were explicitly relied on (either independently or in conjunction with
qualitative factors) in assessments of the balance. Question five
entailed noting what sources were specifically acknowledged by the DN
writer as providing him with information about the balance with which
he was concerned.
Coding question number six -- What recommendations does the DN_
author make in view of the state of a balance as he perceives it? --
required that this writer exercise a fair degree of judgment. The
reason is that, while many recommendations were straightforward,
causing no coding problems, a large number were not directly linked
by the DN author to the comparisons with which they were associated by
this writer . It was not at all unusual for a DN_ author to make com-
parisons in the course of an argument in which he made a number of
other points and assertions. Numerous recommendations might also be
made, but none would necessarily be tied in any direct, explicit,
"cause-and-effect 1 manner to any of the points or comparisons made in
the argument, yet particular recommendations seemed to this writer to
flow logically from the comparisons made and hence were coded,
doing I constantly sought not to make connections which the DN author
simply did not intend to have made.
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Collating the Data
Collating the data meant ascertaining trends or patterns contained
in the coded responses. For the purposes of this chapter, the questions
which guided the collating process fall into three groups.
Questions relating *How did the balances rank relative to
to the frequency one another over the twenty years in
of comparisons: terms of the frequency in which they
appeared?
*If one compares frequency totals for
the last two five-year periods, were
there any radical shifts in the
attention paid each balance where
attention is measured by frequency
of comparisons?
*Vler*e conventional force comDarisons
most often made in a US-SU or N/W-
S/S context?
Questions relating *What were the long-term trends in
to DN author per- perceptions? Particularly, which
ceptions of the balances over the twenty years
balances: trended in favor of perceived US
superiority, USSR superiority, or
parity?
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*What were the more recent trends in
perceived superiority or parity if
one compares perception totals over
the last two five-year periods?
*Were perceptions for the conventional
balances in the N/W-S/S context
similar to those in the US-SU context?
Questions relating *How often did quantitative indicators
to quantitative play a role in comparisons?
indicators: *Which balance areas most often involved
reliance on quantitative measures?
Question relative *Grouping sources into categories, how
to sources: did they rank relative to one another
over the twenty year Deriod?
Questions relating to *If one focuses on policy recommendations
DN author policy having applicability to more than one
recommendations: balance area, which recommendations
recurred most frequently?
*Were these recommendatiors associated
with any recurring or predominant views
as to which side was ahead in the res-
pective balances?
!03
*From this writer's viewpoint, were
there any recommendations which
recurred much less frequently than
expected?
STUDY RESULTS
Results Relating to the Frequency of Comparisons
There were 361 comparisons overall, and their distribution in
order of frequency across the balances is contained in Table 7.1.
This table also hiqhlights shifts in attention paid to each balance
by noting the difference in the number of comparisons made in 1965-69
with the number made in 1970-74. As seen therein, the strateqic
balances generally received the greatest amount of attention with the
strategic nuclear balance far and away beinq the subject of the Greatest
number of comparisons. Consistent with the frequency of strateqic
nuclear comparisons was the relatively high number of strategic missile
(aggregate) references. Of the conventional balances, the naval was
definitely the most significant while both the air and conventional or
ground forces categories received the smallest amount of attention of
all balance areas.
There were no radical shifts in the attention given to any balance.
The most significant difference in the number of comparisons made in the
last two ^ive-year periods was a decrease of 3 comparisons each associated
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(1) Strategic nuclear balance 201
(2) Strategic missiles 57
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From the point of view of context (see Table 7.2), the conventional
or ground forces balance was most often seen in N/W-S/S and the naval in
US-SU terms. The air totals were too small for valid conclusions.
Results Relating to DN Author Perceptions of the Balances
The data summarized in Table 7.3 indicate that over the twenty
years the United States dominated in comparisons of strategic bombs and
warheads, ballistic missile submarines, strategic aviation, overall
naval power, and overall air power -- though the U.S. lead in this last
area is questionable due to the small number of comparisons. The Soviets
led in only one category: that of conventional or ground forces, but its
lead is also questionable due not only to the paucity of comparisons but
also to the fact that there were no comparisons in the period from 1965-74.*
Both superpowers were overwhelmingly perceived as equal in the strategic
nuclear balance, and both were viewed as superior in a nearly equal
number of times in strategic missiles, this balance being in "stalemate"
for the twenty years as a whole since 86 percent of all comparisons
had one or another side -ahead.
Trends of a more recent nature result from comparing perceptions
in 1965-69 with those in 1970-74. Table 7.4 reveals that the United
States in 1970-74 "held its own" in maintaining 1965-69 leads in
*The Soviet lead, however, is not so questionable if one considers
that USSR forces make up the vast bulk of Warsaw Pact armies and that
of 36 N/W-S/S comparisons of conventional or ground forces, the Soviet
group was perceived as superior in every case. See below, Table 7.6.
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strategic bombs and warheads, ballistic missile submarines, and
strategic aviation. In no area, however, did it "experience" a signi-
ficant increase in favorable perceptions whether one compares absolute
totals or percentages.
In contrast the Soviet Union went from being viewed ahead in
only 8 percent of 1965-69 strategic missile comparisons to 43 percent
in 1970-74 -- a very sizable gain occurring predominantly at the expense
of favorable U.S. perceptions. The end result is that the strategic
missile balance shifted from overwhelming U£ domination in perceptions
in the former time period to both superpowers being viewed as ahead an
equal number of times in the latter.
An even greater percentage shift took place -- again at the
expense of perceived US superiority -- in the naval balance. There
were only four comparisons of overall naval power in 1965-69, but all
favored the United States. The number increased to six in the next
five years, but only three were "pro-US". The remaining three had the
balance in parity, causing this balance to trend for the first time in
the direction of equality.
The tendency to perceive the strategic nuclear balance as in
equality, already well-established in 1965-69, was reinforced in
1970-74 as the US. lost some ground in this balance also. In the first
of these periods, 77 percent of all comparisons had both sides equal
and the remaining 23 percent had the U.S. ahead. By the end of the
second period, the percentages had changed to 91 and 9 respectively.
As for the air and conventional or qround forces balances, there
were too few comparisons to allow for conclusions.
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Table 7.5 links together the twenty year trends with the more
recent trends described immediately above. Balances by long-term
trend are grouped together in columns while arrows or boxes represent
recent trends. An arrow indicates the direction of a significant
shift in perceptions while a box signifies that no such shift occurred.
A heavy box has been placed around the strategic nuclear balance to
highlight the increasing tendency over the last ten years to view it
as in equality. Parentheses around the air and conventional or ground
forces categories indicated that trends associated with them are of
questionable significance due to small number of comparisons.
In comparing US-SU and N/W-S/S trends, it is best to start with
the naval area
x
where long-term trends for both contexts do match since
the U.S. and N/W sides both clearly dominated. (See Table 7.6). In
contrast, the short-term trends are dissimilar since the US-SU context
shifted toward equality while the N/W-S/S did not. Lack of adequate data
precludes reaching any such conclusions for the other conventional
balances. It is worth noting, however, that, of the 42 conventional or
ground forces comparisons (6 US-SU and 36 N/W-S/S), the Soviet group was
perceived as superior in each instance.
Results Relating to the Use of Quantitative Measures
Quantitative measures entered into 23 percent of all comparisons,
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had a very strong tendency to think numerically (whether exclusively or
in conjunction with qualitative factors) when contemplating the
strategic bombs and warheads, naval, and strategic aviation balances.
For each area 59, 55, and 48 percent respectively of the comparisons
were quantitatively-oriented either in whole or in part. The strategic
nuclear and conventional or ground forces areas differed sharply since
only 8 percent of the former and none of the latter (which had only
six comparisons) involved numerical indicators. If one eliminates
these last two from consideration, then quantitative factors entered
into 44 percent of the remaining assessments.
Results Relating to Sources of Information
DN authors acknowledged the sources they relied on for information
about the balances on 82 occasions, and these are grouped together in
Table 7.3. Contrasting sharply with the fact that no Soviet source was
ever mentioned, the U.S. Government (especially the Defense Department)
accounted for 46 percent of the acknowledgments -- well ahead of any
other source. Annual publications specializinq in military force
levels made up 34 percent with The Mil itary Balance , published by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, alone constituting 19
percent. With the category labelled "other" including two additional
references to the IISS as an organization, the result is that the




ACKNOWLEDGED SOURCES BY GROUP
Number of Percent of
Source Acknowledgments Acknowledgi
U.S. Goverment 37 45%















(a) Does not total to 100 due to rounding
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Results Relating to DN Author Recommendations
Three recommendations recurred most frequently. The first was
that France or Western Europe should develop a force de fraope and/or
related delivery systems. This recommendation appeared 51 times and
with increasing frequency per five year period (i.e., 10, 11, 13, and
17 times). It was usually made in connection with comparisons of the
strategic balances wherein both sides were viewed as equal, and it was
not at all unusual for it to be associated with the thought that the
US could no longer, due to increases in Soviet strategic power, be
counted on to go to nuclear war in response to Soviet aggression in
Europe. It was also not unusual, regardless of the Derceived state
of a balance, to have this suggestion justified by claims that France
must develop her deterrent either to avoid a superpower condominium
or to assure herself a strong voice in NATO circles.
Recurring somewhat less frequencly (i.e., 42 times) were admonition
that the United States and/or the West should increase their flexible
response capabilities. These recommendations occurred especially with
strategic comparisons that had both sides equal. They also arose with
"pro-SU" conventional or ground forces comparisons (3 times) and
"pro-US" naval comDarisons (twice). Unlike the force de frappe
recommendation, this one generally appeared with decreasing frequency
per five year period (14, 14, 9, and 5 recommendations per period).
Occurring 23 times and almost always in connection with strategic
balances were suggestions to the effect that the West must act to
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counter Soviet politico-psychological advances in the Third World.
All except one of these recommendations were made in the late fifties
and early sixties when Khrushchev was strongly wooing the underdeveloped
and verbally supporting "wars of national liberation." They were
particularly associated with the Soviet's reaching equality in the
strategic areas (hence assuring themselves a modicum of security vis-a-
vis the United States) or with Soviet space activities viewed as
particularly impressive to Third World states.
Some recommendations were conspicuous by their absence or by the
small number of times they appeared. As perceptions of the strategic
missile balance shifted strongly away from U.S. domination to equality
in the last five years of the study, one might have expected that at
least some DN_ writers would have called on the United States to build
up its missile arsenal. Such was not the case -- a fact, however, which
was not inconsistent with the increased trend of perceiving the
strategic nuclear balance as an equality and the continued tendency to
accept U.S. superiority in strategic bombs and warheads, ballistic
(SEE INSERT PAGE 218a)
missile submarines, and strategic aviation. 1" There were merely five
recommendations (all reflecting perceived equality in the strategic
nuclear balance) supporting the strategic arms limitations negotiations
or agreements and no recommendations, even with the mutual balanced
force reduction talks, supporting conventional arms control measures.
In contrast to the encouragement given the force de frappe , there was
only one occasion (in 1971) when an author called upon France, exclusive
of the West or the United States, to build up her conventional force
218
Insert for page 218.
It was also not inconsistent with the belief of many DN_ authors
that both superpowers had an excess of sufficiency in the strategic
nuclear area so that an increase in such missile numbers would make
little difference.
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capabilities -- in this case, naval (reflecting perceived equality in
the naval balance). Finally, while many DN^ authors desired that France/
Western Europe build a nuclear deterrent due to some lack of confidence
in the United States, there were, surprisingly, no recommendations to
the effect that, since one or another balance was shifting in favor of
the Soviets, France/Western Europe should move to build up political
fences with them. Indeed, recommendations that the United States or
Western countries as a group increase their flexible response capabilities
signified willingness to continue working within the American/Western
alliance context. Whether the decreasinq number of flexible response
recommendations over times signified decreasing willingness to do so
is a question worthy of investigation in future research.
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
This section lists some of the more significant findings of this
research:
(1) The strategic nuclear balance by far was the subject of the
greatest number of balance comparisons while the overall U.S. -Soviet
air and conventional or ground forces balances elicited the fewest
assessments.
(2) DN_ authors making comparisons tended to view the conventional or
ground forces balance much more in NATO-Soviet Union/Soviet bloc terms
than in U.S. -Soviet Union terms. The opposite was true for the naval
balance.
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(3) Discounting the overall air balance, the United States consistently
dominated -- both over the long term and in recent years -- in the areas
of strategic bombs and warheads, ballistic missile submarines, and
strategic aviation. There was no comparable area for the Soviets if
one discounts the conventional or ground forces balance due to the
small number of comparisons. (See, however, footnote on page 206.)
(4) The superpowers were generally viewed as equal in the strategic
nuclear balance over the long-term with this trend becoming overwhelming
in the last years of the study.
(5) When shifts in the balances did occur as a result of comparing
the last two five-year periods, they did not favor the United States.
Both the strategic missile and naval balances shifted from U.S.
dominance toward equality.
(6) Some balance areas (particularly strategic nuclear bombs and
warheads, naval, and strategic aviation) elicited a greater tendency
among _DN authors to think of them in quantitative terms than did others
(particularly the strategic nuclear and the conventional or qround forces
balances,though the data is limited for this last area.)
(7) The U.S. Government (especially the Defense Department) was most
often acknowledged as the source of information concerning the cap-
abilities being compared, followed by annuals specializing in national
military force levels. The London International Institute for
Strategic Studies also figured prominently as an organizational source.
At no time did any author indicate use of Soviet information.
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(8) Three recommendations recurred most frequently, very often in
conjunction with viewing the strategic nuclear balance as in equality.
These encouraged development of a force de frappe by France or Western
Europe, an increase in flexible response capabilities on the part of
the West or United States, and implementation of a Western program in
the late 1950s-early 1960s to counter Soviet politico-psychological
advances in the Third World.
(9) Contrary to this writer's expectations, there were few recommen-
dations supporting strategic arms limitations; no recommendations
calling for mutual balanced conventional force reductions; no recommen-
dations that the United States increase its strategic missile arsenal
as that balance shifted markedly toward equality in the 1970s; only one
recommendation encouraging France to develop her own conventional force
capabilities; and no recommendations calling upon France or Western
Europe to build up political fences with the Soviets as balances
shifted away from the United States.
NOTES
1. See Donald C. Daniel, DEFENSE NATIONALE Perceptions of the US-
Soviet Military Balances , Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report
56D176111, (Monterey, CA. , November, 1976).
2. In contrast, excluded from consideration were articles that, e.g.,
dealt with U.S. activities aimed at checking rebel, guerrilla, or in-
surgent activities in Third World countries or with U.S. aid intended
to help Israel check or balance the Arabs.
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3. Admittedly both the criteria for selection and the method described
above were by no means foolproof. It miqht have been possible to make
the selection process both speedier and less subjective by deciding
ahead of time, for example, to read thoroughly every third article or
c.i. and code only those balance comparisons which by chance were con-
tained therein. I chose not to do that on the conviction that too
much relevant data would be lost and that I would be wasting my time
in reading articles, for instance, whose titles or scanning indicated
a high probability that they had little or no value to this study.
4. The strategic nuclear balance category includes all comparisons of
U.S. and Soviet capabilities to win a nuclear exchange and/or -inflict
nuclear destruction. It also encompasses references restricted to
comparing overall strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It does not
include references concerned with comparing more sDecific capabilities
such as strategic missile systems per se or nuclear bombs. These are
dealt with under other categories.
5. This category includes references comparing which side had more
and/or better bombs and warheads, more associated megatonnage, or better
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bomb and warhead development programs. Some comparisons dealt only
with bombs or only with warheads while others dealt with both as a
group and were so coded. In most cases identifying comparisons for
coding was a relatively simple task, but there was difficulty in as-
certaining if mega tonnage comparisons dealt with total megatonnage or
with warhead megatonnage only. This writer did not control for the
difference.
6. The "strategic missiles (aggregate)" heading encompasses references
to strategic missiles-in-general, land-based ICBMs, and SLBMs. Com-
parisons were readily identifiable and dealt either with which side
had more and/or better missiles or better associated development
programs. If a reference to strategic missiles-in-general was accompanied
by clearly differentiated comparison of land-based ICBM's or SLBM's,
then the ICBM or SLBM reference was coded also.
7. This balance includes all statements as to which side had more and/
or better boats and all statements comparing the progress each side was
making in its boat development and production programs.
3. Included in this category are references comparing which side had
more and/or better bombers in general, more and/or better strategic
bombers in particular, better strategic aviation capability, or a better
bomber or strategic aviation development program. Of primary concern
were references to heavy or long-range bombers or bombers which could
leave one side's homeland, strike the other's, and return. No attempt
was made to control whether a DN_ author's reference to "strategic
bombers" or "bombers" in general was meant to include medium bombers,
light bombers, or forward-based tactical aircraft.
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9. This category aggregates together references to the general or
overall conventional forces balance and to the general or overall
ground forces balance. They were aggregated because some authors
clearly referred to one or the other's superiority in "conventional,"
"classical," or "traditional" forces but then restricted discussion
to ground forces. Comparisons of overall conventional naval or air
power are dealt with in other categories.
10. This category includes all statements focusing on which Navy is
superior overall as well as all references restricted to comparing
which had more ships or tonnage, technically better ships, or better
ship development programs.
11. Coded under this category were statements to the effect that one
or the other side had more air power, more and/or better aircraft over-
all, or a better aircraft development program.
12. Because of difficulties of knowing exactly what was being compared,
coding for one balance category not mentioned above had to be discon-
tinued. This category dealt with "general military power/war-winning
capability." There were too many unresolvable ambiguous statements in
the writings potentially relevant to this category. The ambiguity
arose from constantly recurring references to Soviet or American power
in general which seemed to be military-associated but were never clear
enough to rate coding.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
JAPANESE ELITE ASSESSMENTS OF THE




No systematic study of the Japanese elite's perceptions of the
U.S. -Soviet military balance is known to exist. On the other hand,
we do have substantial documentary and a good deal of impressionistic
information on this auestion. An analysis of the available data thus
can provide a general idea of the Japanese leadership's interpretation
of world events and of its assessment of the international balance of
forces.
In focusing on the views of the Japanese elite rather than on
those of the Japanese public (as USIA surveys do), the problem Dosed
itself of defining which individuals and interest groups should be
considered to make up Japan's elite. For the purposes of this Daoer,
the criterion guidinq this determination has been to include those
individuals, organizations or interest groups which participate either
directly in the process of making Japan's policies or who by virtue
of their social, economic, or political position or their special
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expertise have important influence on those who do make policy. In
practice this meant an exploration of: the views and perspectives of
Japanese political and government leaders and those in policymaking
positions within the powerful Japanese bureaucracy; the opinions held
4
by Japan's business world (as reflected, for example, by the highly
influential Keidanren — Federation of Economic Organizations -- and
its sub-sections); and finally, the views of those advisers, defense,
foreign policy and technology experts and commentators who are known
to play a role in the Japanese decisionmaking process in foreign and
national security policy through their influence on the policymaking
elite. This categorization reflects not only the writer's analysis of
Japan's power structure, but is shared by most experts on JaDan.
The opinions of individuals in the above categories were gleaned
from a variety of sources: official and unofficial documents, speeches,
policy statements and writings; conference proceedings and other reports
by third parties -- Japanese and American --, and personal interviews
with representative. Japanese fiqures whom the writer has known for
some time. While use was made of the information accumulated over many
years during the writer's frequent trips to Japan, most of the inter-
views took place during 1974 and 1975, either in Japan or in the United
States, benefiting from opportunities created by research on other
facets of the U.S. -Japanese relationship. Since most individuals inter-
viewed Dreferred not to have their views attributed to them in writing,
no reference to their identity is made in the text.
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JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE OUTSIDE WORLD
Insularity and Weak Threat Perceptions
Ever since Japan regained its sovereignty some two decades aqo,
4
the ruling conservatives and the opposition have been arguing over
Japan's international alignment and the most effective way of assuring
the nation's security. The existence of such divergent views imposes
severe constraints on Japan's defense strategy and discourages the
Japanese government from playing an activist role in international
affairs. Yet, a closer examination of the Japanese scene suggests
that despite these differences, most Japanese, including the leadership,
share certain basic perspectives on the outside world, perspectives
which stand in marked contrast to those of the European allies of the
United States. These Japanese international perspectives can be
summarized under two headinas: insularity and weak threat perception.
The JaDanese themselves are deeply conscious of their insular
mental attitudes ( shimaguni konjo") which aark their relationship to
the outside world and tend to set them apart from it. But noting the
rapid pace of Japan's Western-style modernization of daily life and
the Japanese economy's ever growing global involvement, one might be
tempted to play down this characteristic as diminishing in relevance
for the Japanese international outlook. Nothinq could be farther from
the truth. Language and cultural -psychological barriers continue to
present enormous obstacles to international communications with Japan.
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At the same time that the Japanese are economically more deeDly
involved with other nations than ever before, they remain to a con-
siderable degree isolated from the outside Western developed nation
with its own yery distinctive value system and perspectives. Para-
doxically, although the Japanese have developed one of the world's
most hiqhly developed international communications networks, in their
perceptions they continue to remain remote from developments abroad
and admit to a lack of "feel" for them. (The extremely homogeneous
ethnic and cultural make-up of the Japanese population may account as
much for this national insularity as does the country's island location
off the Asian continent.)
These observations apply, if to a lesser degree, to the policy-
makings elite as they do to the general public. At the top of the
Japanese power pyramid stand men who are singularly Japanese in their
social and psychological outlook, personal associations, and world view.
Japan's decisionmakers in the political, economic, and bureaucratic
spheres tend to have only a superficial intellectual involvement with
the world beyond Japan. Hence the significance in Japan of such inter-
mediaries as the "defense intellectuals" and other specialists in
international affairs who can serve as interpreters of international
developments for an audience of policymakers not well equipped to read -
literally and intellectually -- the news from abroad.
The insularity of Japan also contributes to the weak external
threat perceptions that characterize Japan and stand in sharp contrast
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to European reactions. With the exception of the Allied (i.e. American)
occupation after World War II, the Japanese islands have never
experienced- foreign military incursions. Whenever Japan has been
entangled in military ventures, it has been the result of Japanese
initiatives and occurred away from the home islands. If anything,
Japan's defeat in the war has reduced the Japanese people's concern
with an external threat, as Japan's security is being assured by the
American military presence and formal U.S. defense guarantees. So
long as the United States is acknowledged to be the world's paramount
power, the Japanese, further protected by their physical distance from
potential adversaries, can feel secure, leaving them free to focus
their energies on domestic construction. In the past three decades, •
this inward-directed effort has minimized Japan's involvement in
international affairs and thereby also the Japanese people's exposure
to external problems.
Another factor deserves mention in this context. Japan's disarma-
ment after the war, its rejection of military power as an instrument
of national policy (Article 9 of the Japanese postwar Constitution),
and the Japanese leaders' conscious decision to build economic rather
than military strength has naturally tended to divert their attention
away from global military concerns. Nations, like individuals, presumably
are inclined to see the world in an image fitting their preferred
strategies. Rightly or wrongly therefore -- and we are not concerned
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here with judging the validity of Japanese views but with describing
them -- the Japanese have commonly been viewing military power as of
lesser utility in assuring their national security than the protection
provided by economic strength and world-wide trade relations. The
conviction is by now deeply embedded in the minds of the Japanese
people -- and not only of the general public -- that so long as Japan
continues its present policies, there is no good reason -- or incentive
for the Soviet Union or any other nation to threaten the security of
Japan.
Reinforcing these conclusions are certain widely-held notions
about the U.S. -Soviet military relationship. In the past, statements
by authoritative Japanese (e.g. the Defense Agency Chief and Japan's
Foreign Minister) confirm that from the Japanese leadership's viewpoint
the U.S. -Soviet equilibrium has positive global significance in the
sense that it renders an armed clash of the suDerpowers highly unlikely
thereby setting also natural limits to the localized conflicts expected
to occur from time to time on the fringes of the two competing alliance
systems. In the Japanese view there is no reason why any nation should
wish to engage in aqgression against a virtually unarmed Japan, allied
to the United States and deeply enmeshed in mutually beneficial economic
exchanges with the world's major nations, although there remains some
fear that Japan might be drawn into a local conflict. Thus, under
present conditions, characterized by the absence of acute tension in
Japan's international environment, one finds little concern among the
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Japanese leadership about serious repercussions for Japan resulting in
the short term from the U.S. -Soviet global military competition.*
There is another difference between Japanese international
perspectives and those of the European non-Communist nations. In
Europe one notes a strong conviction that the U.S. -Soviet global balance
has a direct and immediate bearing on the security of e^ery European
nation and that Soviet challenges wherever they may occur in Europe
are viewed as inter-related and affecting all of Europe. Hence the
deeply felt need for a united front against Soviet pressures. The
Japanese, on the other hand, view their security as being assured and
essentially distinct from that of most of Asia. They see the rest of
Asia in a state of extreme flux, where the threats to stability tend to
be multiple and largely internal rather than single, external, and
easily defined. In line with these basic perceptions, the Japanese elite
recognizes in the Far East no place for a strong and broad military
alliance that would include Japan.
*Japanese opinion makers and defense intellectuals participating
in Moscow in late 1974 in a conference devoted to an appraisal of
Soviet-Japanese relations saw such convictions confirmed when their
Soviet counterparts reportedly downplayed the U.S. -Japanese security
pact as being no more than one element in U.S. attempts to maintain a
U.S. -Soviet global balance rather than being specifically aimed at the
Soviet Union.
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It is understandable then that the Japanese leadership has been
much less preoccupied with global non-economic concerns and the U.S.
and Soviet military roles than is the case with the Europeans. The
relative intensity of Japanese sensitivities can best be depicted with
concentric circles. At the center is, of course, the preoccupation of
the leadership with the state of affairs at home; then, concerns about
the security of the area around Japan and Korea; further out, a continued
strong interest in the stability of conditions along the arc from North-
east to Southeast Asia; and, finally, a broad, general, but rather
remote concern with the state of the global U.S. -Soviet military
balance. Although this balance is acknowledged to have its indirect
effect on areas of special interest to Japan, it is viewed as a problem
quite beyond Japan's ability to affect. In that sense, the Japanese
perspective is that of a reqional and economic rather than that of a
world power.
Japanese Preferences Vis-a-vis the Superpowers
Perceptions of reality filter through the prism of policy
preferences. What then are Japanese psychological predispositions and
preferences with regard to the United States and the Soviet Union? The
answers are not difficult to ascertain. They are reflected in every-
thing we know about Japanese views of each country, in Japances behavior
toward the two big powers, in Japanese writinqs, official statements,
and in the many public opinion polls conducted on the subject over the
years.
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It seems hardly necessary to go into detail regarding Japanese
attitudes toward the United States, a subject on which much has been
written on both sides of the Pacific. While there have been ups and
downs in the U.S. -Japanese relationship since the war and while the
relationship has never been completely free of friction, Japanese
attitudes toward the United States remain essentially positive, despite --
or perhaps because of? -- the wartime defeat and the effects of the post-
war military occupation of Japan. This is a tribute to U.S. policy
and to the success of the economic, social, and political restructuring
of postwar Japan in which the United States played initially at least
a dominant role. It is also an indication that the Japanese leadership
sees Japan's national interest in close political and military bonds
with the United States rather than in a neutralist or unaligned posture.
While the alliance rests primarily on economic and thus perhaps
shallow foundations rather than on a consciousness of shared values,
this has never really subtracted from the essentially positive Japanese
perception of the United States. These positive sentiments are held by
the vast majority of the general public as well as by Japan's conservative
leadership, but they also are present as a latent force far into the
liberal and left wings of Japanese opposition politics. After more than
two decades of close political, economic, and military ties between the
two countries, the alliance with the United States has proved its worth
to most Japanese -- even to many in the political opposition, as is
evidenced in its leaders' increasingly gingerly handling of the security
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pact issue. So long as Japan prefers to assure its security through
a military alliance, the United States remains the logical and favored
partner in the eyes of the majority of the Japanese people and its
leadership. In their view, U.S. policy objectives and world outlook
continue to be essentially compatible with the perceived national
interest of postwar Japan.
In studying one nation's response to another nation, one
encounters a composite of predispositions, assumptions, and reactions.
The resulting image plays a very real role in influencing a nation's
international behavior and its foreign policy choices. Such an image
appears to be primarily the result of the cumulative effect of the
historical experience. It encompasses conflicts and alliances --
military, political and ideological. It is affected by geographic
and economic factors, by the scope, depth and nature of cultural inter-
change, by the intensity of the flow of communications between the
countries concerned and by the actions and inter-personal relationships
of their leaders.
It has already been pointed out that the Japanese image of the
United States is on balance a very favorable one. Japanese perspectives
on the Soviet Union, on the other hand, are strongly and neqatively
marked by past confrontations of a military and ideological nature.
World War II further accentuated Japanese feelings of hostility and
distrust when Soviet forces suddenly attacked in Manchuria durinq
last days of the fighting (and desoite the still valid non-aggression
pact with Japan), subsequently held a million or more Japanese
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captured military and civilians in camps (where many of them did not
survive the rigorous conditions) and seized territory traditionally
considered Japanese. Thereafter, Soviet international behavior — in
Eastern Europe and closer to Japan -- coupled with the rapid buildup
of military strength did nothing to improve the Soviet reputation in
Japan. Moreover, in the competition with China for Japanese support,
the Soviet Union from the beginning was handicapped. Chinese propaganda
in Japan still further blackened the Soviet image. During the past
decade, Soviet approaches to Japan and expanding economic exchanges
have provided a somewhat better environment for Soviet-Japanese
relations. Nevertheless, Japanese distrust of the Soviet Union remains
deep-rooted among the elite, especially among the older generation
which provides Japan's political leadership. On public opinion polls,
the Soviet Union continues to vie with the two Koreas for the spot of
"most disliked nation" in Japan. In its global competition with the
United States Japanese sympathies and Japan's national interest are
acknowledged to be on the U.S. side. The Japanese leaders realistically
view the Soviet Union as a power to be reckoned with. They view it as
a potentially troublesome neighbor with whom relations should be
improved, but who also deserves to be watched with suspicion.
Reliance on U.S. Information
The nature and dimensions of the channels through which one nation
learns about another obviously exert an important influence on the
perceptions of one nation by another. The flow of information entering
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Japan from the United States has always been vastly superior in
quantity, quality and diversity from that coming out of the Soviet
Union. There is no precise way of comparing the two information
flows, but a ratio of 100:1 is probably not an exaggeration. Cer-
tainly, both the Japanese general public and the elite are notably
more familiar with all aspects of American conditions and Dolicies
than with those of the Soviet Union. The reasons lie in the different
natures of the two societies as well as in the very extensive and still
progressing enmeshing of Japanese and American societies. In contrast
to the trickle of Japanese visitors to the Soviet Union going there
for political, commercial or cultural purposes and to the even fewer
Soviets cominq to Japan, millions of Americans have had direct contact
with the Japanese since the days of the military occupation and
hundreds of thousands of Japanese have visited or lived in the United
States as tourists, students, businessmen, technicians and scientists.
Every day the average Japanese is exposed to the English language --
in school, on television and radio, in advertisements, in press and
literature. Familiarity with the Russian language remains the exception
in Japan^being found primarily among students of literature or among
government research analysts, concentrated in the Foreion Ministry,
the Defense Agency and the several organizations concerned with foreign
intelligence. Not surprisingly, these analysts are severely handicapped
by the less accessible nature of Soviet society and the consequent
paucity of data on Soviet developments. This applies particularly to
information which would allow continuous, direct monitoring of Soviet
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military strength. Thus, today the flow of information about Soviet
developments, especially with regard to military matters, enters Japan
almost entirely by way of the United States rather than from the
Soviet Union.
Japanese perceptions or relative U.S. and Soviet strengths thus
tend to be powerfully influenced by U.S. views, perspectives and
judgments. This phenomenon is accentuated by the large gap between
the levels of U.S. and Japanese sophistication in the understanding
of advanced weapons technology and the complexities of nuclear strategy.
Virtually all nonactive Japanese military experts and defense intellectuals
have been trained in the United States or else have honed their
analytic skills through frequent contacts with their American counter-
parts and through their reading of the pertinent American literature.
Much of the Japanese perspective on the worldwide military balance and
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two superpowers is thus
the result of continuous exposure to American views and interpretations.
Available evidence indicates that virtually all U.S. public
information of importance and relevant to the state of the U.S. -Soviet
military competition reaches Japan sooner or later through one or
another of the many existing channels. Conversations in Tokyo, con-
firmed by a review of the pertinent Japanese literature, suggest that
among this massive flow of information certain sources exert a
particularly strong influence on the Japanese elite's views and that
the number of these sources is quite limited. Among them are, not
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surprisingly, statements by the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State,
the military service chiefs, and high officers in the Pacific command.
(To a lesser extent, this is true also of the statements of their Soviet
counterparts.) Hence the annual posture statement of the Defense
Department and its State Department version are paid special attention
by Japanese officials* and experts who brief their superiors or comment
on the trend of world developments, although the political element in
such statements is recognized. To the extent that budget figures allow
a detailed analysis of U.S. military programs and their evolution,
the annual U.S. defense budget is also examined with much interest in
Japan. Such documents are usually compared with the versions of earlier
years in order to detect trends and new developments in U.S. military
estimates and strategies. Presidential speeches, interviews, and
messages are given attention primarily for indications of the future
direction of U.S. policy rather than for their value as sources of
specific information.** It is not always realized in the U.S. how
*Hence in evaluating the military strength of the nations
relevant to the security of Japan, the recent White Papers (1976 and
1977) issued by Japan's Defense Agency rely heavily on such official
U.S. assessments.
**Thus, a speech delivered in Kansas City in July 1971 by President
Nixon--and largely ignored by the U.S. public—was studied in Japan for
clues as to the meaning for Japan of the Nixon Doctrine which long puzzled
the Japanese as to its concrete implications.
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carefully Congressional debates, testimony, and reports are scrutinized
in Japan for information which may elucidate, complement -- or contra-
dict -- the data provided to the Japanese government in official U.S.
communications (including those submitted by the U.S. side in connection
with the various regularly-scheduled bilateral talks or the exchange of
intelligence information). The \/ery diversity of views and arguments
expressed in the Congressional forum enriches -- and often confuses --
Japanese interpretations of U.S. thinking.
A similar and very important role is played by the many non-
official studies and analyses prepared by a number of U.S. and other
research organizations or individual specialists on strategic problems
enjoying a high reputation in Japan. Much of the Japanese elite's
thinking about the U.S. -Soviet balance turns out to be inspired by the
International Institute of Strategic Studies' The Military Balance or
such reference works as Jane's Fighting Ships
,
Jane's All the World's
Aircraft , the SIPRI Yearbooks , the Brookings Institution's Setting
National Priorities (and related studies) and many analytical reoorts
issued by The Rand Corporation and several other U.S. research organi-
zations concerned with problems of national security and weapons tech-
nology. Nor should one underestimate the role played by a handful of
U.S. and other prestigious newspapers and periodicals in shaping the
Japanese elite's views. Traditionally, The New York Times has occupied
a special place on this short list which includes a few guality non-U. S.
papers like The Times of London and Le Monde. Pravda and Izvestia,
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although actually read by a small number of Japanese specialists,
nevertheless, in their translated form constitute imoortant sources of
information, as do the more specialized Soviet publications dealing
with military matters and world affairs. In sum, the Japanese elite
obtains its information on the state of the U.S. -Soviet competition
very much as do their American counterparts. It is only natural there-
fore that Japanese elite perceptions in that reqard often parallel the
evolution of American views.
The influence of the personal factor in shapinq Japanese per-
spectives is a considerable one. The major reasons for this have already
been referred to but bear repetition: the fact that Japan is a society
in which interpersonal relations are particularly important; conditions
where Japan today larqely lacks the information, sophistication, and
experience to evaluate many of the specific technical aspects of the
U.S. -Soviet military competition; the heavy reliance of U.S. military
power reflected in intensive interaction between the two military
establishments; the limited number of Japanese individuals engaged in
and competent to judge issues of military strategy and their conseauent
heavy reliance on information provided by U.S. sources and contacts;
and the intensive U.S. -Japanese dialogue conducted between the two
countries' political, economic, scientific and cultural elite as well
as amonq their military.
Official exchanqes of views between U.S. and Japanese aovernment
leaders, civilian and military, exert a demonstrable influence on the
views of the Japanese decisionmakers insofar as the apDraisal of the
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U.S. -Soviet balance is concerned, as the U.S. side is assumed to have
a virtual monopoly on inside technical knowledge and sophisticated
analytic capability. (This has been shown again and again in such
matters as the Japanese assessment of the significance of new weapons
4
developments like the ABM, or MIRV.) Much U.S. influence also
is exerted through informal U.S. -Japanese contacts involving private
citizens, a condition almost totally absent from Soviet-Japanese
relations. Although the Soviet Union has belatedly bequn to make
efforts to institute a dialogue with Japanese opinion leaders and
decisionmakers, this attempt is still in its early stages and is
hampered by institutional, political, and psychological barriers
between the two societies. On the other hand, the U.S. -Japanese
military alliance and its ramifications -- exchanges of personnel,
training programs, licensing and joint weapons production and the
like -- provide the Japanese side with a continuous opportunity to
gauge and be influenced by American perspectives. In recent years,
hardly a month has gone by that prominent and influential Americans
and Japanese have not met somewhere to discuss international issues
at conferences, seminars, or workshops. In many instances, it is
possible to trace back to such meetings the emergence of specific
Japanese views on issues pertinent to an evaluation o f the U.S. -Soviet
mil itary balance.
In sum, all available evidence suggests the key role of the United
States in forming Japanese perceptions of the outside world, especially
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where judgments of a military or technological nature are concerned.
Nevertheless, differences in world outlook, priorities, and policy
context do not make Japanese perspectives simple mirror images of
American views. In the following, an attempt will be made to provide
an admittedly cursory and tentative exposition of some of the more
interesting Japanese perceptions regarding major aspects of the current
state of U.S. -Soviet competition. These observations represent a
distillate of information gained from the writer's freguent personal
contacts with relevant Japanese and from a continuing examination of
the pertinent Japanese literature of the past two years.
SOME JAPANESE ELITE PERCEPTIONS
Japanese elite perceptions of the U.S. -Soviet military balance are
a composite of diverse considerations. Genuinely military judgments
enter, of course, importantly into the assessment. So do political,
economic, and technological assessments of observable developments and
trends produced by the interplay of the two big powers. But the
resulting conclusions regarding the state of the U.S. -Soviet balance
are also functions of a much broader set of considerations related to
the prevailing psychological climate in Japan, the nation's priorities
as perceived by its leaders, as well as national reactions to the
behavior of the two superpowers, factors that have been discussed
earl ier.
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Thus, judgments on the part of Japan's power elite as to "who
is ahead" or "who is advancing and who is retreating" are not the
product of a single assessment -- military, technological, economic,
or political — but the result of a combination of considerations
the elements of which are not always analytically separable. Never-
theless, it is generally possible to determine at least what kinds of
international events and developments or actions taken by the United
States of the Soviet Union have markedly affected Japanese elite per-
ceptions of the U.S. -Soviet military balance and how and why any of
their previously-held views have been modified.
The question may legitimately be raised whether it is possible at
all to generalize about the Japanese elite's perceptions of the U.S.-
Soviet balance since in Japan as in other democratic
societies the elite can presumably not be precisely defined and since
at any rate it may be expected to hold a spectrum of views on the
subject. In answer to this question it should be pointed out that this
analysis consciously confines the inquiry to those Japanese circles
making up the country's power elite and to those who by virtue of their
professional functions have direct influence on it. The scope of this
study thus does not encompass the views of Japan's Socialist or Commun-
ist opposition leaders who do not directly participate in determining
Japan's foreign alignment or defense orientation. Nor does it purport
to reflect the judgments of anti-establishment activists and ideologically-
oriented intellectuals associated with the left wing of Japanese politics.
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The principal components of Japan's power elite -- the qovernment
bureaucracy, the ruling conservative political party, the leaders
of finance and business, and those professionals who as experts,
advisers and commentators have a continuing impact on the views of
Japan's leadership -- are quite homogeneous, sharing a common value
system and basic perspectives. Differences in these leaders' assess-
ments of the U.S. -Soviet military balance tend to be differences of
emphasis and degree rather than fundamental disagreements originating
for the most part in their differing professional vantage points and
areas of responsibility.
What then is the prevail ina view among the Japanes elite regarding
the present correlation of U.S. and Soviet forces operatinq on the
world scene and what changes if any do they expect in that regard in
the decades ahead? In a broad and undifferentiated way, they judqe the
United States and the Soviet Union to have reached a state of near-
parity. "Near-parity" because the United States is believed to retain
some deqree of superiority in the purely technical aspects of military
power, but this U.S. edge is thought to be rapidly becoming thinner and
thinner to the point that strategically it may no longer count for much
In essence, this state of near-parity is seen as Droducinq relatively
stable international relations, for like powerful sumo wrestlers
image frequently used to describe the situation) the superpowers are
straining to upset each other while beinq locked in a qrip that
virtually immobilizes them. Hence for the time beinq at least, the
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United States and the Soviet Union are forced to concede strategic
parity to each other. At the same time, their strength is such that
no third power is now or will be in the foreseeable future even
remotely in a position to challenge the two superpowers militarily.
In the Japanese view, these circumstances create conditions conducive
to a continuing detente in superpower relationships. In turn this
state of affairs is also considered highly desirable from the point of
view of Japan's national interest since the resulting relaxation of
tensions not only prevents a catastrophic clash of the two big powers
and their allies, but imposes limits on the scope and violence of
local military conflicts that even in an era of detente might occur
from time to time on the fringes of the two alliance systems.
If the prevailing Japanese view of the U.S. -Soviet balance shows
a lack of serious immediate concern about the implications for Japan
of the present state of U.S. -Soviet strategic relations, this does not
necessarily hold true of Japanese assessments of future developments.
It is widely believed that the long-term trend of U.S. -Soviet strategic
power ratios may hold danger for the status quo, for SALT and other
U.S. -Soviet arms agreements are not interpreted as evidence that the
Soviets have abandoned ambitions to achieve military superiority over
the United States. While it is acknowledged that many things can
change between now and the late 1980s, over the longer run trends in
the balance of forces are on the whole perceived as tending to favor
the Soviet Union.
245
What are the reasons for such Japanese views about possible
changes in the future U.S. -Soviet balance? The answer is evident
from Japanese comments on the world situation includinq those expressed
in private by members of the elite. The Japanese are simply extending
into the future the trend of world affairs of the last decade as they
see it. They see no reason to modify significantly such a projection.
The United States is judged to have had absolute superiority in all
major areas of national power perhaps as late as the 1950s. Since
then the world has witnessed a relative decline in U.S. influence, the
devolution of U.S. international commitments and responsibilities (the
Nixon Doctrine is generally referred to*, as one of the important
symptoms of this development), the Soviet attainment of military
parity or near-parity with the United States, the qradual narrowing
of the existing technological gap between the two powers at least inso-
far as military capabilities are concerned, the well advertised domestic
(socio-economic and political) difficulties the United States has been
experiencing in the past years, and a number of what are deemed to
have been American failures in international affairs -- prominently
mentioned among them, the Indochina conflict and occasionally also the
India-Pakistan War and the situation in Africa. The United States has
been unable to stem the aradual intrusion of Soviet power into regions
which once were closed to it. It is acknowledged that to extrapolate
from such trends may be misleading as trends are reversible. Yet,
is seen as a fact that the Soviet Union has advanced in a very short
span of time from a state of clear strategic inferiority to one aDproachina
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parity; that it has become a factor, politically and militarily, in
an ever-widening portion of the world. It is not so much the exist-
ing correlation of military forces that gives rise to concern, but the
momentum which appears to carry the Soviet position forward. Will this
momentum continue unabated during the next decade and if so, what will
be the results for world stability? These are the questions being
asked in Japan, not insistently as yet, but occasionally and with some
hesitation.
Specific developments or events which have given rise to such
interpretations can be ranged under four categories only two of which
are of a genuinely military nature. In the first place, there is the
guestion of superiority in sophisticated, nuclear weaponry. The Japanese
leadership continues to have great confidence in U.S. technological
capacities. At the same time, the impression has gained ground —
strongly supported by U.S. analyses circulating in Japan -- that at
least in the field of military applications, the gap has been steadily
narrowing. This process has been observed in Soviet nuclear weapons
development from its inception. The latest example, frequently
mentioned in Japan, is the issue of MIRVs. Rightly or wrongly, the
Soviet Union is believed to have progressed in this field much more
rapidly than had been anticipated in U.S. estimates so that agreements
concluded in Moscow (SALT I) and believed to have been premised on a
slower Soviet rate of MIRV development may give some advantage to the
Soviet Union. The United States is conceded superiority in tactical
nuclear weapons, but in regard to strategic nuclear weaponry the
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equilibrium is now considered a more precarious one. Japanese
strategic analysts recognize that the superior throw weight of Soviet
missiles may be a reflection of inferior Soviet technical capability
to produce more accurate weaponry, but it is also argued that the very
massiveness of the Soviet weapons could have a psychological and
political effect and, more importantly, that the Soviet Union in
seeking to give these large weapons greater accuracy could gain a
further advantage in the future. Arms control agreements may have the
effect of pushing the military competition in the direction of
qualitative rather than of quantitative improvements of weaponry,
conditions which traditionally would favor the United States, but the
rapid rate of Soviet advances in military technology is beginnning at
least in the view of some influential Japanese to cast doubt on this
assumption.
The second area of U.S. -Soviet competition, that of conventional
forces, is providing even more food for thought. It is not just the
force ratios which are shifting to the advantage of the Soviet Union,
but a major Soviet effort is successfully being made to remedy existinq
deficiencies. This is seen with regard to Soviet aviation (where the
MIG-25 is reported to have performed very well in the Middle East), but
more conspicuously with regard to Soviet naval forces. Japan being an
island nation with a navy tradition and in view of the important role
assigned to the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Japanese thinking with regard
maintaining stability in the Pacific, it is not surprisina that
issue of the steady growth and geographic advance of Soviet naval forces
248
is prominently mentioned by Japanese leaders and commentators as
dangerously increasing Soviet military capabilities and political
leverage far beyond the Soviet defense perimeter. Comments on the
Soviet tonnage increase and the gualitative improvement of the Soviet
naval forces tend to be juxtaposed with statements about the declining
number of U.S. naval craft and their growing age. A prominent U.S.
admiral's warninq that the Pacific has ceased to be an American lake
was widely taken up in Japan. In that context, the Soviet naval
exercises termed Okean II, conducted in 1975, have had a particularly
strong effect on Japanese analyses of military and foreign policy
issues, analysts of the exercise dwelling at some length on the grow-
ing dimensions and ambitiousness of the 1975 operation compared to its
1970 Dredecessor.
In a similar vein, one encounters comments about the lengthening
reach of Soviet intervention abroad. (It is this third area of arguments
pointing toward an increasing Soviet political world role at the expense
of the United States that is particularly effective with the general
public.) There is of course the case of Soviet influence in the
Indochina War which is believed to have resulted in a strengthening
of the Soviet position in the Pacific reqion; India, where a formalized
rapprochement (now questionable) with the Soviet Union could open up
a vast sub-continent and adjacent seas to Soviet influence; Africa and
the Middle East where instability and uncertainty continue to char-
acterize the situation, but where the United States is seen as conceding
249
a role to the Soviet Union in a region from which the Soviets' in-
fluence had hitherto been barred.
But Japanese doubts about the continued ability of the United
States to prevail over the Soviet Union appears to be less rooted in
t
the actual and concrete manifestations of expanding Soviet Dower than
in vague doubts about U.S. will and determination to maintain the
American world role, to stand up to Soviet pressures and to bear the
attendant economic and psychological cost. Much of what has taken
place in the world at large as well as in the United States since the
days of the Cuban missile crisis seems to be feeding Japanese doubts.
As with other Japanese perceptions about the state of the U.S. -Soviet
balance, Japanese conclusions regarding a weakening of the United
States appears to originate from American analyses and declarations
rather than from independent Japanese judgments.
It would be an exagqeration to say that the Japanese elite feels
anxiety over the future of the U.S. -Soviet balance. That is not the
case. For the moment Japan feels relatively secure in conditions of
U.S. -Soviet strategic parity and expects this state to endure at least
for the near future. Further, it is a common assumption in Japan that
so long as the United States will compete for world influence with the
USSR, the American nuclear umbrella over Japan will not be withdrawn
and aggression against Japan thus be deterred. In these circumstances,
the Japanese leadership sees no reason for immediate concern aboi
possible Soviet actions directed against Japan. This has been
250
evidenced time and again, most recently when Foreign Minister Gromyko
ended his unsuccessful mission to Tokyo (January 1976) with parting
words that could be interpreted as an implicit warning to the
Japanese government. Nor do occasional Soviet incursions into
Japanese air and sea space cause great excitement in Japan. In summing
up the situation, it would be fair to say that the Japanese elite's
perceptions about the global U.S. -Soviet military balance reveal at
this point merely the existence of a mild degree of uneasiness about
that balance's future evolution.
If the global balance of forces is judged to be as yet no cause
for immediate concern, it is also perhaps because it is perceived as a
remote issue over which Japan has at any rate little influence. This
is demonstrated by Japanese reactions to SALT and other arms control
agreements, concluded or under discussion between the United States and
the USSR. SALT has not aroused much interest in Japan. Only specialists
have examined the substantive issues involved pointing among other to
the possible relevance of future SALT agreements to the defense of
Japan insofar as questions of range limitations for offensive weapons
are concerned. Generally, SALT has been interpreted in Japan as an
understanding between the two superpowers to promote certain coinciding
interests and only symbolically as a move toward disarmament or as
evidence of an approaching end of the race for arms superiority. The
issues involved in the SALT talks are viewed essentially as global and
as transcending the range of Japanese interests. Moreover, they are
not well understood in Japan in their technical implications except by
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a few specialists. Their conclusions in turn tend to be based on U.S.
analyses and on discussions with their American counterparts. Thus,
to the extent that any critical comments are made about the SALT talks,
they repeat American warnings aqainst harboring illusions about Soviet
intentions and Soviet willingness to live up to arms agreements. Such
warnings strike a sympathetic chord among many Japanese in view of
Japan's past bitter experiences with the Russians.
The region around Japan is yery much in a state of flux providing
incentives for the superpowers as well as for China to compete and
expand their influence. Hence American and Soviet behavior and more
specifically their force deployments and demonstrations are watched in
Japan as indicators of future trends.
In that context, Okean II and the steady growth and increasing
visibility of the Soviet naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
are read as reflections of Soviet ambitions. Similarly, U.S. deploy-
ments and the extent to which the once predominant American role is
being maintained in the region are interpreted not only as directly
relevant to the security of the area from Soviet pressures and in-
fluence, but by implication also as measures of American will and
determination in a worldwide frame. Thus, while U.S. pledges to
continue to maintain forces and interest in Korea had an important
positive effect on Japanese assessments, the U.S. plan to withdraw
forces has again raised questions in the Japanese mind regarding U.S.
reflections in the Pacific reqion.
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SOME IMPLICATIONS
In conclusion, a few observations are in order regarding the
implications of Japanese elite perceptions of the U.S. -Soviet
military balance. In the first place, the Japanese show little
concern about the global aspects of the issue which to them is one
involving essentially only the two major players. While their interest
certainly lies in preventing this global balance from being destroyed,
they feel impotent to do much to sustain it. They view the Soviet
Union as having made great strides in recent years, militarily,
technologically, and perhaps even politically (although clearly not
economically) toward superpower status rivaling that of the United
States which is seen as having meanwhile entered a period, temporarily,
perhaps, of relative decline. There remains in Japan strong confidence
in U.S. technological superiority and in American capacity to maintain
the material foundations required for competition with the Soviet Union
on at least equal terms. But one notes also some uneasiness about the
future. That uneasiness stems from perceptions of weakening U.S.
determination to carry on the competition, an aspect of power of which
the Soviet Union is thought to have ample supplies. These perceptions
may be responsible for a delicate change that has occurred in the
thinking of what is still a minority among the Japanese elite with
regard to the optimum way of ensuring Japan's national security. The
need for maintaining the American alliance is acknowledged by them as
strongly as ever. But one notes incipient support for the concept of
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supplementary security guarantees for Japan includinq Soviet partici-
pation in such an arrangement -- a concept, incidentally, that in the
past found advocates only among the opposition Socialists.
Evidence regarding the impact on Japanese perceptions of demon-
strations of U.S. power through weapons demonstrations, space exploits
and other technical feats is contradictory. But Japanese assessments
of U.S. strength are certainly affected in a significant way by the
regional role of the United States in the Pacific. The importance of
the Seventh Fleet as an indicator of American intentions has already
been suggested. Its withdrawal or drastic reduction if undertaken in
a global context favorable to the Soviet Union would likely be taken
by the Japanese leadership as a significant signal that the regional
balance was in the process of shifting due to declining U.S. determination
Such a development could prompt not only a reappraisal of Japanese con-
clusions regarding the state of the U. S. -Soviet mil itary balance, but
consequences also could be felt in Japanese national security policies.
It could lead to a reopening of the internal debate reqardinq the limits
of self defense and the desirability of building indigenous deterrent
power. In addition, one needs to emphasize once more the enormous
influence of the U.S. self-view on Japanese perceptions of the U.S.-
Soviet balance: to what extent this balance appears to the
Japanese elite to tilt in favor of the United States or the Soviet
Union is to a considerable extent a function of the way the United
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1. For a detailed analysis of thses issues, see the writer's
Japanese National Security Policy—Domestic Determinants , R-1030-
ISA (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, June 1972).
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CHAPTER NINE





Many argue that military force is too narrow a conceptual base
for power status. It cannot be denied that mineral resources, prod-
uctivity and productive capability, national character, and many
other elements traditionally identified as innredients in power rankinq
are relevant in influencing world affairs. Yet, ultimately, in the
face of China's population, Japan's economic vitality, mineral and
other resources in many of the world's weakest states, and a very poor
*We are deeply orateful for the conceptual assistance of Gerald
Sullivan (then of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Aqency) and our
colleague, Paul A. Jureidini; for help by our colleagues Phillip P. Katz
and Edward E. Azar (also with the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill and the Center for Advanced Research, ChaDel Hill, NC) in developinq
a codebook; and for the invaluable support of Suhaila Haddad (Library of
Congress) and Ed Azar, respectively, in codinq and analysis of the data.
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correlation between geography and power status, perceived military
capability seems still to eguate most closely with power or influence.
The Soviet Union is an excellent case in point. While it is not the
economic or technological equal of the United States, most analysts
have since World War II accepted that it and the United States together
-- beinq the world's military superpowers -- dominate the international
system.
One regional subsystem in which both the United States and the
Soviet Union have important interests is the Middle East. Indeed,
the salience of superpower interests, investments, and commitment com-
bined with intra-regional conflicts have made this area the most
explosive in the world. It is a region for which the superpowers have
shown themselves willing to expend considerable resources -- including
potentially coercive resources such as military force -- to influence
the views of the local actors.
STUDY PURPOSE AND METHOD
The purpose of this study is to consider Arab Derceptions of the
Mideast superpower regional balance as these are reflected in Arab news-
papers between 1965 and 1975. Two newspapers served as sources of data
for the entire period with an additional two consulted when gathering
data for 1975. The former are al -Ahram , a semi-official Cairo daily,
representing the Egyptian regime, and an-Mahar , the most important
Beirut daily, highly-regarded as independent in its editorial policies.
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The latter are al-Hayat
, a Beirut daily representing the Saudi
perspective, and ash-Sharq
, a small daily, also published in Beirut
but reflecting the Syrian viewpoint.
Content analysis was employed in order to gather data from these
sources. It is a research method which aims at objective, quantitative,
and systematic description of communications content. Although in-
numerable systems of content analysis vary markedly depending upon
objectives, all must enable different coders to arrive at similar
coding decisions on the same material, must organize content into dis-
crete categories of which statistical analyses are possible, and must
explicitly posit criteria for treatment of content. Detailed coding
rules and procedures were developed and assembled together in what
was termed the FACES codebook (i.e., Codebook for the Force Assessment
Content/Events Data System ). It is suffice to say here that the unit
of analysis was an article or article seqment discussing superpower
military force events which occured in or affected the areas from
Morocco on the West to Iran on the east and from Turkey on the north to
Oman on the south. These events included but were not limited to: the
conclusion of defense aqreements; agreements on, implementation of, or
other developments concerning arms transfers or arms control; weapons
systems developments and performance characteristics; advanced tech-
noloqy breakthrouqhs with potential military relevance; force deDloy-
ments (includinq new weapons or additional manpower); the establishment,
expansion, reduction, termination, or change in terms of reference of
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military missions in countries near or in the Middle East area;
maneuvers and exercises; visits to these countries of armed forces,
ships, aircraft, or personnel; military (naval) operations in times
of crisis; policy decisions or statements by the executive or legis-
4
lative branches relating to defense policy within the legislative
branch.
Resources were inadequate to collect data systematically across
one or more newspapers for the entire 1965 through 1975 time frame.
Data-gathering was restricted to those issues published during time
periods when superpower military force events (such as those described
above) either occurred in the Middle East or, if outside the area, were
of such a magnitude that they might well be expected to influence
regional perceptions. These were specifically selected with the in-
tent that the various types of U.S. -Soviet military force events should
be represented, preferably by more than one example. Other than super-
power ship visits, military maneuvers, exercises, and non-crisis deploy-
ments (mentioned nearly 290 times in the papers consulted), there were
over 200 events (including crises and associated deployments) which
guided the selection of dates with the majority in 1970 and beyond.
Obvious examples were the June War, the Yom Kippur War, the 1970
Jordanian crisis, and the Lebanese civil war. Others included the
signing of the Nuclear Nonprol iferation Treaty, the Czech invasion,
the announcement of the Guam doctrine, the opening of SALT discussions,
and the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt.
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DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
A number of hypotheses were developed against which to test the
data gathered. Their development and the order of their presentation
reflect the categorization of superpower military force events con-
tained in the FACES codebook. These hypotheses appear below:
I. Symbolic force events in the Middle East are not related by
the media to either the local superpower balance or to the superpowers'
local capabilities.
II. U.S. weapons are generally considered superior in design and
quality control to Soviet weapons of the same type. Exceptions are some
SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems, ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles),
and the Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle. (The weapons were widely used by the
Arabs and have been generally reported by the Western media to be highly
regarded by the Arab forces using them.)
III. Foreign military missions are not considered as factors
influencing either local superpower military capabilities or the regional
balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
IV. The Arab press does not relate weapons researched develop-
ment (R&D) to the local military balance or to the local superpower
military capabilities.
V. Arab media are not in a position to determine the time 1 aq
between research/breakthrough and deployment. Consequently, thesi
lags are not related by the Arab press to the local military balance
between U.S. and Soviet forces.
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VI. On the other hand, deployments of new systems are seen by
the media to affect both American and Soviet capabilities and the
regional balance of their forces.
VII. Middle East military facilities under the control of the
United States and the U.S.S.R. are related by Arab media both to U.S.
and Soviet regional capabilities and to the force balance.
VIII. Deployments, exercises, and maneuvers of forces in non-
crisis periods are not associated by Arab media to military readiness
and therefore are not associated with the local U.S. -Soviet balance.
The contrary is true during crisis periods.
IX. Superpower airlift/sealift capabilities are seen to directly
affect the local superpower balance.
X. Middle East elites believe the United States and the Soviet
Union are in a position of global strategic stand-off. They do not
follow the details of new strategic weapons developments, but assume a
mutual deterrence capability both globally and regionally.
FINDINGS
I. Symbolic force events are not related by the media to the local
superpower balance or to the superpowers' local capabilities .
None of the 143 visits, -- which are symbolic force events -- or
40 games, maneuvers, and exercises -- many of which are also symbolic
events -- was identified as having any effect on the regional military
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only two of
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the 155 other deployments were considered to influence the balance.
Thus, Table 9.1 indicates that the Arab newspapers do not equate
symbolic force events for critical developments affecting the balance.
Similarly, symbolic force events are not perceived to have an
affect on local superpower military capabilities. Unlike the balance
issue, local capabilities could conceivably be affected by visits,
maneuvers, and the like. Nevertheless, none of the 143 visit observa-
tions or the 40 observations relating to maneuvers, games, and exercises
was stated by the newspapers to be likely to affect U.S. or Soviet
capabilities. Somewhat surprisingly, only one of the other 155 deploy-
ments was expected to have such an effect, according to the newspapers.
Table 9.2 summarizes the data.
II. U.S. weapons are generally considered superior in design and
quality control to Soviet weapons of the same type. Exceptions are
some SAM systems, ATGMs, and the Kalashnikov .
The media do not seem to assume consistently U.S. weapons
superiority, but, in
general, the United States is considered to enjoy an overall technology
9
lead over the Soviet Union, and this lead ramifies predictably on
certain areas of complex weapons systems such as, for example, aircraft,
where even the MIG-23 is considered inferior to many Western aircraft.
However, in two areas -- air defense systems and ATGMs -- the
volume of newspaper data suggests Soviet weapons superiority,
there is relatively little discussion of artillery, Soviet equipment was
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also considered superior in that field. Soviet SAMs received
particularly abundant laudatory newspaper attention. Interestingly
enough, the Arab press totally disregarded that Soviet SAM systems
had a s/ery low kill rate in the Yom Kippur War and that newer ECM and
better tactics later in the war further reduced SAM-inflicted Israeli
aircraft losses. See Tables 9.3 and 9.4.
III. Foreign military missions are not considered as factors
influencing either local superpower military capabilities or the regional
balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R .
Of the 25 observations addressing the subject of military missions,
not one suggests any of the missions is likely to affect the military
capabilities of either the United States or the U.S.S.R. In reality,
however, the large-scale Soviet military training in Egypt did result
in altering local Soviet military reconnaissance capabilities to surveil
the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Moreover, the availability of Egyptian ports
materially increased the flexibility of the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron. Eqyptian facilities supportinq these activities, while not
technically a part of the mission's role, were provided in exchanqe for
the Soviet training effort. In this context, two of the articles
(3 percent) indicated that the military missions concerned did affect
the local superpower military balance.
IV. The Arab press does not perceive a relationship between
weapons research and development (R&D) and the local military balance
or regional American and Soviet military capabilities .
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U.S. 105 73,222 51 (47%) 43 (41%) 52 (50%)
I.S.S.R. 59 16,267 29 (49%) 8 (14%) 34 (58%)
uperpovers 17 6,770 (0%) 2 (12%) 12 (71%)
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The media do not give credence to the importance of weapons
research with respect to the local force balance of the superpowers,
since none of the 149 relevant observations posited any such effect.
Counter-intuitively, neither did the Arab newspapers have a sinqle
observation dealing with weapons R&D that stated a likely impact on the
regional military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union.
We had expected coverage of Soviet naval carrier procurement or con-
struction of Western aircraft to demonstrate such an effect.
Weapons R&D events were seen to affect the military balance
between regional powers rarely (2.6 percent of the observations dealing
with weapons development and performance), and the global U.S. -Soviet
balance seldom (but less infrequently -- 12.8 percent of the observations)
V. Arab media are not in a position to determine the time laos
between research/breakthrough and deployment. Consequently, these lags
are not related by the Arab press to the local military balance between
U.S. and Soviet forces .
With the recognition given time lags between weapons research,
development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and actual deployment, it
is hardly surprising that none of the observations in which time lags
were considered suggested that the reported event would have an impac
on the local force balance between the United States and the Soviet
Union. See Table 9.5.
VI. On the other hand, deployments of new systems are seen by the
media to affect both American and Soviet capabilities and the regional
balance of their forces.
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Effect of RDT&E Time Lags













Test 177 17A 5 3
Develop 35 25 2 10 1
Deploy 18 15 5 3









1 signifies that the stated impact is on the local superpower force balance.
2 signifies that the stated impact is on local superpower military capabilities,
3 signifies that the stated impact is on the global military balance.
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New weapons systems deployed to local units of U.S. and Soviet
military forces attract considerable media attention but are not
perceived to have much effect. Of the 117 deployments of new weapons
systems to superpower forces in the Middle East area, only one -- i.e.,
less than one percent -- was expected to affect the U.S. -Soviet regional
balance. See Table 9.6.
VII. Middle East military facilities under the control of the
United States and the U.S.S.R. are related by Arab media both to U.S.
and Soviet regional capabilities and to the force balance .
Bases in the Middle East are not seen to play a critical role in
the local politico-military situation. Only 1.25 percent of the 160
bases observations indicated that the event would affect the local
military balance of the superpowers, and none of the observations on
this subject projected an impact on the military capabilities of the
United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area.
VIII. Deployments, exercises, and maneuvers of forces in non-
crisis periods are not associated by Arab media with the local U.S. -
Soviet balance. The contrary is true during crisis periods .
Surprisingly, exercises and maneuvers do not seem to attract much
more attention in crisis than in non-crisis periods. They receive
2 2
slightly more space in non-crisis periods (61.2 cm to 51.6 cm ) and
are almost three times as frequently covered. (See Table 9.7.) Althouqh
the relative rarity of crises (even in the Middle East) is greater than
this, one must consider the fact that the articles were selected to
focus on such periods as the June and October Wars.
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New Systems Deployments and Effects
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Exercises, Maneuvers, and Deployments
Crisis j Non-Crisis
Activity Obs. Space (cm ) Obs. Space (cm )
Exercises & Maneuvers 9 464 32 1,957
Deployments 90 10,749 63 5,758






However, clearly crisis deployments attract media attention.
Almost 60 percent of the deployments recorded occurred during crisis
periods. The size of these articles was 31 percent greater than that
of non-crisis deployments.
As a whole, 51 percent of the observations were related to crisis,
and 59 percent of the space was devoted to crisis-coincident observations.
Predictably, also, while only 20 percent of the editorials on the
subjects were written for crisis-related or -coincident observations,
75 percent of the banner headlines on this theme accompanied deploy-
ments and other movements during crisis.
Of the 95 non-crisis observations of force movements, 32 dealt
with exercises and maneuvers. None of these observations was related
by the media to the global or local superpower force balances.
Surprisingly, none of the 90 crisis deployments observations was
explicitly stated to have an expected effect on the military balances
at the global level
.
No deployments to forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, or
other nearby areas during crisis (n = 72) were perceived to affect the
regional U.S. -Soviet force balance. Surprisingly -- and quite counter-
intuitively -- one non-crisis observation was perceived to have such
effects. (See Table 9.3.)
IX. Superpower airli ft/seal i ft capabilities are seen to directly
affect the local balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
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Table 9.8
Effects of Force Movements
Effects on Local




Activities dealing with airlift and sealift capabilities and
operations in our data population were expected by the media to affect
only local military balances between regional states (8.2 percent of
the 49 observations). Indeed, U.S. -Soviet airlift/sealift was the
second most important category in terms of perceived impact on the
local military situation (principally, the Arab-Israeli conflict). We
were surprised that the media did not address the importance of air-
lift/sealift capability in the global strategic balance, since Western
media discuss the subject frequently, nor was any effect seen on the
regional force balance of the superpowers.
X. Middle East elites believe the United States and the Soviet
Union are in a position of global strategic stand-off. They do not
follow the details of new weapons developments, but assume a mutual
deterrence capability both globally and regionally .
The analysis of Arabic newspapers suggests that this hypothesis is
valid. We have elsewhere written of this Derception of global strategic
3
standoff and its implications. We found no suggestion that any news-
paper saw either superpower as having a decisive edge in military cap-
abilities. Substantial awareness of and interest in events that are
viewed as affecting the local balances of power between Arab countries
and between the Arab states and Israel are not reflected in local
superpower capabilities or in the regional global balance of U.S. and
Soviet forces. Table 9.9 demonstrates this limited concern.
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Breakthroughs 167 0.0 0.0 2 1.2
Airlift/sealift 49 0.Q
_0 0.0 JO 0.0
563 2 Q.4 2 0.4 81 14.4
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Another way of viewing the small proportion of events expected to
have an impact on the U.S. -Soviet balance is that only 15.2 percent of
all events dealing with these subject areas were perceived likely to
have an effect on either the global or local superpower balance or
regional military capabilities of the United States or Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, over 11 percent of military assistance and sales observations
posited some influence on local military balances between regional states.
The different levels of effect suggest that conflict salience
dictates perceived effect. Although Arab media pay some attention
to weapons systems developments, and the like, many articles suggest
that the Arabs see the global rivalry as balanced, at least in the sense
of a deterrent level of mutual assured destruction. Local superpower
capabilities and the local U.S. -Soviet balance seem to have little
salience because a local superpower conflict is expected to become a
global one, and because the local U.S. and Soviet forces are seen to
have symbolic ("trigger") rather than military importance in terms of
their contribution to the local problems that preoccupy elite analysts.
In other words, the Soviet-American military equation is simply not
viewed as a local balance, and both forces are seen to have already
the level of capabilities necessary to accomplish regional functions,
including deterring the other from intervention. By contrast, many
events are seen to affect the local balance between regional countries
and the global U.S. -Soviet balance.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Arab media are not very attentive to the details of the U.S.-
Soviet military balance in the Middle East. The impact of deployments
of personnel and weapons, of weapon technology developments, of security
assistance and military sales, and of airlift and seal i ft capability,
for example, is not believe to significantly alter or affect the
regional superpower balance or even the capabilities of local American
or Soviet forces. The inattentiveness suggests that the Arabs do
not focus on regional power, probably because they feel each superpower's
forces deter the forces of the other from intervention in the Middle
East.
We are left with the ambivalent observation that although the
individual elements contributing to or detracting from U.S. and Soviet
local power are not important to the regional audiences both Washington
and Moscow seek to influence, the aggregate of regional power -- credible
deterrence through symbolic presence -- is vitally important to them.
Hence, the psychological elements of credibility may be far more
critical to influence than factors concerning military readiness.
NOTES
1. The codebook gives a thorough explanation of procedures and
requirements. Edward E. Azar, Suhaila Hadd, and R. D. McLaurin,
Assessment of the Impact of Military Force: Codebook for the Force
Assessment Content/Events Data System (FACES ) (Alexandria, VA: Abbott
Associates, Inc., 1976).
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2. See R. D. McLaurin, "The Soviet-American Strategic Balance:
Arab Elite Views," International Interactions , III, no. 3 (1977),
pp. 236-237.
3. R. D. McLaurin with Suhaila Haddad, The Political Impact of
4
U.S. Military Force in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American






This chapter highlights and draws together findings on issues
addressed in two or more chapters of part two. While all the conclusions
are subject to further investigation and refinement, they provide
initial insights and can be useful when formulating hypotheses in future
studies.
Issue one: Which superpower is "presently"* perceived as ahead in
overall military capabilities or in overall strategic nuclear strength?
Agreement was not entirely uniform for either balance. On the one
hand, a majority of British, French, and West German public opinion
believed the Soviets to be equal or ahead in total military strength
with the greater bulk of opinion leaning toward Soviet superiority. The
Japanese elite, on the other, perceived the Americans in possession of
a very narrow lead.
*The quotation marks reflect the fact that the final cut-o1
in the time period covered in each chapter fluctuated from the end of
1974 to mid-1977.
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As for the strategic nuclear area, the Americans who expressed
an opinion differed on the standing of the superpowers, but the Soviets,
the French of Defense National
e
, and the Arab media generally believed
them to be equal. The Japanese elite were concerned that a faster-than-
expected rate of Soviet MIRV development may have given some advanatage
to the Soviet Union.
Issue two: How do the superpowers "presently" compare in the other
balances covered in part two?
Of the remaining balances, the United States was generally
accepted as the leader in tactical nuclear weapons by the Japanese
elite, in military- technology by the Japanese and the Arab media, and
in strategic bombs and warheads, ballistic missile submarines, and
strategic aviation by the French journal authors. These last also
rated it superior or equal in naval power and equal to the Soviet Union
in strategic missiles. If one includes NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional or
ground forces comparisons, the Soviets viewed both groups as essentially




Issue three: Have recent shifts in perceived strength favored the
United States?
Recent shifts have not. This conclusion applies to Soviet, British,
French, West German, Japanese, and, for the most part, American views of
the overall military or strategic nulcear balances, Japanese elite views
of the military-technological balance, and French journal views of the
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strategic missile and naval balances. In each of these areas, the
momemtum was perceived to favor the Soviet Union.
Issue four: How were the United States and Soviet Union rated
in overall power (consisting of economic, political, scientific as
well as military factors)?
The United States was perceived as superior by British, French,
and West German public opinion as well as by the Japanese elite, but
not by the Soviets, who felt that the "correlation of world forces"
(which includes additional factors such as the ideological) had shifted
in 1969 or 1970 to where they were now equal. Soviet spokesmen did
acknowledge that the most significant factor affecting the change in
the overall correlation was achievement of strategic parity. One
implication is that they weighed the military-strategic factor more
heavily than did the British, French, Germans, or Japanese, who seem
in turn to have given more weight to economics.
Issue five: When the United States was the preferred superpower
ally, did this preference carry through to a preference for U.S. strategic
nuclear superiority?
The case studies dealing with British, French, and West German
public opinion and with Japanese elite views established that, while
these observers did prefer the United States, they also preferred
superpower strategic nuclear equality rather than American superiori
They believed that international stability was thereby enhanced.
Issue six: What were the perceived prospects of superpower
confl ict?
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The prospects of such conflict were assessed as low by American
spokesmen, Western European and Japanese elites and, by implication,
the Arabs. The Soviets also saw the prospects of war decreasing due
to strategic equality causing "sober-minded" circles in the United
States to realize the futility of war.
Issue seven: What was the perceived relation between the global
strategic balance and local or regional superpower balances?
Japanese and Arab observers viewed the global strategic nuclear
balance as overriding the local or regional superpower balance. In
their minds, the global balance set limits on superpower activities
in regional areas. In the Japanese case, however^ U. S. efforts to
maintain the local balance were seen as important indicators of U.S.
resolve to stand up to the Soviets.
Preferences for strategic nuclear equality by the British, French,
and West German publics, on the assumption that stability was thereby
enhanced, imply that they also may have seen "strategic override"
applying to their areas. Many of the Defense National
e
authors
seemed to be as sensitive as the Japanese about maintaining a local
balance when they recommended that, with the advent of strategic
equality, the Western alliance should increase its flexible response
capabilities.
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Issue eight: What role did American sources play in shaping
foreign perceptions?
The Soviet, Defense Nationale
, and Japanese studies clearly
established that U.S. spokesmen (with Government spokesmen being
prominent) played a pivotal role in shaping perceptions abroad. They
were a chief source of information relied on by observers who either
desired to know more of the balances or (as with the Soviets) wished to
offer proof that strategic parity had become an accepted "fact."
Issue nine: Do military demonstrations, space exploits, and
activities such as games, maneuvers, exercises, and deployments trigger
thinking about the balances?
This is a very complex issue, and what evidence is available
suggests that the impact of these activities is highly
uncertain. The Arab study noted that symbolic force events such as
military visits, exercises, and deployments, even in crises, attracted
much media attention but had almost no visible impact whatsoever on
views relating to the local balance. The Japanese study concluded that
the evidence was contradictory, but it also pointed out that the steady
growth and geographic advances of Soviet naval forces and their cor
of large naval exercises such as the 1975 OKEAN maneuvers did contribute
to Japanese misgivings about trends in the military balance,
that the U.S. Seventh Fleet deployments to the Western Paci
willingness to station troops in Korea were important for all
such misgivings.
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Issue ten: To what extent did the perceivers tend to think
in terms of numerical comparisons of superpower military strength?
The USSR study indicates that the Soviets avoid numerical com-
parisons as a matter of course. In contrast, French journal authors
relied on them over 40 percent of the time if one discounts the overall
strategic nuclear and conventional or ground forces balances. The low
reliance on quantitative measures for the former balance reflects the
oft-stated French belief (shared by some American and Soviet spokesmen)
that overall strategic inventory totals have lost their significance
due to the "balance of terror." It is generally felt that both sides
have more than enough.
Issue eleven: Was any connection evident between views of the balance
and willingness to support defense spending or
efforts to increase military capabilities?
The findings on this issue sugqest a connection. It is clear that
the Soviets are yery pleased to be accepted as the military and strategic
equal of the United States. They are also pleased with the impact, as
they see it, of this equality on aspects of U.S. foreign and military
policy—particularly American willingness to accept the Soviet Union as
a co-equal world actor and American caution on issues which could lead
to confrontation. As a consequence, they seem determined to do what is
necessary to insure that the Soviet Union remains at least equal. Indeed,
while some Soviet spokesmen question the value of seeking superiority in
the face of mutual assured destruction, the official line remains that




As for the American spokesmen, those viewing strategic trends as
unfavorable urged U.S. efforts to insure eguality while their more
confident colleagues, i.e., those perceiving mutual assured destruction,
cautioned against over-concentration on maintaining strict weapons
parity. They feared that such concentration would be at the expense
of other important areas affecting U.S. security ranging
from nuclear terrorism to Third World needs.
Coincident with perceived superpower strategic eguality, many
French journal authors encouraged France or Western Europe to develop
a force de frappe . Some encouraged the NATO alliance to increase its
flexible response capability. The force de frappe recommendations
were linked to one or -two beliefs. The first was that, with parity,
France or Western Europe could no longer rely on the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. The second was that the commanding lead held jointly by
both the United States and Soviet Union in strategic power could
result in a superpower condominium, a situation to be obviated
by development of French or Western European nuclear capabilities.
The flexible response recommendation reflected the obvious concern
that, in a situation of nuclear stand-off, the Western alliance had
to be better prepared to meet threats at lower levels.
While uneasy about military and strategic trends, the Japanese
elite felt themselves powerless to do much about it, but they did want
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the United States to continue to play a balancing role. Their fear
was that American resolve to insure military and strategic equality
was in a period of relative decline.
Finally, the case study of British, French, and West German
public opinion addressed this issue in a slightly different manner.
Focussing on the "defense burden" (defense budget/gross domestic
product) of each state over time, the study concluded that, except
for Germany, as America's perceived position in the military balance
improved, national defense burdens decreased.
Issue twelve: Did recent perceived shifts in some balances
away from U.S. favor result in recommendations that one should
thereby seek accommodations with the Soviets?
Even though many French authors perceived some trends in a manner
unfavorable to the United States, none recommended that France should
as a result increase its ties with the Soviet Union. The same con-
clusion generally but not totally applies to the Japanese elite.
While as a whole it favored continued maintenance of the American
alliance, there is incipient support among some members for supplemental
security guarantees involving the USSR. Interestingly enough, Soviet
observers felt that the Americans did move toward closer accommodation
with onset of strategic parity, and recommendations by some American
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